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Introduction.
In popular thought
,
philosophy has little value.
Its speculations are conceived to "be far removed from
the practical interests of human life. Philosophy may
serve as a mental discipline , hut , as Lotze said,"The
continual sharpening of the knife becomes tiresome ,if,
after all, we have nothing to cut wiht it . "Science , it is
claimed, produces tangible results ;but philosophy offers
no permanent contributions to the worlds thought, and
fails to further its progress. Or , in the words of Bacon,
"Like a virgin consecrated to God
,
she bears no fruit."
This depreciation , in the common mind, of the value
of philosophy , is not without some just ificat ion .Barren
disputations , in which philosophers , so called,have lost
themselves in abstractions and empty verbal forms,have
been all too numerous. Goethe,himself a philosopher
,
put
into the mouth of Mephistopheles his opinion of the
visionary speculator in these words:
-
"Ich sag es dirjein Kerl der speculirt
1st wie ein Thier,auf durrer Heide
Von einem b&ssen Gheist in Kreis geftthrt,
Und rings umher liegt schone grttne Weide."
If philosophy is to stand as the rationalising
science, it must vindicate this claim by showing itself
/

rational. This It is now able to do as in no preceding
age in history; and we may v/ith confidence affirm for
philosophy a large and growing value, both theoretical
and practical.
The theoretical value of philosophy becomes evident
in the definition of +he term itself. It is the pecu-
liar function of philosophy to interpret life: it furnish
es the theories by which the facts of life &e to be ex-
plained. "The world," says Ormand, "is through and
through experience, and through ana through rational;
and experience is inclusive of all reality." It is
the work of philosophy to give a rational meaning to
this experience, as Baldwin observes, "Philosophy must
interpret facts in a consistent theory."
Philosophy thus stands out most clearly as dis-
tinguished from common sense and science. These give
the data for philosophy. The common man and the man
of science occupy essentially the same stand-point of
observation; but their work is not. final, it is not to
be taken as literal and complete statement. It must be
re-thought, and its deeper significance made explicit.
Or, still more clearly, to follow Bowne, science has to
do with the spatial and temporal facts of experience
and their uniformities. Philosophy aims to give to

3these facts a rational interpretation.lt goes back of
the facts to find their meaning, and the cause which ur
derlies them. Physical research deals with phenomena,
t-
philosophical research undertakes to explain the fund-
mental nature of that which underlies phenomena.
Philosophy then is a reading, in a higher light, of
the facts of science. Its purpose is a rational and sys-
tematic comprehension of experience.lt stands for an
orderly but theoetical treatment of the general ques-
tions relating to the universe and to human life. It
supplies a theoretical background for the individual
sciences, -for ethics, for religion, and for other activ-
ities of civilization.
Philosophy deals, not with the sense percepts ,but
with the basal Qoncepts of life and the world; and with
the logic of events as explaining the problems of ex-
ist ence. Existence is so constituted as to come readily
unuer certain general laws of thought or subjective
principles, which go by the name of categories. These
make a kind of frame-work for both knowledge and reality.
Among these are the notions of being, cause, space, and
time. Philosophy must discuss the meaning of these forms,
in the field of thought, as well as, in the field of their

objective application , namely ,the special sciences.
The work of philosophy is not the discovery of new
f«cts, hut that of giving a new significance to facts
already discovered.lt does not create, but it estimates,
and evaluates the work of science. Experienc and science
give the data or facts, while philosophy gives their rai-
son d 1 Stre. Philosophy creates a literature and determine
standards.lt might be called the universal science. It
gives a theoretical place and significance to the sci-
ences, and seeks to intensify their practical aims. We
come here upon the practical side of philosophy.
As science relates to the practical arts, so philos-
ophy has its practical value. Science and philosophy are
necessary to each other. "The opposition of science, so
far as it is reasonable, "says Baldwin," is not an oppo-
sition to philosophy itself, but to the vagaries which, in
the name of philosophy , clothe their barrenness in the
garments of profound generalities, and scout the human
ends of utility which science aims to subserve. With these
philosophy has as little patience as science. Philosophy
has often been made the screen for the scientific char-
latan.
"
Thus, also, James, who, with approval, quotes Chester-

ton as saying , "The most practical and important thing
about a man is his view of the universe. The question is
not whether the theory of the cosmos affects matters,
but whether, in the long run, anything else affects them."
And James adds"As soon as ones purpose is the attain-
ment of the maximum of possible insight into the world
as a whole, the metaphysical puzzles become the most ur-
gent ones of all;while metaphysics means only an unusu-
ally obstinate attempt to think clearly and consistent-
ly.-
History and observation irake the prac 4 ical value
of philosophy clearly manifest. The world's great move-
ments in politics, in art, in religion, have rooted in
some form of philosophy .French democracy , with its fre-
quent and inhuman revolutions , cannot be separated, histor-
ically, from French materialism. The martial greatness of
Rome, with its stolid and stubborn conquests , reverts
back to Stoicism for its source and strength. Grecian
art, with all its human charm, was nourished in the genial
atmosphere of Platonic idealism. The rise and fall of na-
tions, says Hibben,is parallel with the rise and fall of
the philosophies of those nations. And Balfour observes,
*~
"The battles of theology are fought, beyond its frontiers.
James' "Psychology," p. 462.

It is not over purely religious controversies that the
cause of religion is lost or won. The judgements we
shall form upon its special problems are commonly set-
tled for us by our general mode of looking at the uni-
verse. "
In the long run, the problems of human life come
to be the problems of philosophy. Philosophy cannot be
divorced from practical life; for every man is a philos-
opher, and is ever asking himself the fundamental ques-
tions concerning the world,humanity , and God, as to their
source, their nature, and their destiny. His answer to
these questions will express his philosophy ; and the ef-
fect which this answer makes upon his life will be as
diverse as the character of his speculations. A man's
philosophy is simply his way of looking at the universe
and at the affairs of life.
If the world is purely matter ,mot ion ,and mechan-
ism, then man and God can be no more. Then human life
has no purpose or noble destiny, and man is without in-
spiration or worthy ambit ion. This is the outcome of a
materialistic philosophy . The agnostic may insist that
we can really know nothing beyond the mere phenomena
about us. There is no explanation to be found of the or-

igin,or the destiny of things. But the denial of the
agnostic that life is rational , will not banish the
problems that confront him;and to supinely refuse to
attempt an answer,to life's greatest interrogat ions , is
plainly to stultify intelligence, to dwarf manhood, and
to check all incentive to progress. On the other hand,
a true theistic philosophy affirms that back of all ap-
pearance is intelligence; and by this fact is explained
the order in the world. The world is discovered to be
intelligible. Our knowledge is , therefore , trust worthy,
science is possible , nature 1 s secrets unfold, spiritual
aspirations are real, and life is worth living.
In no generation better than in the present can
we measure and appreciate the practical value of philos-
ophy .During the last century, a tide of naturalism swept
over the intellectual world. It had i^s origin in a pre-
mature metaphysics, which brought with it materialistic
and atheistic tendencies whose results were disastrous.
The physical sciences , with surprising assumptions and
implicat ions, came to the fore.Broad and unwarranted
generalizations were made. The new .vine of discovery in
the natural sciences burst the bottles of ancient dog-
matic forms, and a general waste of treasured lore seem-

ed immanent . Old systems and nodes of thought gave place
to new ones, and religion itself appeared to he in peril,
Natural ism,mat erialism, commercialism, and pessimism
threatened all+hat was held, from our heritage of the
past, to be most highly prized.
But now, through a deeper insight, and a more con-
sistent philosophy , we are rapidly recovering from this
confusion. Today, all kinds of facts are welcomed and ev-
ery advance in science is held to be a universal gain.
Theories of interpretation have been imperfect ; philos-
ophy has beon deficient .With a corresponding advance
in philosophy , we have reached more satisfactory results.
Science and religion have come to amicable terms, and
there is now peace and good will among men of thought.
We have come to see that the most devastating er-
rors, that have wrought havoc among humanity , reach back
to false metaphysics for their source and defense.
?rom the low plains of sensuous philosophies , spring
those tendencies to materialism and fatalism which
blight the loftiest faiths of the individual, and par-
alyze the best endeavors of society. Only a truer type
of philosophy can displace the false, and set free the
potencies of a better faith, which shall open the paths

to permanent advance. The springs of such a philosophy,
writes Dr. Bowne,"Lie deep in epistemology and meta-
physics, subjects which seem to have no practical bear-
ing .yet out of them are the issues of intellectual and
religious life. Some harmless looking doctrine is put
forth in epistemology ,and soon there is an agnostic
chill in the air that is fatal to the highest spiritu-
al faiths of the soul; or some sensual blight and mil-
dew spread over the fair growths of our nature. Space
and time, perhaps, are made supreme laws of exist ence , and.
determinism,materialism, and atheism are already at the
door.
"
The significance of space and time in philosophy,
has never been fully recognized. Like knowledge, space and.
time constitute a central problem in philosophy. Knowl-
edge was once thought to be something which passes from
the object into the mind. So space and time have quite
generally been assumed to be the place of things and of
events, without a suspicion of their further importance.
But, as the problem of knowledge received peculiar em-
phasis through the epistemology of Kant, so his concep-
tion of space and time as apriori forms, or laws of the
mind, active in perception, but not gained by experience.
Bowne's "Personalis™, " Preface, p. IX.

has accentual ed the doctrine of the ideality of space
and time, and given to it a new emphasis.
Because of their serious implications and spec-
tral influence , space and time have "been called, in philos-
ophy, the two great intimidating phantoms. Prom the days
of Plato the idealist , down to James the pragmatist , they
have persistently confronted the philosopher as puzzles
that refused to be solved. Even Plato, though an idealist
ascribed to space a kind of being of a third class, an
existence sui generis, eternal, and indestructible, which
could not be apprehended by either thought or sense,but
only by a sort of "bastard reasoning." And Aristotle
held that space exists distinct from bodies; for , he said,
different bodies successively occupy the same space.
Yet space cannot be body, nor can it be pure object of
thought; for the latter can have no magnitude, which
space evidently possesses. With scarcely more success, the
present-day realist wrestles with space and time, and y
to their claim as peculiar and independent existences;
while the idealist of our timers rarely clear or con-
sistent in his proposed solution of the problem.
Space and time still intimidate the speculator ,and,
like Banquo's Ghost, they will not down. They appear de-

terained to remain, as outlying pre-conditions of all
experience. They refuse to vanish, or to be clearly
thought
;
while, at the same time,much "bastard reasoning''
goes on about them. We cannot view them as entities,
without becoming involved in all manner of contradic-
tions; and if ire think of them as ideal, or phenomenal,
//•e are bound to vie,-/ the whole system of experience as
also phenomenal. Just here lies the problem.
If space and time are, with common sense,held to be
substantial realities, we have by implication, the con-
ception of a world of things existing in space, and mov-
ing in time, with the materialistic tendencies vhich
necessarily accompany that view.?or when the medium in
which things are said to be placed becomes phenomenal,
manifestly, the entire world of objects must be viewed
as phenomenal only. If we remove the condition of the
existence of things, as traditionally thought , things
themselves must be considered as having some other mod;
of existence -they become phenomenal. We do not attempt
to prove the ideality of space and time; but we merely
state the problem, and suggest its far-reaching impli-
cations. We no.v pass to note more specifically what the
doctrine really is.
I<
The chief source of the papular objections to the
doctrine of the ideality of space and time is a misun-
derstanding of its positions.lt does not hold that the
ideas of space and time are innate, or apriori,in the a
sense that they are inaependent of experience. ITor does
It claim that these ideas emerge full-grown upon the
first act of conscious contact with the external woild.
They are forms of experience , and , apart from experience
they have no content or significance.
This doctrine,however, claims that the ideas of
space and time do not originate in any forms of sensa?
lion, or in any mere sequence of mental states. liore spe-
cifically, as to the idea of space. Its rise, being too
early for observation, is very obscure; but reflection
confidently affirms that the space idea cannot be gen-
erated by the mere association of sensat ions , or by any
combination of them. Nor can it be identified with them
through any mental chemistry of sensations or ideas.
Neither can it be derived from temporal elements. Any
attempted deductions of the space idea from association
have meaning simply because of their quest ion -begging
implications.
We are unable, with James, to find the space idea

arising , necessarily , with every sensation, as if the
sensations were themselves extended. The quality of vol-
ume,he says, is in every sensationjand this solves all
the thre spatial problems. This quality of volume , or" ex-
ternality , "is the original sensation of space out of
which all of our knowledge af space is woven by discrim
inat ion, association, and selection.
"
This is "bad psychology ; for the space idea is as dif-
ferent from the spatial object as the idea of a triangle
is different from the three-cornered form which goes
by that name. Moreover, we cannot entertain the notion
that the mind itself is extended, and so comes in direct
contact with physical extension , thus solving the prob-
lem of the space idea. The act of perception has no like-
ness to the thing perceived; and the thought of exten-
sion is not itself extended.
As it is the nature of the mind to react in sensa-
tion against external action, so it is the nature of the
law of the mind to interpret these sensations under the
form of space. "3pace"says Munsterberg, " is a form of its
objects, not a form of its own reality." Objects exist in
relations, we must not confuse existence in relations
with a knowledge of relations. Space relations mean noth-
(
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ing to us until the mind itself brings its objects into
these relations.
The idea of space involves not merely extension
in objects, but the relating of objects in a common space.
This synthesizing power is a mental principle which
the mind does not find in its objects, but brings to
them. The essential thing is the bringing of objects to-
gether in space relations. The origin of the idea of
space is thus found in the nature of the mind itself.
As in a painting, the mind correctly interprets the object-
ive significance of the lights and shades, so , before
they can have meaning for us, the mind must give special
significance to non-3patial sensations.
Space thus appears in a double aspect, that of a
form relating objects, and that of a result of the pro-
cess, vhich appears as a void containing co-existing things
in space relat ions. This void is not a substance, but a
synthesis of relations in thought ;and things are in
space only in the sense that to think of them at all
is to relate them spat ially. Sown e defines space as "A
law of the mind which compels it to give its objects
spatial form and relations." As Xant suggests, space ap*
pears to be a primary and apriori condition of the per-
Bojirne's "Introduction to Psychological Theory
,
"p. 153
.
t
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ception of externa.1 olDjects.lt cannot
,
therefore, "be de-
duced, though "by it alone things become external to us.
Space is empirically real, as having objective validity;
space is ideal, as having no independent existence a-
part from experience.
"Its reality, "says Lotze,"is to be found in its e
I
existence as intuition in ideating beings, not in exist-
ence as a vacuum independent of them. Its reality is not
thus diminished, but its nature is fixed. Light really
shines, although only to the eye that" perceives it. The
power of money, and the truth of mathematical lacss real-
ly exert their influence, though the first exists no-
where except in the estimation of men, the second no-
where except in the actual things to which they relate.
So space has reality , though It does not exist, but only
appears. The^that shinse embraces not only the existence
of that which exists, but also the process of that vhic/i
happens, and the validity of relations and the appearance
of phenomena. The mistake is in attributing to any one
of these the kind of reality which can belong only to
one of the others, and complaining when there is assigned
to each the place, and the particular kind of existence
possible for it. There is really nothing between things;
Lotze's "Microcosmus, " Vol. II. p. 610,
-
there is no network of sp&cial relations among objects,"
The ideality of space holds that space is a mental
product created according to mental laws. That the no-
tion of space is called into activity by the external
worldjbut ,like genius, it must be in the mindbefore it
can come out. However real space may be, it can be real
to us only as there is in the mind a space law or po.7-
er of giving space relations.lt is true that all ob-
jective knowledge must arise in the same way as the
space idea. So the ideality of space must be basecLjnot
upon any notion of the origin of the idea in perception;
but upon analysis -of space itself conceived as some-
thing existing apart from things.
Both the realist and the idealist accept the spa-
tial order of experience as an undeniable datum. The
question is simply as to the interpretation of what is
given in experience. That space is real, all will agree;
but what kind of reality has it? To the crude realist,
space is objective to all being, and independent of all
relations among things. If all being were away, it is
said, space would still remain; and even the fundamental
Reality must yield to this inevitable fact. But this is .
confusion of substantial and phenomenal reality; and

ends in numerous irreconcilable contradictions. The
reality of space is found to be incompatible with the
unity of fundamental Being. If space is real, it must be
infinite. The Infinite Being, Himself ,must then exist in
space, and possess bulk and form, and be made up of parts.
This view cannot be allowed.
If space is real, it cannot be a mere nothing; It
must be a thing of some sort, and have relations and
interaction vith other things. This makes space an ac-
tive thing, and contradicts the space intuition itself.
Moreover, to the idealist , space cannot be a system of
relations;for relations cannot properly be conceived
as having independent objective existence The existence
of relations depends upon the activity of some relating
mind. What is true of relations in general as operative
among things, is true of space relations. To the ideal-
ist, space is a form of intuition. Things are not in
space, nor space relations ; things are essentially non-
spatial, and by a mysterious interaction *e have .vhat $
seems to be a world of extended things in a common space.
Time, like space, expresses a unique order of re-
lations. As space relates objects, so time relates event*.
We cannot trace its origin in experience ; for it is so

early present in consciousness as to seem to have been
always there. The doctrine of the ideality of time
maintains that time, like space, is a mental form which
"becomes active through experience, and is not merely a
quality of mental states which, with their antecedence
and sequence , enter the mind from without. For time is
not a quality of these states, but a relation among them.
It must also be insisted upon that succession , or
sequence , cannot originate the idea of sequence. Succes-
sion in concsiousness , can only furnish the occasion for
the rise of the time idea; the mind itself must furnish
the idea. The ideality of time holds that, psychologi-
cally, time is a law of the mind, or intuit ion, which requires
It to connect all mental events, or experiences , under the
general order of antecedence and sequence. Time is also
the form of this synthesis of events. Time is apriori in
that It "belongs primarily to the mind. The time idea, like
that of space , becomes active through experience ; and can
have no practical significance apart from experience.
History is said, to be in time, as things are in
space. The ideality of time challenges this assertion;
and urges that time, as well as space, is phenomenal only,
and has no independent existence. Time is not a mode of
existence , but a mode of mental activity.

In the study of time, we meet peculiar difficulties
which space does not present. We are not assisted in our
conception of time, as in our thought of space, by any
proper intuit ion. When events are all thought away, there
remains nothing that the imagination can picture. It
naturally folows that all our representations of time are
images borrowed from space. As commonly conceived,
t
ims
resembles space. It is an exist ence , sui gereris,with no
necessary relation to objects; and which moves in a
steady flow forever.lt can neither be created nor anni-
hilated. To the existence of time, as to that of space,
the basal Being ,K imself,must submit. This crude realism
must be rejected;for the independent existence of time,
no more tnan triat of 3pace,can be allowed without vio-
lating the principle of the unity of Being. The notion of
the reality of time also leads to hopeless contradictions.
Of course, psychology makes it clear that we can
have no experience apart from temporal relat ions. Time
must then be a form of all experience, The contention is
only with reference to an independent time which is sup-
posed to be some sort of an exixtense in which events
occur, as space is the place of things. The idealist holds
that this notion is a fiction and a delusion resulting
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from divorcing the form of experience fro:-: experience
itself.
The ideality of time accepts time as a practical
reality with which we must deal in all of our engage-
ments in lifejbut we must not attempt to conceive of it
as a thing existing by itself. With the notion of time
as a self-subsist ing 3ubstance,difficulties abound.
There is no clear current conception as to whether time
is an existence which is standing or flowing ; whether events
flow through time, or time flows through events. If time as
a whole is st anding, then, past
,
present , and future coex-
ist; and we come upon the conception of an eternal pres-
ent, which contradicts the time idea. If we accept the
opposite view, only the present exists. ."But the present
can be merely a point of change ; and, since the past and
the future do not exist, time and thinga,as supposed to
be in time, can have no existence.
Again, we cannot rationally assign any relation be-
tween events and an independent time without making time
causal | which would be absurd, and contradict the notion
of time. Or, if time be real, yet without causal influence,
then all events must occur at the same time; for no condi-
tion would be logically wanting to prevent this result.

It thus appears that the notion of time as a substctnt ial
existence , cannot be rationally thought. The view is unclear
inconsistent , contradict ory, and absurd.
It is said,however , that we are conscious of real
time through which we have lived; and this alone is suffi-
cient to establish time as real. This simply means that
experience is temporal, which no one denies. Here ,however
,
the idealist insists that the mind itself constitutes
these relat ions. There is something in the nature of the
mind which is changeless and timeless, by means of which
it may have the knowledge of succession ; and the conception
of time itself, as of events, thus becomes timeless just
as the thought of space is without space. Time then is
merely phenomenal; and thought , inst ead of being in time,
is the founder of all temporal relat ions. Real time,so-call
ed,is only a shadow of our mental processes.
For us things are ever active and changing ;but
change does not imply time as an actual existence. Time
is but the subjective appearance of change, or the font
under which we conceive change. In the actual relations
of things, time does not enter as a reality, but only in-
to the appearance. Yet , as the form of change, time is as
real as the change itself . Change does not take time,
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The fact of dependence appears to the mind as tem-
poral antecedence and sequence. But the temporal order
of things is a product of mind, and exists only in thought.
Change is the basal fact; this founds time, Change is not
in time,and does not require timejbut time is the form
of change. Time is not, as in the common view, a pre-con-
dition of change. Change is first, and time is but its form.
This is its reality .Reality changes in passing from state
to state. Time is simply the measure of this change.
But, since there can be for us no extra-mental re-
ality, and, since to us change can occur only in things re-
lated to our intelligence, time must be understood, and,
interpret ed, from the standpoint of experience and self-
conscious intelligence. The mind constitutes its own present.
.Experience, then, is not in the present, but the present is
in experience. Time is not an independent existence, but
a function of self-conscious intelligence.lt is primari-
ly the form of individual experience, and relative to
ourselves. Time is real in experience , but its reality is
phenomenal only.
If then we ask whether space and time are real,
we must inquire what kind of reality is meant. Space
and time are valid laws for experience. All experience
tI"' t
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must have a time form, and all experience of externaliy
will involve space forms. Space and time are phenomenally
real; and no idealist vould think of questioning this
reality. But they do not lie hack of experience as independ-
pre-condit ions of experience.
The ideality of space and time then recognises their
reality as a practical , but phenomenal fact in life.
Things are in space and time, according to the standpoint
taken by the observer. Things in experience have space and
time relations , and so are in space and timejbut things
are not in space and time, as something which is inde-
pendent of experience, and would continue if experience
were away.
Experience itself implies thought, and the world be-
comes ours only as a mental activity, by immanent lavs,
constitutes it for us. There is a sense in which Kant
was right when he said we make our own world.However
real or ideal the space and time world may be, the prin-
ciple for an intelligible construction of that world must
already be in the mind. Space and time are but the forms
of our inner and outer experience. If we cancel experience,
space and time will go with it. They have their being in and
through intelligence. If space and time are ideal in^this

sense, and exist only through intelligence, it involves
the ideality of all that appears in space and time. The
world of sense exists in mind and for consciousness, e
Before we pronounce upon this doctrine as absurd,
let us reaall once more its real meaning. If we ask what
,
according to this doctrine , does really exist, the ideal-
ist would answer that we must admit the existence of o
other persons "beside ourselves. Also that the world of
apparent objects has its pract ical , though phenomenal,
existence for all other persons; so that we live in a e
common world.Moreover we are bound to vie.v the phenom-
enal world, not as merely a series of similar experiences
in similar minds, but we must look upon the objective
world as a continuous existence of some kind which is
independent of finite thought and consciousness.
But theistic idealism views both things, and the
space and time in which they are said to exist, as hav-
ing their being only in an infinite Int elligence. ToAthe
idealist, it is contradictory and absurd to attempt to
think of them as existing apart from such a cosmic Mind.
It may still be asked, if we do not really create the
world, and if it has an existence independent of the fi-
nite mind, what can it be other than the commonly con-

ceived realistic world. The difference is that material-
istic realism holds that the world has its being apart
from all thought , either finite or Infinit e ; while theistic
idealism believes that the world is dependent upon an in-
finite Mind. The difference is the difference between ma-
terialism and spiritualism. The world is then subjective,
yet it exists for all minds; it is phenomenally and sub-
stantially ideal. To the individual , the world is a practi-
cal objective fact;with which he has to do; it is no illu-
sion. It is both real and ideal.
It is objected that the ideality of space and time
differs from the vie// of common sense, and from that of
the common forms of expression. Popular thought is insist-
ent upon the claim that impressions made upon the unso-
phisticated mind must be truejand that , therefore,no phil-
osophical investigation may justly conflict with them.
The oversight is here made that while common sense
impressions are to be dealt with as true, they are not
final. They are trustworthy as far as they go, but they do
not complete the whole circle of thought. Common sense
and science occupy essentially the same plane of obser-
vation. Science, however, carries its observations
immeasurably beyond that of spontaneous thought; and
aarC *»Iio
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discovers the laws that, in conventional language
,
gov-
# ern the phenomenal facts of life. Philosophy advances
still further and undertakes to interpret the meaning of
these facts and laws. Science transcends common sense;
and philosophy , in turn , transcends science. Yet there is
no conflict among them.^or a full comprehension of ex-
perience, all are true, and all are necessary.
Science deals with the phenomenal world; while phj
losophy has to do with the causal world which lies beh.ind
it . Philosophy does not discredit the senses, hut declinles
to accept the hasty inferences which are founded upon
them. Our senses report the phenomenal world correctly, and
give us a working basis for practical life. Sense exper i-
ence deals with things as they ajpearjand the space and
time world is real in appearance. Yet every step of ad-
vance in science means one more remove from the impres -
sions of common sense.
The facts are the same for all, but the conceptionis
of science and philosophy necessarily differ from thoa a
of common sense. The chemist and the astronomer both deal
with worlds which are beyond the present grasp of the
•
man of mere sense conceptions. Philosophy , again, does nc t
discredit either, but attempts to interpret both. John

Jasper's facts were true enough, but his conclusion that
the sun moves was wrongly drawn. Space and time are real
and true for practical life. In this posit ion, common sense,
science, and philosophy agree.
But, looking at the facts, as they do, from different
points of view, their terminology necessarily varies. The
language of common life is inadequate to the proper ex-
pression of scientific thought, and the forms of "both
are insufficient to embody the subtleties of philosophy.
The common man deals with the space and time world
by the Way of intuition, the scientist, by means of exper-
iment and induct ion , and the philosopher , through reason.
Space and time are proper terms in the intuition life,
for they are forms of intuit ion. Phenomenal language
must be used in treating of phenomena. Only a pedant
would, in common conversation, speak of colors in terms
of vibration, or of the rising of the sun in phrases of
astronomical science, or of causes of change in temperature
in the language of metaphysics.
Forms of expressioruunavoidably differ, yet the space
world
and timeA remains the same. It is not the purpose of this
doctrine to despatialize or det emporalize experience.
It does not oppose the use of the imagination in picturing
-If
. I
<
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objects as occupying space and events as occurring in
time. But the ideality of space and time simply cannot
be interpreted in these terms. ITon-spatial and non-temporal
relations cannot be critically expressed in terms of the
imaginat ion ; they cannot, as the appeal to the imagination
implies, be said to appear at all. Into this realm, with
metaphysical exactness , only pure thought can enter.
How we must^lof those realities which are the ground of
all appearance, only that language whioh does not appeal
to the imagination can be used to explain.
Again , according to this view, it is said that space
and time become delusions , and, that , therefore .confidence
in the mind is thereby shaken. But we have already seen
that ,for all practical purposes, the theory that space
and time are phenomenal does not conflict with the common
view. Space and time remain the general forms of object-
ive experience ; and, in daily life, are as real as ever.
Because of a different way of conceive them, the laws
of space and time do not thereby lose their binding
force. The certainty of meeting engagements is, by this
doctrine, in no wise diminished, nor the obligation to
do so in any way extenuated. ?or every-day experience,
no one denies the universal validity of space and time.
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Phenomenally space and time relations are real, and
trustworthy;and,as such, they may be stoutly maintained.
But when we abstract them from experience, and constitute
them realities independent of experience , we pass unwit-
tingly from bald common sense into bad metaphysics. In
experience, space and time are no delusion.
Popular thought is still more confused, when It
attempts to relate mind and reality. In our spontaneous
thinking, the objective world exists apart from mind,
and independent of all thought. Our knowing seems to be
but the copying of things which exist in space and time,
and which, in appearance , would remain unaltered, if all
mind were taken away. We ascribe the origin of things to
the supreme Intelligence ;but think of them as now exist-
ing without His support. Reality, to common thought, is
practically extra-mental.
But' a deeper insight reveals to us, what, at second
thought , seems almost self-evident , that reality can have
its full existence for our minds only as it is the pro-
duct of mind, and rooted in mind. A world becomes intelli-
gible to our thought, only just so far as the laws of its
existence are paralle^with the laws of our knowing .
Extra-menta\reality is a fiction,ard cannot even be af-
firmed.Because things were not created by our thought,

they seem to "be independent of all thought. If this were
true, it would he impossible for us to know them. In the
sense that things depend on mind, subj ectivity is univer-
sal Jit includes all objectivity.
It is In order ,however , to ask the question, what
kind of reality objects do possesslDifferent parts of
the objective world may have different kinds of reality.
If space and time are no delusion,what kind of reality
must we ascribe to them!we find that Berkley's law of the
phenomenality of sense-qualities is now extended to the
entire sense world;and that all qualities of things have
only phenomenal reality. They exist only in and for the
mind. This fact does not change their nature; they are
no less significant for practical life.Because their
deeper nature is revealed, color and sound are not thereby
made delusions.
The ideality of the spatial and temporal order of
things does not render it unreal,but real only for mind.
Space and time are no less essential to our objective
and subjective experience ; and remain as determining laws
of our activity. Space and time are not final. There is
something deeper in ultimate existence upon which space
and time must rest, that is mind, a fundamental Intelli-

gence. Appearances are not denied, but appropriated by-
reason. Appearances do not delude the mind;but demand a
mind to which they may appear, and by which they may be
interpreted. The objective and the subjective unite in
one reality.
Epistemology offers another objection to this doc-
trine. It is said that in the process of knowing the
world of things, the object is external to the subject;
and that this is a necessary antithesis. The idealist is
obliged to use the term external ; and, it is claimed,he
can only mean by this that the space world is extended
outside of the subject. This is thought to be decisive
against the doctrine of the subjectivity of space and
time.
But here the body, through Athe subject acts, is
confused with the knowing subject itself. The body has
spatial relations to objects external to itself, but
this cannot be said of the mind; the mind does not come
under the spatial law. The relation between the subject
and object is a unique one. It can be experienced, but
cannot be spatially represented. The distinction of in-
ternal and external must
,
psychologically , be limited to
those experiences in knowing to which we give spatial

relations, rather than temporal relations. Put this does
not imply that objects are extra-mental ; for , in that
case, the mind could not reach them at all.
The universal element in knowing seems to require,
in some way, a common object. This can most readily "be
provided by imagining a common space with the object
for all to observe placed in the midst of the void. The
identity of the object is thus readily secured, and it
is made knowable by all.But this is a sense view, and a
cheap theory of knowledge which reflection finds inadequate.
Philosophy makes it clear that all reality is located in
thought rather than in space. Deepest reality goes back
to the divine Mind; and in Him all things consist. This
conception gives an entirely different theory of knowl-
edge; and of the unity , identity, and reality of the object
to be known. The relation between subject and object can-
not be pictured; and objective space is not necessary to
this higher conception.
But, it i £.3 said, p'-eromera car he in the mind orly;
and sense-qualities, though subjective, may yet >e relat-
ed to an objec + in s^ace. If, however, the object itself
be made phenomenal, there can remain no longer any,
reality, identi J y or community of the object, but pure
individualism alone mus 1 result.
•T =
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But, to reflective thought, the mystery o p knowledge
is deeper . Science has shown that things in the sense
world are diTferent from what they appear to he. Apart
from the hearing subject, it is insisted, there is no
sound, and, without a seeing eye, there can be no light*
Transfigured realism, as a theory of knowledge , has failed;
and the object itself must now be considered as phenom-
enal. As a matter of fact, we may affim that we have a
knowledge of an order independent of our making, and of
objects in^that order as being common to all.
How this knowledge is possible, cannot be explained.
The community of finite minds involves the fact of common
laws of knowledge; and the solution of the mystery must
be found in the plan of the Infinite Mind. We are ration-
ally bound to posit an object of knowledgejbut we can
grasp that objeet only by thought .However real, or ideal
the object, this remains true. We secure the identity of
the object, not by putting it in space,but by recognizing
it as an alement in a rational world. From this point of
view, space, time, and the world of things,may as rational-
ly be phenomenal as self-subsist ingjand the objection
from epistemology disappears.
Once more, it is obj est ed, that , according to this
t
view, the application of the space idea would become ca-
pricious and arbitrary. If the mind furnishes the space
forms, is there anything in the nature of reality itself
to determine how they shall be used? May they not be
imposed without lav upon reality? Is .there more than an
arbitrary relation between form and fact? Does the mind
alone determine the order and sequence of phenomena?
The law of causation, according to Kant, does not apply
to things in themselves.
But the fact that the forms are mental does not
determine whether the figure conceiveu shall be round
or square, a plane or a cube. If the application of forms
is allowed to be a matter of chance, the subjective ideal
ism of Fichte cannot be escaped. Experience teaches that
there is a fixed oraer in our subjective spatial and
temporal relations. They are independent of our volition
they may not be chang3d,or arbitrarily imposed at random
upon things, things are not near or far, nor events past
or future at our option.
As in the subjectivity of sense-qualities, mental
affections have an objective ground and cause, so in spac
and time experiences , ve must affirm something beyond
ourselves which determins their form. There is an objec-
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ive ground for subjective intuit ions. If we should think
of objects as impersonal finite agents,with which we are
in contact, we might say, as the sensation of color from
intuition is not an exact copying of any objective thing,
but a subjective symbol of an objective fact, so the space
intuition is but the tralslation of realities beyond us,
which, though real and independent of our control , can be
pictured to us only in space relations. As change in col-
or implies external change, so space relations are govern-
ed by la.vs and are fixed.
This gives a basis for science, and for the calcu-
not
lation of events upon which we can rely. But we must A view
objects as independent existences in interaction with
ourselves , which this statement of the case implies.
A
better view puts in the place of the impersonal agent
the Infinite Mind and Will in which we find the ground
of our space and time order. In this conception the finite
agency does not appear as an existence by itselfjbut
we have rather as our objective world the Infinite Being,
and phenomena as a manifestation of His energies. Caus-
ality must not remain as impersonal ;but must be raised
to the personal plane. As a reality, the impersonal dis-
appears, and there remains only phenomena and the In-
finite as their cause.

The experience world with space and time, in
which it appears to be located, is then phenomenal. The
whole system of objective experience is a function of
a crsative I'ind.This view constitutes space and time
the farthest possible from all illusions, or left to
finite will or chance. As factors of experience, they
remain.
The objective world, with its space and time re-
lations, is real, but real only for intelligence. The
world is the more real because dependent upon Kind.
lToumena,or an extra-mental world, are but fancy and
fiction. Beyond the thought sphere, there ia nothing
substantially or ontologically realjbut all reality
is embraced within the law and order of trie cosmic
Tind. In this Hind the phenomenal world has its deeper
and essential being. If this be accepted as true,
what bearing, if any, would this doctrine have upon
our conceptions of science ?

Chapter I.
The Significance of the Ideality of Space and
Time for Science.
Assuming, now, + hat space and time are purely
phenomenal, what relation 10 science would this view
naturally "bear? Thinking of science under this formula,
what would we i'ind? To answer this question, we must
obtain a clear conception of what we mean by science.
It is but recently that science has come to a definite
understanding with itself as to its scope and limita-
tions; and in this discovery, science has found its
greatest strength, and come into fuller possession of
its own.
Science is more and more restricting its field
of operation to experience; it is essentially exper-
imental. It deals primarily with the observation and
registration of phenomena. Science has to do with
facts rather than with theories, with the discovery of
natural laws rather than with their explanation.
Munsterberg has said, "The goal of science has been
the description of the universe by dissolving it into
atomic elements, + he explanation of it by natural laws
without regard for the meaning anu value of the worlu.
"
"Psychology u.nu Life", p.l.

8And again, in Imitation of that sort of science -vhich
proclaims its results as a kind of philosophy, he says,
"Psychology, as a science, is a special abstract con-
struction which has a right to consider everything from
its own important stand point, but which has nothing to
assert in regard to the interpretation una appreciation
of our freedom and duty- our real values and ideals."
In its own field, science has absolute rights,
which all are bound to respect. That field is in that
research after facts, and that analysis of them, which
brings to light the relations of things in experience,
and shows how they are bound together. Science proper
does not presume to instruct us as to the hidden power
which gives ultimate significance to these facts, and
their relations, in this world of experience. James,
in the Introduction to his Psychology, clearly limits
science to its legitimate field when he says, "Physics
assumes atoms, action at a istance, etc., uncritically;
and Chemistry adapts the data of Physics, and Physiology
adopts those of Chemistry. Psychology, as natural sci-
ence, deals wi-i.h things in the same partial way, leav-
ing to philosophy the test of their ulterior significance."
So also dullerton urges, in his "System of Ke 4 a-
physics", that the psychologist should limit his science

to the stuuy of mental states, and rot, as of old, go
into the metaphysics of the self; but should remain on
the plane of natural science, and, of the common under-
standing. Agair , Duncan writes, "Science is naive;
she takes things as they come, and rests content with
such practical definitions as will differentiate matter
from all other forms of non -matter. The "Ding an sich"
is forever outside the province of science. What matter
is, in itself and by itself, is qui -* e hopeless of ans-
wer, and concerns only metaphysics." (1)
Along this line the division of labor between sci-
ence and philosophy is clearly manifest, and the respect-
ive fields of their operation made apparent. As Bowne
has well expressed it, "Things hang together in certain
ways, and events come along together according to cer-
tain rules. These uniformities of coexistence and
sequence admit of being studied and discribed and reg-
istered without reference to metaphysics."
This is true alike in the physical .vorld, the
psychological world, and the social and historical
world. There is a certain order in nature. Its laws are
revealed to us in experience, and verified by us through
ex^rim ;nt . For our practical guidance in life, and
for our advancement in civilization, a knowledge of
(l) "The New Knowledge," p. 2.

theae laws is of utmost importance; and to discover and
use them is the sum of practical wisdom. This is the work
if science ; and, except in a general way, is independent
of metaphysics.
A statement upon the place of science made by Pres-
ident Maclaurin,at the recent meeting in Boston of the
American Association for the advancement of science,
and quoted in "Science"by Henry Cre.v,is worthy of being
repeated here: "We should pay more serious attention
than we usually do to the logic of science, and have
as clear ideas as possible as to what we are really
aiming at, as to what we can really expect to do and
not to dc.A little artificial stimulous toward philos-
ophy might accelerate the process.lt seems to me extreme-
ly unfortunate that men of science are still so scared
by the bogy of metaphysics. *** * We should realize, per-
haps, that a science such as Chemistry, is above all else
a work of art, and that concepts like atoms, energy, and
the like, are not much more than pigments with which we
paint our pictures." (1)
With this conception of science in mind, the bear-
ing of the ideality of space and time upon science would
be a very simple problem. The doctrine would have chiefly
a negative relation to science. This theory of space
(l)"The Debt of Physics to Metaphysial," "Science,"
Apr. 8, 1910.
f
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and time being purely a metaphysical problem, while sci-
•
j
ence deals entirely with the simple practical quest iorI
of the coexistence and sequence of facts, in experience,
the latter would he relatively unaffected by the former.
Only reinoi.xLer ing that It is dealing with phenomena anc I
not with subs tanc
e
A/ith physical rather than efficient
causes , science, within its own field, may proceed unmol«JSt -
ed by metaphysics , and may advance with its scientific pos-
tulates and experimental processes in the discovei^y artd
systematic arrangement of the phenomena of facts and
observable events , whether in the physical ,mental , or t?le
social worlds. looking at science from this view-point
- >
the practical bearing of the ideality of space and tinle
would, be simply to limit the laws of nature to the ph.6 i
nomenal world, and to free them from any metaphysical
implications.
We may say that common sense begins the work of
observat ion , which science, proper ,carries on to a higher
precision , and to a larger attainment . Science re-reads
the common knowledge concerning the contents and laws
of experience which unreflective thought has gathered,
and gives to them a wider meaning and application. Yet
science is limited to the same simple principles of
observation and trial which are used by the common mar
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only these principles are dealt with in a more thorough
manner, and methods of observation made more accurate.
But no metaphysical postulates are required, in practical
experimentat ion , to make critical discoveries in chemical
combinations , exact observations in the physical labora-
tory, or valuable calculations in the astronomical field.
In this r«aLm of physical change and combination,
science has unquestioned freedom and authority ; and in
this work no philosopher may justly intrude or interfere.
Here science has done invaluable service; and by these
simple processes of observation, registration, and induc-
tion, science has secured a mastery over nature which
has made natural science a universal benefactor , light en -
ed the burdens of humanity, and created the possibility
of an advanced civilization. In its field and function,
we cannot overestimate the value of science.
But science has not been content with these high
honors and mighty achievements. Its field is limited,
and science has seldom clearly conceived its natural
Doundaries ,and has often overstepped them. Scientists
have, in the past, quite generally stumbled out of science
proper into metaphysics.
The discovery and registration of the facts in a
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phenomenally spatial and temporal world, is, to humanity,
a great bu + only a partial service. The profounder prob-
lem of the explanation of these facts remains as yet un-
solved. This question naturally presses for an answer,
and'^scient ist is drawn into metaphysical discussion.
But science, critically speaking, cannot legitimately en-
ter this field. This realm of discussion belongs to phi-
losophy . Science discovers ana tabulates the iacts;phi-
losophy interprets them, and seeks to bring to light
their hidden source, and deeper meaning.
For the fullest satisfaction cf the human mind,
both science and philosophy are needed; and the rights
of both must be carefully guarded. They are not contra-
dictory to each other, but supplementary ; their functions
and fields, however, are to be sharply distinguished. V/e
must not confuse science as fact with science as, theory.
Where science proper leaves off, philosophy begins. But
science may be theoret ical, and yet remain within the
realm of phenomena and their physical causes . Science , as
theory ,however , too often assumes the role of philosophy.
This must be avoided, for science cannot, in any case, en-
ter into the question of efficient causation, or the
problems of substalt ial esistence.

Science as theory and explanation, must still re-
main upon the surface, and deal with the laws of change
and combination among phenomena. In the purely scientif-
ic .vorld of experience ,metaphysical theories are a mat-
ter of indifference. Any theory as to the ultimate nature
of matter, force , and motion, space or time, of atoms, ether,
or electricity , held by any scientist , need not affect
his practical experimentation. But scientific explanation
must not be mistaken for metaphysical interpretation.
Science as theory has a large and legitimate place ;but
it too often becomes a misplaced attempt to make the
observed facts intelligible in a metaphysical sense.
Too often the scientist claims to have found the suf-
ficient reason, and the efficient cause of things.He un-
dertakes to deal with productive cause , whereas his field
is limited to that of induction. This ends only in con-
fusion; the scientist stumbles out of science into meta-
physics, and counsel is darkened by words without knowl-
edge.
The natural desire for ultimate explanation even
with scientists of the present time, needs caution in
its gratification. Science should relate itself properly
to metaphysics. Upon this point , Professor Taylor of

Aberdeen, is quoted as follows; "It car. he no business
of the metaphysician to determine .vhat the course of
events will be, or to prescribe to 'he scientists what
methods and hypotheses they shall employ in the work
of such determination. With these sciences themselves
any and every hypothesis is justified, whatever its
nature, so long as it enables us, more efficiently then
any other, to perform the actual task of calculat ion.
"
Yet, he continues, "The metaphysician has rendered the
inestimable service of pointing out to the experiment
investigator the paradox that his greatest strength
lies in his confessed limitation. The essential- the
only essential point- is for us to recognize the facts,
to know ourselves, to admit our limitations^ then the
more nearly we remain inside these limitations, and
avoid'The den of the metaphysician', tne better." (1 )
And he further cautions the present-day scientists in
these trenchent words: "Each of the particular sciences
views phenomena from its own particular angle; but there
is, I fear, sometimes - often indeed- u tendency for
the 3tudent of physics to think that in measuring, say,
the inertia of a body, he is in some sense getting at
the quantity of matter in it; or to A put in another .vay,
there is often <x tendency to think that in determining
(1) "Science," Apr. 1910,

the mass, on a beam balance, he is perhaps doing something
more fundamental than merely determining inferentially
the ratio of the inertia of this body to the inertia
of some body selected as a standard; for which purpose
he has abstracted the inertia from all other properties
of the bady, and is really no nearer ^he naiiire of the
ultimate' substance ' of the body than of he had measured
its temperature or its color."
In still further emphasis of the fact that the
scientist should limit himself to science proper, and
not to fancy that he has discovered the metaphysical
nature of physical elements, we may quote the latest
prounoement of Sir Oliver Lodge upon ether: "Modern
views of electricity are that the ether of space is a
continuous, incomprehensible, stationary, fundmantal
substance, or a. perfect fluid; that matter is composted
una electrified
of modified Aef specks of minute structures of ether
which are amenable to mechanical as well as to elec-
trical force, and add to the optical and electric den-
sity of the medium; and that elastic rigidity and all
potential energy are due to an excessively fine-gretined
etherial circulation."
Upon this statement, to suggest the properly guarded
"Ether of Space", p. 151.

attitude of the scientist as to his knowledge beyond
that of phenomena, Grew comments as follows: "Leaving
matter aside and considering only the ether, what is
the net result? Practically this, that electromagnetic
disturbances, including light waves, are propagated
through space with, a speed of three hundred million
meters per second. This I conceive to be the criti-
cism which Q^LQjcy sound metaphysician, but only sjume
sound physicists vould £ass upon the present knowledge
of the ether. This is the one ijaot concerning the
ether which we know in the same sense in which we are
said to know the ordinary every day facts of physics.'
Even Galileo, in his Dialogues, recognised the
limitations of science .when , as a scientist he wrote,
"It does not appear to me worth while to investigate
the caus_es of natural motion concerning which there
are as many different ppinions as there are different
philosophers.
"
Science has a perfect right to form any and every
theory that will make the simple expectation in the
natural order of fact and event more probalt', and,
inductively, more intelligible; but these theories deal
solely with the world of experience, and are relatively
"Ji
independent of metaphysics. Science nec3d not concern
itself with causation, except in the sense of empiri-
cal conditions, which, being assumed, lead to the dis-
cevery of facts and +heir laws of coexistence and se-
quence. This is the conception of causation in daily
life; and sho; Id prevail in all induction. As Powne
makes clear, "It simply enables us to see in what order
one state of things grows out of another; but it reaches
nothing final. It gives no insight into the metaphysi-
cal world upon which the phenomenal world rests."
m9ti fry, . ^,
But the scientist frequently confounds inductive
cause -with the _undamen + al reality which underlies
and produces scientific results. Here he rakes his
most serious mistake; and forms notions and theories
about space and time, matter, force, and motion. Then
he views these as the real ontological factors which
are to explain the phenomenal world. Metaphysical
postulates enter into the discussion; and being,
cause etc., are assumed. In this way substantial
reality appears to be assured to the system which he is
trying to build.
The aim is u fair one, but the logic is false.
The whole process is superficial and fictitious. Space
r<
and time provide the field of operation, matter sup-
plies the substance, and force, with, attendant motion,
represents the causal demands. After this order,
schemes of physical metaphysics take their rise.
When science falls into this error, it needs. anew,
to be reminded that its field is quite distinct and
free from that of metaphysics, except as metaphysical
presuppositions underlie all life und experience; and,
except further, as metaphysics includes epist emology
,
und as sue' is called upon to "Orient the sciences
among themselves, criticise their foundations, their
methods, and even their conclusions inso far as their
conclusions depend upon pure logic." In the sense of
philosophy, metaphysics rounds out and corrects the
individual sciences. But this is the work of the meta-
physician; while the scientist is free ^ o advance in
his distinctive field without fear of molestation.
In dealing with matter, force, and motion, space and
time, he is untrammelled by any metaphysical implica-
tions of the terms which he may employ.
But when the scientist becomes the metaphysician,
he should prepare himself to abide by the results im-
plied in assuming that position; and he may well beware

of what Maxwell called "The den of the metaphysicain
strewed with the remains of former explorers, und ab-
horred "by every man of science." For then +he ideality
of space and time would enter in and decidedly modify
the conceptions und statements of science. If space
and time are subjective, and ideal, then, by implication
we have the complete subjectivity and phenomenal ity
of all that appears in the space and time world; and
all scientific investigations and results must then,
theoretically, be viewed from this standpoint. Space
ana tim^, as the field of operations in world building,
and matter, force, and motion, as the elements to be
used in the process, will be conceived in a very dif-
ferent manner from thai of naive common senee, or that
of practical science.
These supposedly real things of nature, to the
idealistic metaphysical scientist, now have only a
subjective or mental existence. They now have their
true being only in consciousness, and for intelligence.
The entire world of objects must be viewed as purely
phenomenal. The objective order is not changed, and
natural laws are no less to be sought out and observed;
but they can not be thought as having any meaning ex-

•cept as directly related to intelligence. And, since
:ve cannot believe that the subjective oraer is depen-
dent on our thought alone, and exits only for the fin-
ite mind, neither can ve suppose that it has its being
apart from all mind, we are bound, as theistic ideal-
ists, to hold that + he v/orla is conditioned and con-
stitute^, by some all-embracing Intelligence.
Prom this point of view, how will the scientist
be affected by trie ideality of space and time? With
the new conception of the world-field and its processes,
his terminology will be materially changed. The
facts will remain the same, but his new theory will
altar his mode of conceiving them, and they will, there-
fore, take a differen' form of expression. Just as
the language of science differs from that of common
sense, because the scientific theory modifies the
point of view; so tne terminology of metaphysics, by
necessity deviates from that of science. Science is
a new reading of the facts of common experience, meta-
physics is a new reading, or translation, of the facts
of science.
From the scientific point of view, the untrained,
rustic mind lives in a vorld of constant illusion. He
mistakes simple phenomena for substantial fact, what
(
the chemist sees in matter, or the astronomer in the
heavens, is all unrevealed to him; ana even when ex-
plained to him in the formula, of science, remains
still opaque and mysterious. Of the peculiar and ad-
vanced discoveries of science, he can have no clear
conception, ris experience, as far as it goes, is true;
but his interpretation of the facts, from a scientific
point of view, is altogether inadequate. The astron-
omical heavens are, to him, final; and matter, to him,
just what he sees it to be in the mass. To the plain
for
man, scientific terms have no meaning; yet, the expres-
4
sion of scientific thought , Ihcse terms are a necessity
Something like this holds true between science
and metaphysics. Metaphysics undertakes to go back
of scientific conceptions; and to translate the fact
of the scientific theory of natural phenomena and law
into the language of substantial realities and effic-
ient causes. To do this, the terminology of metaphysics
naturally transcends that of science, as that of science
transcends the forms of common sense. If the scientist
will be a metaphysician, he must, theoretically, speak
in the tongue of the metaphysician, or fail to express
what he see3.
(
To the metaphysical scientist, space is no longer
the vast and empty void, of ordinary conception, the
place for things, and the pre-condition of an external
world. To him, now, space must find expression as
viewed from the subjective side, and must he stated
in tems of mind and in intelligence. Space is no
longer a place but a law; it is not a thing, but a
principle, immanent in the mind, by which +he mind
relates objects in externality.
So, also, time would be conceived, not as a static,
or moving, imponderable, ether ial substance ir which
events occur; but, again, time, also, is a law of
thought, according to which facts and events appear
in coexistence, or in succession.
Or, if he is to report on the nature of matter,
the metaphysician cannot speak of mass, molecules,
and atoms, or of atoms, ether, and electrons, as if
these were actual, solid and substantial particles.
He will not represent matter as some sort of ultimate
core or mass of being in which eertain qualities and
motor-forces inhere, or have taken up their residence.
By "Jissolving the universe into atomic elements,"
science itself, has made a strong appeal to idealism;

for thus the so-called material world becomes a matter
of abstract conception wiu belief.
At first thought, it. seems but a step from this
position to that involved ir. the ideality of space
and time. It is true the reference in both is to the
mind; but in. the metaphysical view, matter is dependent
upon mind for its existence. It is also conceived and
represented not as self -exist ent solid particles or
corpuscles, with resident properties, but metaphysics
dissolves matter away into forms of energy which are
not its own, and speaks of it rather a.' a mode of ac-
tivity of ci fundamental In + elligence.
The same is true of force and motion. Self-con-
sistency in statement would require the metaphysical
scien + ist to treat a force, not as if it were some
material reality, some physical energy, independent
of mind, distributed through atoms, and producing in
bodies certain activit.es; but to him force is an ab-
straction from various forms of activity, und the i-
dealist conceives the Cctuse of this action as located,
not within any corpuscles of matter, but as centered
in a Supreme Intelligence, and the processes of nature
as some manifestation of that Intelligence. The trans-
(
ferenee of all feeing to mind, and of all activity to
an intelligent Agency, demand of the scientist, who
assumes the metaphysical ro3e, the new nomenclature
which correspondingly transcends that of both common
sense and science, In order to make it possible for
him to adequately express his conception of the rela-
tion of phenomena to the Source of Power upon which
all phenomena rest.
Another possible theoretic bearing of the ideal-
ity of space and time upon science may also be here
suggested, namely that of a uniformity ir conception
of the atom in the world of phenomenal matter. If we
accept the current view of the corpuscular form of the
atom, we find no agreement among scientists as to 4 he
correct conception of the theory. Each scientist
creates for himself a different atom according to the
nature of the facts treated. The chemist deals with
the changes of composition in matter, and builds up
his own atomic theory. With him the atoms are endowed
with certain selective forces, affinities, and powers
of change and combination.
The atom of the physicist differs from that of
the chemist. His atom is conceived as endowed wi^h

certain universal forces; and. he aeals with changes
among objects without reference to the specific compo-
sition of matter. ?or the astronomer, atoms are
chiefly centers of gravity, with the dominant assump-
tion that each attracts every other with an intensity
which varies inversely as the square of the distance,
While the mineralogist, the biologist, the physiolo-
gist, and the psychologist, may need to add new and
very different conceptions of the atom. Conceptions
which suffice in one fiela of study, may cone short
in another field; ana there is as yet no consistent
theory found which will harmonize these different
notions.
Little attention has been given to this diversity
of theory as to the structure of atoms. Without any
attempt at self-consistency , atoms have been comceived
as having all possible forms and relations from the
crude corpuscles of the Greeks, to the centers of
force of Boscovich, and the vortex-rings of Lord Kel-
vin, down to the electrotonic theory of matter which
makes the atom "A sphere of positive electrification
enclosing a number of negatively electrified corpus-
cles," As presented in The New Knowledge, these cor-
Ii
puscles or electrons, nay be a thousand times smaller
than atoms; and, it is claimed that natter is made up
of electricity, and of nothing but electricity. Dun-
can, however, closes his discussion with these signifi-
cant words: "There is a deep-seated conviction that the
universe is One. And /e must assume that matter, ether,
ana energy, are but forms of an underlying ana un-
knowable reality, or, though separated, are yet One
in some mysterious way."
Passing from this agnosticism, to idealism,
which holds that what we call material things exist
only for and in relation to Intelligence, we have at
least the theoretical possibility of a aesirable self-
consistency of view among our notions of the atom.
This metaphysical concerjtion sets aside the idea of
being as having the form of solid corpuscles ana atoms,
or of ether and energy, outside of and apart from mind.
The same is true of the notion of cause in the form
of inhering forces. It rather conceives of atoms and
of all possible manipulation of atoms, as having their
existence in and through a fundamental, conecious
Reality; and all activities of matter are thought of
as the intelligent proceedings of the one basal Being.

When considered in this way, the forms of atonic activ-
ity and all their achievements, however varied and
multitudinous, can never exceed the "boundaries of
rational supervision and control, nor occasion confu-
sion, contradiction, or alarm.
But mutter, force, and motion have not thereby
been made illusions. Though phenomenal, matter has
not disappeared from experience. It is nothowever. a
fundamental, self -existent , substance. "This world
being independent of us, r as all the continuity, uniform
ity, and obj ectivity, which an extramertal system could
have? says Towne, "and, as distinct from individual
delusion, is real and unversal." (1)
We may say that matter is posited by us as the
basis of phenomenal activity. Without phenomenal
matter, life, thought, and speech would be impossible.
"The category of substance supplies to experience,
those points of rest which are needed in order to
make its processes conceivable," says 0rmand.(2 fcpace
and time, matter and motion, must be assumed in all
inductive study and practical science. These must
be recognized and emphasized in experience, and in
scientific method. But from the view-point of the
ideality of space and time,th..iy have only phenomenal
(1) "Theory of Thought and Knowledge," p. 343.
(2) "foundations of knowledge," p. 192.
«
existence. The causality which operates among then,
must be located in a Supreme Cause behind them.
Space una time, matter ana motion, as independent
existences, are merely the substantiation - of physical
phenomena r.ade by crude thinking, and a gratuitous
use of categories which belong to another field
of thought.
(
Chapter II.
The Bearing of the Ideality of Space and
Time upon Philosophy.
Philosophy is more than 'the love of wisdom. 'In a
technical sense, the ideal aim of philosophy i« a ration-
al comprehension of all reality, it accepts from science
ready-made material, and then, passing "beyond the purely
scientific classification of facta, it attempts their
rational interpretation. Philosophy seeks, not proximate,
but ultimate r ealit ies ;not how one fact exlpains another
fact, but how each fact of experience fits into a scheme
or system of the whole. Its aim is to systematiae, ra-
tional ize,anoy.iarmoniz3 all known facts concerning the
nature of the world, of man, and of Goci.
The nature and order of "being, is the ultimate aim
of philosophy ; but , since philosophy is rational, this
aim will involve also a theory of knowing. The problems
of philosophy then include "both epistemology and met-
aphysics. The whole fiela of speculation is covered "by
a theory of thought, and a theory of reality. The questions
that will determine more than any others the direction of
our philosophy will take, are, in epistemology, whether our

knowing process is conceived as active, or as passive,*
has the mind within itself controling laws of thought -
or is knowledge a mere reflection of objects in a pass-
ive consciousness ;ana, in metaphysics , whether fundamen-
tal being is conceived as intelligent , or as unintelli-
gent ,as having will and purpose, or as purely mechani-
cal. These theories have their various implications and
mutually influence one another. Logically , the passivity
of knowing accompanies the mechanical theory of being;
While knowing, as an active process, is an implication of
the view that fundamental existence is intelligent.
Epistemology and metaphysics are but aspects of
philosophy , since, as rational, it must use gome theory
of thought as its instrument. We have then, in philosophy,
two forms of the thought process which includes , logic
,
as the lavs of pure thought, and epistemology , as these
laws applied to knowledge, and also metaphysics which
seeks through thought, for final conceptions concerning
ultimate reality. By nature
,
philosophy is theoretical,
yet out of its theories come, not only theoretical con-
clusions, but also those principles vhich determine
the xjractical issues of life and death.
Assuming the ideality of space and time, what
I»
"bearing has this view upon, first , cpistemology. As W9 have
seen, a primary application of the doctrine is the phenome-
nally of the entire world of obj ects.This would involve
the conception that the .vhole system of material things
exists only for mind, and in relation to mind; as over a-
gainst the materialistic conception that things exist by
themselves as impersonal realities outside of mind, and
in antithesis to mind. If the world is phenomenal, manifest-
ly the process of knowing that world would imply the men-
tal activity of a knowing subject. This doctrine, then, as
bearing upon epistemology , vould emphasize the conscious
self in the ace of percept ion, as opposed to any crude
notion that knowledge is something that may enter bodily
and ready-made into a passive consciousness.
Before the time of Kant, two views of knowledge pre-
vailed, both of which vere superficial. One was that in
knowing, the mind is purely passive, the other that the mind
pay know some things entirely apart from experience.Hume
reduced the former view to an absurdity, and both Locke
and Hume were abliged to recognize rational principles
as operative in every articulate experience. This was
later made still more apparent by the elaborate exposi-
tions of Green.

A new era in apistemology was introduced by Kant's
question how experience can be possible; and by his answer
that it becomes possible only as the mind, through immanent
prino ioles, constructs that experience. This great contribu-
tion to philosophy by Kan£, stands firm, for criticism has
not been able to set it aside. For rational though^, it
practically vacates the old traditional empiricism, with
its theory of passivity in percept ion, and the immediacy
of knowledge, which is the corner-stone of all mechanical
and materialistic philosophy. As Httffaing observes','The
burden of current idealism is to putify and conserve the
work of Kant. "The doctrine of the ideality if space and
time, then, relates itself to epistemoiogy as insisting
that a chief implication of the knowing process is the
self with its immanent laws of mental activity.
There may be a sense in which the self may not be
essential to the scientific study of psychology ;but the
self , nevertheless, abides'.'No psychologist
,
"says James,"
Can question the existence of personal selves." And
Mtlnsterberg has written : "Psychology may dissolve our will
and personality andjfreedom, and it is its duty to do so;
but it must not forget that it speaks only of that personal
ity and will vhich are, by metamorphosis, substituted for the

recti personality and its free will *vhich creates psychol-
ogy in the service of its ends and aims and ideals."
"This billing personality has unity." "The world ve '/ill
is the real world." (1) The theory of knowing, then, as a
mentel act ivity ,and, in the present day, no other theory
can be intelligently maintained, remains unfliolest ed, and
unchanged, "by the ideality of space and t ime; for ^whatever
the nature of the object, the mind can apprehend it in only
one way, by an active mental process.
If we inquire further into epistemology,and,ask
how knowledge is possible, we discover that knowing is
more than a psychological event; it presupposes objective
existence to be known. Knowing depends not alone upon the
nature of the subject,but also upon that of the object.
The mind must possess a nationalizing power, and the object
admit of a rational construct ion, or there can be no knowl-
edge. But , what ever may be the nature of the object to be
known, the activity of the subject will be the same.
The external world but furnishes the occasion for
the stimulous which results in the mental reaction which
we call knowledge, and this reaction is an expression of
the nature of the knowing subject. The mind constructs
the knowledge of the world, by its own a ct ivity. Knowl-
(1) "Psychology and Life," p. 27>.

edge cannot "be carried "bodily into the mind. As in person-
al communication, thoughts are not literally exchanged,
hut each thinker translates certain signs into thoughts
for himself and by himself, so to know things is to think
them, to know the world is mentally to construct it, and
in such a way as to give rational content and meaning to
it. Here mind stands over against mind. So in all knowing.
The world, for thought, is more than sensation, more
than percept ion, it is also an interpretation. As the mind
goes beyond sense impressions when looking into a book,
a mirror, at a picture, and then interprets the meaning of
these, so the world signifies anything to the mind only
after it becomes to it a thought world. The mind constructs
its own rational world through its own immanent and ra-
tional laws. We may say, the world exists, for the observer,
only as it becomes the product of his thinking. The com-
plicated nature of the knowing process is clearly appar-
ent ;and that the knowledge of reality cannot be a simple
reception of thought from without by a passive conscious-
ness.
We observe further, that all thinking has some objec-
tive reference, and our knowledge is conditioned by the
nature of the object to be known. That we are able to build

concepts which are valid for an external world, implies
an objective existence of some kind, independent of our
thinking, and which ,at the same time comes under the
laws of our knowing proeesses.The object thus appears
as a determining factor in epistemology. In our knowing
processes, we presuppose some fixed order with a fixed mea»
ing.But with our theory of ideality, whatever that order
may be, or whatever the natuee of the object to be known,
the theory and process of knowing remains the same.
With the realistic view, a world of things stands
over against our thought ;but with the idealistic concep-
tion, we have in its place, a world of objective thought,
not our thought, but the thought of the Infinite. With
both views, we have the same problem, namely , to reproduce,
in our thought, the objective fact, whether it be real or
ideal. This can be done in only one way.Both things and
thoughts become ours only as we think them for ourselves,
just
A
in conversation each makes the others thought his
own.
If the world is a manifestation of a Supreme Being
Whose thought founds the unity of our objective system,
which our phenomenalism assumes , this world becomes ours
just so far as we are able to think His thoughts after Kim
If things are mere groups of sensations, real or possible,
t
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as the sensationalist holds, or if, as Berkley maintained,
things are nothing more than ideas presented to our con-
sciousness
,
or
,
if we deal with a phenomenalism which re-
duces things to appearances only^if with Hegel, we hold
to absolute idealism, our epist emology is unchanged, and
we know the world, what. ever it may he, only "by mentally
constructing it.
Those who disregard this activity o? the mind in
knowing, turn thought into a kind of thing which can
exist apart from any thinking mind, a notion which van-
ishes upon reflect ion. As Dr.Bowne has said, "However
real or ideal +he world may be, it becomes an object for
us only as the mind builds up in consciousness a sys-
tem of conceptions, and relates their contents under the
various forms of intelligence. An abiding order independ-
ent of our finite and individual thinking, and in this
sense a real order, is a necessary presupposit Lon and
implication of our thinking. This order becomes our men-
tal possession only through our mental activity. In this
way existenc slowly passes into knowledge." (1)
But this conceptual existence of things in our
thought is not their real existence. We do not create
things by our thought, yet our conceptions may be val-
" Theory of Thought and Knowledge," p. 56

id for things. Our forms of knowledge are primarily
forms of thought , and these forms determine all our knowl-
edge, Unless , then, the laws of our thought are also the
laws of being,manifestly, our apparent knowledge can
have no objective validity.
If, with our view of space and time, we consider the
v/orld of objects in relation to knowledge , several im-
portant results in thought will appear, and certain chang-
es in popular notions will be suggested. If we assume
that the mind reaches objects by imposing its laws and
forms upon experience, .ve must also assume that the ob-
jects thus known will come under these laws and forms,
and thus become knowable.This implies an objective ra-
tional order parallel to our subjective order of thought.
But after we have mentally constructed our ^orld of
things, how do we know that by this process we have reach
-
the things themselves. Is our knowledge valid?Do we tru-
ly apprehend reality?or^we dealing with mental shad-
ows only? In this region of thought confusion abounds.
?or the sake of clearness, we must often ask ourselves
what kind of reality we are seeking. We need to recog-
nize that the self and its experience's practically,
and for us, the surest of all realities. Our knowledge
I'
Our knowledge of any reality must necessarily consist
in our thought concerning it; and its reality for us
consists in its fitting into the system of our experi-
ence. For practical purposes, the validity of our knowl-
edge must rest here. The validity of our knowledge of
our neighbors is no greater than that for objects; for
the process of perception is the same in both.Knowledge
vindicates ifcself, practically , by its consistency in our
experience
.
Reflection upon the order of things , assures us
thatVtis no illusion ;and that knowledge is a mental re-
action against some external existance and activity.
But it quite as clearly appears that the 3ysten of
objects derives its meaning, and, therefore, for us
its existence, through mind ana consciousness. This
doctrine would call for not a few moaificat ions in
popular philosophy; anu, through it, we may escape
many illusions which have grown out of crude realistic
conceptions
.
This view vacates the traditional notion of a
material world, the world, to spontaneous thought,
is made up of bodies in space which are unquestion-
ably solid and substantial realities. Objects are

held to be material, and matter offers no problem.
Pact is what is seen and felt; and there is no mystery
in a knowledge 30 manifest. But upon reflection, the
sense report is modified. Thought works over its first
impressions, and changes its spontaneous conceptions.
Things are not what they appear to be, and phenomenal-
ity becomes a common experience. The walking staff,
for example, when thrust into the water, appears Bent,
but this change is known to be appearance only.
The doctrine of the Ideality of space and time
implies, of course, that the space and time world is
phenomenal, and, in our philosophy, the difference
between the real and the phenomenal must be reckoned
with. Things, as seen, must be regarded as apparent
rather than real, as phenomenal, rather than sub-
stantial; or better, as having a phenomenal reality
of their own. They are not fictitious, nor illusory;
but, instead, arte objective experience is largely con-
stituted by them and their laws. Our doctrine simply
empties them of their being as self-exist ence
;
they
still remain as the feld of objective science, and of
practical life.
This doctrine also removes the illusion that

this external world exits in some extra -mental mode,
j'or the iaeality of space and time puts the emphasis
upon mind, and that things can exit only in relation
to mind, as opposed to the claim of t^at realism
which looks u-on objects as having an independent ex-
istence apart from, mind, and in antithesis to mind.
It is assumed that things are before mind in existence
and entirely beyond the sphere of thought. With this
supposit ion , it is evident we can know only phenomena
and can not reach things in themselves. This mistake
is in assuming that, because things exist apart from
our consciousness, they, therefore exist apart from
the consciousness of the Infinite. This would give us
a world of things, which, in themselves, our thought
can not reach. But experience shows that only through
thought is it possible to reach the external world.
We have seen that space and time are the mental
principles by which we relate objects in mutual extern
ality, and events in antscedence and sequence. We
have also discovered J hat perception is a complex
menatal activity by which alone the objective world
can become anything to us. The idealist recognises
an order of objective existence independent of finite

mind, "but not therefore independent of all mind; for
the knowability of objects, itself, depends upon the
Intelligence which founds both objects and the knowing
mind.
All rational epist omology rests upon t e suppo-
sition that Intelligence is a constitutive factor in
the cosmos. Our knowledge of phenomena can have ob-
jective validity only as our objects themselves are cast
in the moulds of thought. The laws of thought must ^e
al3o the laws of things; otherwise, there would be
a paralax between the thought and the thing, between
the conception and the reality. An extra-mental
world becomes an impossibility; for it would be an
unrelated world. Unless the laws of thought are founded
in Intelligence, and are valid for reality, knowledge
vanishes.
Locke was led astray by this notion of a reality
back of phenomena, which existed on its own account,
but which, being unrelated, was unknowable. TBiis
confusion resulted form a failure to see the Tbeistic
implications of epist emology. The ideality of space
and time assumes that the world exists through an
Intelligence analogous to that of finite intelligence;
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and that the world we reach is a world of thought re-
lations. An extra -mental world would be, to us, an
unknown, unknowabl e , and unaffirmable world. By this
doctrine, we are freed from an illusion which confounds
extra -human with extra -mental
.
The ideality of space and time, with its true
phenomenalism, enables us to set aside a false phe-
nomenalism or the notion of a noumenal world. In
Kant's epistemology our knowledge is limited to appeur-
ances, ana from this theory, an agnosticism arose
concerning reality itself, which has since been
current in philosophy, as a doctrine of the relativity
of knowledge. The laws of thought, he said, are
valid for phenomena ony , and not for things in + hem-
selves, they simply give an order to subjective pre-
sentations. But Kant's theory of knowledge can not
be harmonised with experience, and besides, it is bur-
dened with inconsistencies and contradictions.
Kant assumed, for example, the existence of other
persons. Persons thus become phenomena, and yet are
known. But, in our knowledge of persons and things,
we are shut up to the same process. With Kant, things
became mere subjective appearances. Persons, then,

as api^earances , can be no more; ana personal communion
vanishes, for minds can hardly be said to appear ^o
other minus. We are thus left in doubt as to t e
existence of our neighbors. Thmy are like things,
noumena, and can not be known. So also his transcend,
dental ego, as distinguished from the active, con-
scious, or phenomenal- self , of experience, is a "nou-
menon" a educed from his theory, rather than a fact of
experience, and can not be accepted. For the self,
as the living, conscious subject of experience, is thjp
surest of things in human knowledge.
Kant's epistemology as to the external world, is
equally unclear. Phenomena, or appearances are all
we know. Behind them are the noumena, or things ir
themselves; and since the phenomena do not reveal
any knowledge concerning the noumena we can know
nothing of them. For us, they must disapear altogether;
for if they are not in space or time, and come under
no law or category of thought, they are, for us, as
nothing either in thought or existence. For us, the
primary fact is experience, and self a.-, its subject;
whatever else we affirm, is for the purpose of raking
experience rational. For us there can be no thing -in-
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itself; for whatever does not come under the categories
of thought and so of experience, has no claim to exist-
ence.
an(4
Spencer's agnosticism followed Kant.had ro better
foundation.His failure in dealing wi+h the Unknowable
is familiar to all. As Kill facetiously remarked, Spence r
gave us a"Prodigious amount of knowledge respecting th e
Unknowable. "
This notion of +he back-lying noumena is based a] -
on the naive assumption of the extra-mentality of some
sort of vorld. There is no such world, and there can be
no rational problem concerning it. The demand of thought
is , simply , that it Shall reach the real rather than the
illusoty-the mind is merely seeking the truth. to seek
this in any realm, or way, which ignores the use of the
fundamental laws of thought, and to lose oneself in son
supposed existence beyond thought is manifestly absurd
Theistic idealism brings the world of things with
in the sphere of thought; and the problem of knowledge
becomes as simple and satisfactory as that of mutual
communication among individual persona. This doctrine
assmmes that the world of objects had its origin in an
• Intelligence which is being revealed through them, and
that things are commensurable with our intelligence.
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The world exists independent of our thought, tut not
independent of His thought.
This theory of idealism solves the problem of the
unknowable, and does no violence to common sense; for it
leaves intact the inherent antithesis between the fi-
nite thinker and the objective world, at the same time
it unmasks, for the human mind,the realities of experi-
ence.
With the ideality of space and time, the whole phys-
ical world teeomes phenomenal; and these phenomena are
real in the sense that they ace forms and factors of ex-
perience which we truly know, and which constitutes the
chief part of practical lif e .Whereas Kant's doctrine of
relativity ends in a denial of all independent otject-
ivity. Phenomena, then, do not mask some noumenal reali+y;
but rather manifest their own practical and scientific
reality. They stand as effects of some sausal Power, which
may
,
in part, be known through them. IT oum en a, as used in phi-
losophy, are a fiction. The problem of knowledge ultimately
becomes the problem of the Cause of phenomena. JCpistemol-
ogy leads directly to metaphysics , and there this question
must find its solution.
Once more,we observe that by the doctrine <if the
ideality of space and time, with its Theistic implica-
(
t ions, we free ourselves of all phantoms of an abstract,
an abstract, or a static universe.Kant limited the cate-
gories to experience ; they have no meaning, except as they
apply to the objects of a real or possible experience.
But he made the mistake of limiting experience to the
physical world; and did not recognize the experience of
the conscious self, or the inner spiritual experience.
This limitation is fallacious and mischievous.
If , however , we include the whole of experience, Kant '
s
theory was right and valuable; for the forms of thought
are not themselves the reality, but only valid for reality.
Apart from experience, forms are empty. Th4ir function is
merely to give form to the contents of experience. This
is made clear by Bowne in what he calls his doctrine of
transcendental empiricism, in distinction from traditional
sense empiricism. All thought about reality must be roo%~
ed in experience ; and through experience only are we sure
that our conceptions represent any actual fact.
In this way we escape pure conceptualismjand we .
bring the forms of thought to the test of fact. The cate-
gories are the forms the mind gives to experience ; and
these forms are themselves known through the actual ex-
perience of the mind. Thus being must relate itself to
,'OuM
either obj ect ive, or subjective experience. So with iden-
tity and unity;they find their meaning, if they are to he
more than logical forms and abstract ions , in the experi-
ence of the conscious self . Or , again , the conception of
causality that has any definite value, beyond that of
mere scientific or superficial explanation,must find its
reality in the causality of experience , in the self-con-
sciousness of free intelligence , which is the only caus-
ality that really explains.
This theory vacates many speculations which are mere-
ly verbal and therefore empty of any practical, or phil-
osophical value. In this connection we meet with the tra-
ditional notion of an absolute and static universe, a sys-
tem complete in itself, and which is real in a higher
sense than that which we know in our experience. This
universe is another illusion. There is no such universe.
It might be said, that if we knew things as they really
are-in some perfect system-we should find them very dif-
ferent from what they seem to be. But Plato's ideal static
universe has, in modern thought , become very contingent.
Bradley and Spencer have given us glowing illustrations
of the failure to make any impersonal and abstract sys-
tem self-consistent and satisfactory. With Bradley,
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all the categories and relations of thought are hut
• contradict oty until dissolved in the one Ahsolute and
perfect Being. And Spencer loses himself among logical
abstractions, and mistakes these for metaphysical realit&s.
But these difficulties vanish when we recognize, not an
abstract and impersonal Ahsolute, but a personal and self-
conscious Intelligence.
Hegel's absolute idealism nay alao be included in
the category of systems which are too speculative for
any practical service.Ee attempts to show that in thought
itself are to be found the principles of self-movement
and self-development , which necessarily pass through th
various forms of exist ence , and return again to absolute
thought or perfect being. As Ormund expresses it, "The cen-
tral category of Hegelism is the pulsating dialectic of
immanent rationality which, to Kegel , expressed the whole
inner truth of reality." (1)
Kegel , doubtless , did some profound thinking ;but his
whole scheme of a dialectic of pure thought without a
thinker, is far from transparent in its meaning, or possi-
ble in its application.Bradley , himself a problem in ab
stract thinking
,
gives U3 this vivid phrase about Hegel •s
* ) philosophy , "An unearthly ballet of bloodless categorie s. "
(l')-?oundations of Knowledge, "Introduction, p. 12.
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If "being is conceived as impersonal, ve are left in
atheism, or in pantheism; but if fundamental being is pur-
posive Intelligence, it must he all-embracing and all-
producing. Our theory of idealism frees us from doubtful
abstract ions , and from impossible and unintelligible
identifications of thought with being. Our thoughts are
not things, but they are valid for things. The subject and
object cannot be ident ified; but we come ultimately to
a Thinker whose objects are hut His thoughts realized.
The "bond of union "between the finite subject and object
is to be found in the Infinite Intelligence, which founds
and transcends them both.
Back of finite experience, is no absolute, imper-
sonal or static universe which eludes our grasp and
knowledge. 7rem our view-point , the universe is the thought
of an Intellitent and Intelligible Thinker
,
whose
thoughts find expression in an order which becomes
ours through experience. Under this theory , science
moves on unmolested;but thought, free ftom many illu-
sions, rises to higher and better conceptions of the
world, and to views more practical and pregnant with
spiritual results.
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We notice, in the second place, the bearing of this
doctrine upon metaphysics. ?rom its literal meaning,
"Beyond physics, "we may get a suggestion of the far-
reaching significance of the word metaphysics. In a gener-
al sense, physics deals urith the phenomenal world, and
metaphysics , with the ontological world upon which phys-
ics rests. The place of metaphysics in critical thought
is more and more recognized.lt underlies all science
and all thought, and determins the "basis of "both.Meta-
physics deals with basal reality. How we know, and what
we know,make up the sum of all philosophy.
We have glanced at the question of knowledge ,and
have seen that epistemology involves the use of certain
fundamental and immanent principles which interweave
both knowledge and being, and constitute for them a kind
of frame-work. IV e have noticed that certain conceptions,
such as space and time, substance and cause, are necessary
forms of thought ;but epistemology does not determine
the nature or the full significance, of these principles.
This is the work of metaphysics.Metaphysics reveals their
deeper content, and expounds their implications.
The human mind is essentially metaphysical ; and de-
mands the rational interpretation of its entire experience.
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This is the supreme problem; for all our practical held.efs
• are rooted in i» some kind of metaphysics. Our most pe?
sistent questions concerning the nature of things, of nlind
and matter, of the real and the apparent , the finite ancI
the infinite, are metaphysical . These questions are uni-
versally discussed, but , as a rule,very superficially
understood. Some who vigorously denounce all metaphys-
ics, still assume a system of their own , andh.old vague r10-
tions of the nature of man ,and of the Infinite Being,
which leads to materialistic and fatalistic conceptior1S
of the universe.Metaphysics must untie this knot of ig
norence,and set free the distinctions necessary for a
full and^rational comprehension of experience. "Interna]
harmony and consistency," says KBffding , "are the sign
manuftl of truth within all spheres, and are therefore
rightly demanded in the sphere of philosophy." (l)
Theoretically , metaphysics must guard us against
a subjectivism which , through the denial to the princj
pies of thought of their legitimate significance for re-
ality in itself , becomes self-destructive, as ih the caple
of Kant's epistemology, which made reality unknowable.
•
On the other hand, it must protect us from a shallow dog-
matism through the nataral and superficial metaphysicst
(1) "The Philosophy of Religion," p. 4.
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of common sense. practically ,metaphysics must lead pop-
ular thought from its sense plane and materialistic
trend, up to where, governedby the higher categories of
thought, it shall attain to a clearer spiritual insight,
trpon this plane must be solved the question, what , in its
deeper meaning , reality is, 7or whatever reality shall be
to us will manifestly depend upon how we approach it
through our thinling.
Common sense, with its superficial notions about
space and time as realities, about matter as substance,
and mechanical action as efficient cause,may easily drift
into hurtful practical error. This result maj be avoided
by a better metaphysical conception of the principles of
thought, and a clearer interpretation of their meaning
as applied to reality. We have seen that all experience
has reference to intelligence , and must be interpreted by
thought. All reality must come under this law. With the
data of experience we build up our own rational systems.
Though, in both physics and metaphysics , we start with the
data of science, we soon enter a world of realities of
wnose nature., even existence, we can know only by thought.
The ground of the seen must ever be found in the unseen.
Both science and metaphysics , as we know, transcends our

sense experience ; and in both , conclusions are often drawn
which seem startling and contradict ory,hut which, upon
deeper insight, are discovered to be in closest harmony.
If we would think clearly on this subject, we must
not confound appearance with realiy,or think of the phe-
nomenal as illusion. The truth of all experience lies in
its dependability, and its harmony with the laws of intel-
ligence. Only a part of our experience comes through
sense intuition, other parts come through a proeess of
thought. The one we call phenomenal , the other, by a crit-
ical use of the word, we may call noumenal,or the thing
as it is thought. Both are equally real, but have not the
same kind of reality . Phenomena are real elements in ex-
perience, but have not substantial being jwhile the noume-
nal are real in the sense of having^of self-activity.
We escape confusion by distinguishing this phenomenal
reality from that which is self-active or causal.
It is the work of metaphysics to lead the thought,
through the study of the phenomenal, t o a rational and ad-
equate conception of the fundamental Reality upon which
it must be based.But our present task is not a compre-
hensive survey and exposition of the categories as el-
ements in realityjbut the more modest one of inquiring

what "bearing the ideality of space and time would have
upon our conceptions of of the basal principles of meta-
physics in their most familiar specificat ions. Assuming
this doctrine to be true,how would we logically have to
think of being in general, of causality, of Reality, of -
the cosmos, and of the human soul.
How, then , shall we conceive of being in general.
In common thought , exist ence appears as the first and
fundamental fact. Objects seem to exist as veritable
things in a real space and time.But, in experience, we
recognize different kinds of reality. In a sense, all
actual forms of experience have a sort of existence;
for they are factors of a real system of things. But
this may be merely a subjective and logical reality,
and imply no actual obj ectivity.Metaphysical reality
means substantial, and abiding existence, as distinguished
from that which is merely conceptual , and from that which
is merely apparent. The problem in metaphysics is the
specific one how we shall think about what we call things .
What , in the deepest sense, is required to constitute a
thing or a real existence. What will fill out our notion
of true being.
For common sense, space and time a.re real; for things
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can "be thought away and these still remain. And again,
objects arc thought of as real, and as filling space and
time. But upon the theory that space and time are phenom-
enal, all impersonal objects within space and time are held
to exist as phenomenal only. This view will call for an ent+re
readjustment of our thinkingwith reference to wh.4t we
call things. But it will enable us to rid ourselves of
the traditional superstition of pure "being. This notion
is merely a logical abstraction from the activity of
things, and, as such, can have no actual existence. Only a
specific thing can actually exist, and practical thought
demands definite and actual obj ect ivity. What , then,may we
say, does really exist?
We cannot, with Berkley , think of things as mere pre-
sentations to the mind, for then, unpresented, they would be
no more than shadows of reality. Science has shown us that
apparent objective existence is in a state of unceasing
activity aad change. This much seems to be certain about so-
called things; and thought demands that this activity
shall have some ground and cause. To explain objects and
give this activity a rational basis, we aay they possess he-'
ing or exist ence ; for a groundless activity would neces-t
3arily vanish.
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We have said all real being is definite and active.
What shall we say of matterjhas it real being and actual
existence? If we suppose matter in its elements to have
real existence, we shall find that both science and meta-
physics declare that mutter, as it appears to us in the
mass, is purely phenomenal; for both affirm that its inner
nature is different from what ife appears to be in the bulk.
This is true, whether we take the traditional atom, or the
latest word on th« subject from Sir Oliver Lodge who says,
"L'atter is composed of modified and electrified spects or
minute structures of ether, which are amenable to mechan-
ical as 7/ell as electrical force." (1) Or if we say with
Duncan, that matter is nothing but electricity , in any
case, the properties of the mass are as different from
the internal structure of matter as the chemical compound
from the elaments which, by their interact ion, produce it.
"ass is a phenomenal result of internal dynamic activity;
and so-called inertia, as we now know, is merely a balancing
of activities.
We cannot , therefore , entertain the notion of being
as a certain unchanging essence of reality in which forces
reside, and to which all activities are to be attributed.
This distinction between essence and activity in matter,
(D'^ther of Space," p. 151. Harper, 1909.

is a purely logical onejfor there is no discoverable differ-
once between being and act ion. There is no such objective
thing as gravity, or affinity, as heat, or electric ity, any
more than angles exist apart from the figures they construct,
A triangle does not first exist and then contain angles;
nor does a person, as a substance, possess a soul. A trian-
gle is its angles, and a person is a soul. If viewed as
metaphysically real, an atom simply isjand if it manifested
self -act ivity , it would fulfill the idea of true being.
The notion of forces within the atom is but an abstraction
from atomic activity
,
which,Irowever naturally made, is
metaphysically absurd. As Bovne has well put it: "Things
do not exist as having a kernel or core of real stulf
in themjbut they acquire a claim to be considered real
through the activity whereby the# affirm themselves as
determining factors of the system. their being is manifest-
ed and realised only through their act ivity.Being and ac-
tion are inseparable; the inactive is the non-existent.
Action is a dynamic consequence of being, and is coexist-
ent with It.? (1)
Things do not exist because they have in them a quan-
tity of reality ;but , because of their act ivit -r
,
they ap-
pear to us as agents in the world-3y3t era. This is the
(1) " Metaphysics," p. 24

mystery of being which even metaphysics cannot solve,
without knowing the nature of creation itself. We must
be content to inquire simply what the object is to us.
Whatever has the power of seli -act ivity exists; and its ac-
tivity is its being. Realities must be agents, and agents
are the only realities.
Prom the stand-point of the ideality of space and
t ime,however , things, as we know them, are merely phenomenal;
and, in a metaphysical sense,hawe no real existence. They
are rather manifestations of some Reality which lies be-
hind them.! ratter itself is ideal.3y this view, we are free
from the clumsy and materialistic notions of being.
Upon this point ,Mttnst erberg writes: "To believe in mate
rialism or dualism is absurd, as matter is given to us on-
ly in idea, in our consciousness." And again, "Science
puts in place of perceivable obj ects , unperceivable atoms,
which are products of machematical construct ion , and are
unlike any known thing. These atoms ari scient if ical^: true
as their construction is necessary for thought; they are
of objective value, and so true." Still again he says,"
"Physical science is t rue ,mat er ialism is wrong. There is
no physical object in the world that natural fought not to
traHsmute into atoms; but no atom in + he world has reality-

These statements do not contradict each other." (1)
If , however , we insist that things exist "because they
appear to us to be centers of activity, we must still ex-
plain the differences among things; for things vary infi-
nitely in form and manifestat ion. What makes this difference,
We explain it by saying their nature is different .How then
shall we construe this nature of things; and just why is
it different in different things. If activity is the mark
of being, then the kind of activity shown by a thing would
explain its nature ;and the principle that determins this
activity would reveal the very essence of the thing, and,
in finding this principle , our problem would be solved.
By popular metaphysics , it is maintained that the true
nature of things lies beyond our knowledge.lt Is said
that the thing itself retreats behind its qualit ies, and
the qualities appear as states of the thing. But, like the
notion of being with inhering forces, this theory fails
to explain the facts. As we have 3een,no such pure being
exists as the theory assumes. The atom of present-day
science is conceived as a system of corpuscles , ions , or
electrons , arranged in various orders and groupings accord-
ing to their nature, and by the activity of these elements,
the nature of the atoms is declared.
I-Ierbart expounded
"Psychology and Life," pp. 1, 19, 20.
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the ancient view, that the true nature of a thing lay
in some hidden, simple, unchanging, and unknown quality, which,
if it could be known, would explain the nature of a thing,
as Descarte held that the quality of extension revealed
the essence of matter.But this notion is inadequate;
for an unchanging basal quality, if it existed and could
be known, would not be able to account for changing
phenomena.
The nature of a thing is a problem, not for sense
intuit ion, but for reason. To know the nature of a thing,
we must finfi the law that governs its activity. We infer
the nature of chemical elements by the discovered laws of
their various combinations; and we infer the nature of the
soul as we find some principle which seems to relate and
explain its successive manifold activities.
To attempt to find the essence of a thing* in some
simple quality within it, fails to provide for either
the change in the thing, or for its identity .Neither of
these can be left out of our account .But by the theory
that the nature of anything is in the lav/ which gov eras
its coexistent and its successive man ifestat ions , we pro-
vide for both change and identity.
whatever the nature of a thing may be,we are now
seeking only for an adequate conception of that nature.
rus lei xlnu
We cannot grasp its essence through any quality, or
group of qualities, "but only through a concrete formula
or law of action. It is true we cannot explain how this
form can take on, for us, the appearance of reality, or
how reality is manifested through law; for the mysteries
of the Infinite do not lie open to us. We may not know
how things are made; it is our work to get, as clearly as
possible, a true conception of them as found in experience.
In seeking to do this, we must not be misled "by mere words.
The nature of a thing is not first, and then a law impos-
ed upon it;nor is the law before the thing.
The nature of an object is not something in the ob-
ject ;nor does the object possess the nature. We must think
of the object and its nature as one and the same, The
object or thing, as acting in certain definite ways, is
the single fact; and this way of acting is the law of its
being or its nature. If things were real, this is the
form our conception of them would take. As distinguished
from non -being , being is active and aausal.To exist at
all, things must be definite. This definiteness is fixed
and defined in the law of their activity. The laws of things
are the ground of their differences ; and when we know these
laws , '.ve know the essence,or nature of the thing. In this
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way we nay test the claim of any thing to real existence.
But, again, we observe that according to our vietf of
space and time, all objects in space and. time are phe-
nomenal only. We must then break entirely with the
traditional anu common sense metaphysics, and look
upon thereal as something more than the seen and the
apparent. Real things are manifestations, not of
some changeless essence within them, but of a funda-
mental Reality upon wich their activity depends. Or,
to quote again from JJttnst erberg , "The real world we
live in has no existence, because it is a form of reality
which is endlessly fuller and richer than that shadow
of reality which we mean by existence. 'VP. Or , as we
would say, which we mean by objects. In what form then,
shall we find the full notion of being expressed, and
in what does a ^eal thing consist. Our conception of
being must be self -consist ence , and contain no contra-
diction.
We have thought of the thing as changing, and yet
we more often associate with it the idea of permanence.
We conceive of it as the same thing throughout its changes.
It is ever active yet constant. A changing thing seems
to be a contradiction. In our notion of true being,
(1) "Psychology and Life", p. 24.
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we must provide for both change and identity.
In order to keep our + h ought clear, we need to
carefully distinguish between a logical identity or
sameness of meaning, which is necessaryto any thought
at all, phenomenal identity or permanence in appearance,
which is essential to practical experience, and, beyond
these, a metaphysical identity, which attempts to reach
the reality behind the appearance. This metaphysical
idenity we must have to ground our changes in phenom-
ena. How to conceive this identity, has always been
a serious problem in philosophy. Two opposing views
have contended for the field; but neiiher has been
able to gain or hold it.
With the Eleatic school, the basal principle was
changeless being, things have in themselves perman-
ence and iaenity. With the Keraclitic school, all
was ceaseless flow and in a state of becoming. All is
flow, ana the process alone abides. Things are but
phases of a process which is forever coming and going.
Like the velocity of a moving body, a thing never is,
but is always becoming; or like the flame of a lamp,
which seems to be a resting thing, but which is really
a continous process. In a system of change like ours,

the process alone is permanent; and thirgs are "but
forms of the process.
Is it possible to so conceive of "being as to
harmoniously unite "both change and identity? 7or this,
under the laws of tkought , we are bound + o attempt.
Popular metaphysics finus identity in a basal core
of changeless substance vithing the thing, which can
not be spirited away by thought into either logical
or phenomena] identity. Changes are due merely to
states, qualities, and activities. But we have seen
that when the states of a thing change, it is the thing
itself witch changes, .External change is founaed upon
internal change. We posit the thing in order to ex-
plain its changes; but we can not, in this way, pass
from: the monotony of a rigid sameness to the manifold
activities of the actual world of experience.
We are compelled to reject, this crude notion of
an inner core of being as founding the identity of
a thing. The popular theory of physics is essentially
the same. It is said, things are in themselves change-
less, ana only their relations change. Beneath the
changing phenomena is a mass of invisible atoms upon
which rests the real identity of things. This notion

may serve the purposes of science ;but metaphysics must
go further and account for the change itself.
Things can pass into new relations only as there
is change taking place in the elements of the things.
The stream of change sweeps all things into it. All be-
ing is in process of bscoming.Hence the identity can-
not be found in its changeless substance ;but rather in
the continuity of some law, principle , or thought , which
governs it. On the impersonal plane, a thing can have iden
tity only in the sense that its changes are under a uni-
formity of law and relations. There is no such thing as
abstract identity and change. In experience, we find only
certain fixed meanings for things, given through mental
activity, and a permanence realized in a self-conscious
equality. To these we are obliged to refer all change
and identity with which we are acquainted.
With our view of space and time, we abandon entire-
ly the notion that a thing has states and releitiona
which alone will explain change and identity. In changing
states, a thing becomes a new thing. 7/e cannot rationally
look for permanence of a metaphysical order apart from
intelligence. To bring change and identity into harmony,
are must have reference to a self-conscious subject. We

may affirm an identity of appearance in the phenomenal
;vorla,and an identity of law in the physical tforldjbut
if we would tie up the successive changes in a concep-
tion that is fixed as identical, we must appeal to a
knowing intelligence.
We can grasp a thing and give to it reality and iden-
tity, only through an ideaa that is fixed in intelligence,
and is without succession in time. To escape the eternal
flow, we must find rest in a self-equal personal being.
Even the soul itself, as sub stance,has no unchanging es-
sence or core of "being. It , too , is under the law of change;
but the soul has the peculiar power of "Thought and mem-
ory, by which it affirms itself one and the same person.
Thro' H
Only
A a sympathetic activity of intelligence, do we find
permanence amidst change, and are able to raise continu-
ity to a proper identity.
Consciousness is the only basis of permanence in
in change. This is no doubt a great my stery.We cannot ex-
plain personality ; it is a primary fact of experience.
If being must include both activity and permanence, only
the personal truly exists . Personality alone can fill
out the conception of complete metaphysical being.
With common sense, identity is never more than
continuity of law. This is sufficient for scientific
tml JCloi
purposes.But within this realm, and deeper than this con-
tinuity, is the changing thing, which must he viewed as a
concrete principle of action. Eoth common sense and sci-
ence attempt to find identity in change by assuming an
unchanging center of being. In the light of recent dis-
coveries, vre must regard this theory as an out -worn tra-
dition and an empty superst i
t
xon,'fJe have seen that
change penetrates to the center of being.
Reality is a process, and is passing incessantly
into new forms. Being, which unites both permanence and
change, is found only in the personal. Things, as we knovv
them, are phenomenal. Thought alone can bring the suooes-
ive impressions into the fixed conception, and thus gath-
er up that which is , otherwise , in a state of temporal flow
Being, itself ,must be interpreted through personal
self-conscious intelligence. The impersonal is in a state
of continual flow, and can become identical for thought
only through some conscious intelligence. We thus trace
thing-hood to intelligence, and to the personal conscious
self.
The objective world is then phenomenal ; and the
objective order, with its incessant act ivity, because it
has its existence apart from our thought,must find its
ground of being in a fundamental Reality, or Thinker.
t-I
V
%Thus grounded in Intelligence , the natural order of things
becomes intelligible, and articulate for our intelligence.
Things, so-called, are real for experience, and for
science ;but metaphysical reality is found only ir> per-
sonality , finite and Infinite. We thus escape, theoretically
,
the shallow notions of spontaneous thought which assumes
reality in things through some hypothetical inner sub-
stance; and we also free ourselves from a deadly subjec-
t iveism, which , in dealing with empty abstract ions , leaves
the categories in irreconcilable contradiction. And by this
view, we also lift popular thought, in a practical way,
from the sensuous, to a more spiritual plane; and from the
lower cat egories , which end with meaningless matter, up
to the higher forms of thought which find satisfaction
in a Supreme Intelligence. "Vie/zed ,vith fuller insight,"
says Haldane, "this world may turn out to be but appear-
ance, and God the ultimate Reality disclosing Himself
in that very appearance." (1)
Again, what is the bearing of this doctrine upon
causality as involved in the nature of being. We have
seen that being is essentially self-active and causal.
By its natuee, reality is causality. Causality is not
something attached to being, but is inseparable from
II fThe Gifford Lectures," p. 18.
4
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being. The ideality of space and time require^ us to
think of the apparent world as phenomenal ; and yet it is
a thought world, and knowable because founded in intel-
ligenc.
The world is, however,more than thought or idea; it
is an act or deed as well. Our present problem is how to
conceive of this causality. Is it mechanical, or volition-
al? is it necessary, or free? We think of causali x y as noth-
ing less than a dynamic control or determination* This dyfein-
ism, or causal relation among things, was, by Hume, and the
early sensational philosophers, denied. But, upon any theory,
causality in sone form has to be assumed; for unconnected
succession is irrational, and, without the fact of causal
connection, thought and the world of things would vanish.
Causality, then, as a fact, as l.he ground of cosmic
changes, must be affirmed. The question is shall it be lo-
cated in sensous objects, or in some power beyond them?
ana shall ve conceive causality as impersoal and mechanic Val
in form, or as intelligent and volitional? JProm the stand-
point of the phenomenality of space and time, the form and
meaning of the category of causality becomes radically
changed.
In popular thought, inductive causality is mistaken
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for me tetchysical causality. Science presupposes the
causal postulate in the following form; "Events in
physical science depend upon a few antecedents, knowing
which re may safely disregard all other circumstances:" (1)
K, r> o ia> »«
InAother words, we explain, according to some, laws,
certain consequents by their antecedeetts.
This is Gausality in a merely inductive and scien-
tific sense, It must be distinguished from metaphysical
or efficient causality. Inductive causality has to do
only with the.order of events: and is not at all con-
I
cerned with the nature of reality. It relates merely
to empirical conditions; when these are met, the re-
sults appear, and that is all. It has no relation
to efficiency, and is independent of metaphysics.
This is sufficient for scientific and practical pur-
poses; and it may serve, in a way, to explain concomi-
tant changes, una how consequents follow their ante-
cedents .
But this process deals merely with phenomenal
conditions under which events occur, and is to be
kept distinct from the metaphysical agency by which
results are produced. The latter must not be confounded
with scientific causality, which onlt/ shows how one
series of changes follows another.
(1 ) "Science, " April 8, 1910.
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Science has done' of late, in its causal processes,
to rid itself of all metaphysical implications. We are not
now required, in the chemical laboratory , to have any met-
aphysical theory as to matter ; or , in the study of physics
and astronomy, to affirm a theory of gravitation. There
is no longer in science any claim to dynamic forces;
"but simply a study of natural law in relation to phe-
nomena. Science does not deny causality, but simply leaves
its discussion to metaphysics.
This insight was long ago expressed by Galileo.
He adopted the causal postulate, and used the word "force"
as a synonym for unknown metaphysical influences which
were somehow related to acceleration of motion. Galileo
acknowledged his ignorence of the nature of this force,
and said, "All that was needful to see was just how
one investigates the properties of accelerated motion,
without consideration of their causes." (1)
In this respect, he was ahead of his time, and of
some modern text -books, which define force as a "oaus_e
of motion" or a "tendency to produce motion;" foB,he
he said,tt was not worth while for science to consider
the question from the metaphtsical point of view. This con
caption was also clear to Newton, who, in the first book
Ostwald's "Klassiker der Exakten wissenschaft en ,
"
No. 24
,
p. 15.
!
of the "Principia, saya, "I here design only to give
a mathematical notion of those forces without consider-
ing their cause or seat."
This distinction between scientific and metaphys-
ical causality clears the way for a true conception of
"both; and leaves us free to more readily conceive of meta
physical causality in the proper sense, as an efficient
dynamism "behind jjhenomenal events.
For untrained thought , there is no problem in caus-
ality. All about uSjmutually independent things appar-
ently exist. Yet even common sense discovers that these
things are related, and somehow form a system of recip-
rocal change. But spontaneous metaphysics at once endows
these apparently independent things with states , forces
,
and influences, by which, through interact ion, they mutu-
ally determine one
A
cinother . In this way they found a cos-
mic system. But this realism comes from mistaking space
and time for actualities ; and viewing the things which
occupy space and time as causally active.
We have seen , however , that apart from self-conscious
intelligence, we can discover no proper being. Since all
is embraced in one ceaseless flow, things , in themselves,
can have no true identity, and cannot be independent and

active agents. And Lotze has made it clear that we can-
not conceive interaction as external activity among
elements which remain internally indifferent .He says:
"We must conceive of the mutual action and reaction of
things, not as something attached to them externally , hut
as dependent upon, or accompanied by , alt erat ion of their
internal states, then each element is at the moment of
its action radically different from what it was before
or will afterwards be. forces are not indestructable
peculiarities that, without respect to relations, inhere
perpetually in the nature of an element. If internal
states of things alter, these relations may change along
with them, and new forces and new laws be developed; the
very law of work of a simple force may alter with al-
tered states in its subj ect .Nothing can take place be-
tween individual elements ultil something takes place
within them." (1)
Causal interaction among things must , therefore, be
an illusion. Interact ion must be based upon *change, which
takes place in the things themselves, and is dependent
upon an all-embracing fundamental Energy. Popular thought
has located causality in states and forces possesed by
things ; and, in interact ion, it is said that these are in
"Microcosmus, "Book I, p. 44, and Book, II
,
p. 21.

various ways transferred to the things tu-cted upon.
But, in this way, no metaphysical causality is reached;
for phenomenal things do not contain resident forces
or states. There are no such entities to he passed from
one thing, to another. We have seen that in things, there
is no real substance to which states and qualities
could belong. This is again strongly put by Lotze;"The
true reality is not in matter, and still less in idea;
but it is in the living personal Spirit of God, and the
world of personal spirits which He has created. They only
are the place in which good, and good things exist. To them
alone does there appear an extended material world, by
the forms and movements of which, the thought of the
cosmic whole makes itself intelligible through intuition
to every finite mind."
In the apparent flow of states and/orces in inter^
act ion, as usually understood, no substance passes from
one thing to anotherjbut a process may be said to take
place which we may call propagat ion , this name, however,
throws no light upon the metaphysical nature of inter-
act ion.iilxperience gives us simply reciprocal changes
in phenomena, in coexistence or in sequence. neither in
the phenomena, nor in tke things themselves , do we find
any adequate causal ex^lanat ion.
t•
Interaction among mutually independent things is
manifestly a contradict ion ; and the equilibrium in our
system of change is certainly not maintained by the inter-
play of forces or influences among things, as commonly
conceived. Physicists themselves are coming to think
thing and events are merely phenomenal processes of
some energy beyond them. As Dr.Bovme has said, "We must
transcend the realm of the relative and dependent , and af-
firm a fundamental Reality which is absolute and inde-
pendent ;and in the unity of whose existence the pos-
sibility of what we call interaction finds its ulti-
mate explarictl ion. " (1)
IV e have previously observad that any system, to
be knowable,must be amenable to the laws of thought;
and to be a real system, it must also be a system of
law which will guarantee the uniformity of cause and
effect, of antecedent and sequent .Upon this metaphysi-
cal assumption, science itself is based.
Any system that was merely conceptual, would, of
course, be referred to a thinker ;and it would be viewed
as wholly determined by the unity of self-conscious
intelligence. This is analogous to our conception of
the actual systemjand we find the necessary bond of
(1) " Metaphysics," p. 81..

unity and law in the Supreme Intelligence. Interact ion
is not a transitive causality ;but is to be conceived
as the immanent causality of the Fundamental Being.
Mechanical causality is the type which popular
thought tends to adopt. but this is based upon the sup-
posed independent existence of space and time; and is
baset with difficult ies , from a metaphysical point of
view, which makes it utterly untenable. With the ideal-
ity of space and time, this idea of causality loses its
self-evidence.Mechanism becomes merely a phenomenal
process; and can present no claim to dynamic significance.
This theory offers no explanation of causation in rela-
tion to succession in time. In the universal flow, things
can have no meaning, or proper exist ence , for us, except
as they are given identity through the unity of self-
conscious intelligence. Intelligence, thus, in a sense,
becomes deeper than being or causat ion ; for here in per-
sonal experience they both find their source and real-
ization.
The attempt te explain causation in the successive
phases of a developing thing by the notion of poten-
tiality is a. merely formal solution. The difference oi
any metaphysical prediction in a changing world remains
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as opaque as "before. If we say the later is potential
in the earlier, we , thereby
,
get no clear conception of
causality. If the latep is in the earlier, it cannot ad-
vance or emerge, unless some new cause or condition aris-
es. We start backward on an infinite regress in search
for a cause, and thought at last fails us. We must have
a conception of causality which provides for a begin-
ning; and this can be found only as we rise from the im-
personal to self-determining Intelligence.Here we find
the onl£ experience of causality with whieh we are ac-
quainted, and which is adequate. Only on the plane of free-
dom, does the term potential nave any meaning for us.
Again ,mechanical causality makes no provision for
"final cause , "which is essentially an act of purposive
intelligence
. In mechanical causality , what was in the pa3t
determins the present, as if pushing itself from behind;
while in volitional causality free intelligence chooses
its ends, and proceeds forward to their realizat ion. 7T o
form of necessary causation can give any light upon this
subject; or solve the monotonies involved in it when in-
telligence is ignored. Spinoza said, apart from intelli-
gence, final cause is preposterous,
Mechanical causality is burdened with contradic-
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t ions, and irreconcilable antinomies.lt assumes the
reality of time. The effect is of course determined by
the antecedents, IT ow, give the antecedent condit ions , and at
once we have the effect. So the end and the "beginning
coexist, and all events occur at the same time. Or, on
the other hand, every event refers to something preced-
ing, and so on in endless regress. The real ground of
events can newer be reached, and thought disappears.
The appeal must be had to experience jvolitional
causality is found in personal experience alone. Of
mechanical causality we have only theoretical knowl-
edge. In volitional causality, we have an adequate concep-
tion of efficient causality which is immanent in the
process; and upon which all changes depend as an abiding
power.Here we find a unity which is free from spatial
and temporal change and plurality, in self-conscious per-
sonal equality , that is able to posit the many, and at
the same time, retain its character as One. In volitional
causality alone, do we find a truly rational conception.
We must replace intraction among the many by an
immanent action of a self-determining Unity. There is
no other conception of metaphysical causality in which
*re can rest .Metaphysical laws of thought are harmonized
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in active free Intelligence. with the phenomenal ity of i
space and time , mechanical causality vanishes.Volitional
causality alone is attested, by experience. This is a
primary fact and cannot "be explained, while it best ey,
plains the problem of causality in our changing worldL
Only through the fact of a Supreme , active, and free Iri-
t elligence , do other facts in life become at all lumir
ous to our intelligence. As Ormond expresses it, "Primal
Being is self -act ivity.lTo other category of primal besing
but self -act ivity is self-explanatory." (\)
If we think of the fundamental Reality as causa] t
in its relation to the world of objects, what bearing
will our view df space and time have upon our concept<ion
of this Reality. If we rightly conclude that all true
being is essentially causal, we must think of causality
as Tuiidai4ieiital Reality, as self-active Intelligence , ar d,
finally, as personal. All finite reality ve trace to tfclis
Fundamental Reality.
We have seen that the notion of space and time as
existing things, carries with it the conception of ex*t.en-
sion for everything contained ir space and time. The
*
idea of being, as substance,has this implication. But
we have freed ourselves from this crude real ism; and we
(1) "_ asal Principles of Philosophy," p. 23.

Ill
conclude that the real is the active, the real is an agent,
and the Basal Reality is , therefore, to he conceived, not
as a passive and quantitative substance, but as an indi-
visible and unitary self-determining Power.
Through this conception of Reality,we become eman-
cipated from many troublesome pantheistic notions of
Reality as related to the universe. Reality is not a
substance, but it is causality ;and as such it is not to
be viewed as some sofct of raw material out of which
the world is made, or as a kind of spatial back-ground
upon which all things are proj ected. All conceptions which
turn objects into emanations streaming out from the
Supreme One, rest upon spatial implications, and are il-
iusive.
"This entire class of views" says Dr. Bowne, "rests
mainly upon a false and uncritical notion of substance which
identifies it with pure being or stuff; and +hus they appear
a + once in their crudity and untenibili + y , when the stuft'
idea is exploded. There is no stuff in being. The Infini + e
substance means the Infini + e agent, one and indevisible. To
explain the universe, we need not a subs+ance, but an agent,
not substantiality , but causality, the lat1 er not. ion
,
explains
the meaning of the former, and is, besides, free from sense
implications." (i)
"Metaphysics , " p, 95.
<t
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We mus + view all true existance as unitary arid causal.
In this way we may rationally escape all forms of pantheis-
tic thought. Funelemental Reality, as related to the world,
is not made up of parts. The phenomenality of space and time
eliminates all ideas of extension and division, as applied
to the Real One. Pluralism is ruled out, and a rational
Monism reigns in its stead. The finite is in no way a part,
or even a mode of the Infinite. A real thing, though finite,
must be a definite individual, and also a self-active agent.
If things are to he thiught as real, they must "be viewed
as created by the Infinite and not as divisions or
parts of Him.
God is ultimate Reality or Subject. "Our 7i*H <>xw «
says Haldane, is that the "real is the individual. We can-
not derive the universal from the particular, or find eith-
er of them elsewhere than in the concrete experience in
which we live and move. Pinal reality is Mind; for final
reality is always in the individual form".
In the individual, every state or mode, must belong
to the entire being, as every human act is the act of the
entire person. Unity of being demands this. Reality, then,
cannot be made up of parta, or the finite be intelligibly
conceived as modes of the Infinite, or as forms or moulds
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into which, like liquid ore , he may pour Himself,
We must drop all quantitative conceptions of basal
Reality, and speaks of things, if they are to be thought as
modes of Reality, as merely the constant forms of His activ-
ity, and as purely phenominal. In the words of Lotae, "Only
on the assumption of this substantial unity, is that intel-
ligible which we call reciprocal action of different things,
and which in truth is always the reciprocal action of the
different states of one and the same thing." (1)
Basal Reality mus* be thought as One, self-conscious
and self-active, and the Source or Cause of the objective
world. We can find identity, and ac + iv causality, only in
the personal self-conscious agent; and interaction can,
properly speaking, take place only among such agents. Im-
personal objecs are, then, merely dependant phenomena.
They are the manifold activity of the basal Reality.
Finite agent or person, is a real thing; and is outside
of the phenomenal world only as a special creation of the
Infinite. The finite spirit is not maue out of some material
substance; but is simply posited as a new element in the
world. Every individual person is a causal center, and can-
not, in a metaphysical sense, be indetdified with the Pund-
imental Reality. The finite person is not self-sufficient,
(l) "KierocosmUs, " p. 600.
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and, ir that sense, has an incomplete existance. In an abso-
lute sense, only the Absolute exists. It was with this
conception of the individual, that Lotze wrote, "All whic v
exists is hut one Infinite Being which stamps upon individ-
ual things in fitting forms, its own ever-similar and sel£
identical nature."
At this critical point, we can avoid pantheism only
by falling back on experience. Because there is but One who
is self-sufficient , it does not follow that all else is simply
a shadow, or is even phenomenal, which is to be far more
than a shadow. As a fact of experience, the fini + e spirit
has the power of thought , feeling, and self-act ivily, and
these qualities are the very meaning of personality. Only
upon the basis of finite self as real and self-active,
though dependent, can we interpret experience. To say that
God is the only ex£.«frtence, is suicidal to reason, and
ends in manifold absurdities. Yet neither finite nor Infii°-
i + e Spirit possesses any "core of substance," and both are
by nature non-spacial. The finite cann-et enter into the
Infinite only in the sense of community and fellowship with
Since the phenominal has not esence or being in itsef,
it must be grounded in the ultimate Reality. And, since
Him.
Lotze's "Microcosmus, " p. 600.
(c
this Reality is viewea as Intelligence, the order
of dependence of the finite is to be found ir His
purpose and plan.
7rom the stand-point of the reality of space and
time, to put nature unuer the control of a free and
volitional Being, seems to leave the world in very
unstable equilibrium. ?or freedom is often thought of
as an offence to Reason, while necessity, so-called,
a c
and mechanical causality, appear A an essential char-
acteristic of the physical order. This is a superfic-
ial assumption ; since for both science and religion,
freedom has a fundamental significance.
All of our problems are best solved in the con-
crete. Questions involving freedom especially appeal-
to experience. Perjjlexing antimonies cart be avoided
only bp finding in experience the proper content for
the abstract terms we employ. In human experience,
we mean by freedom simx>ly the power to form plans and
realize them in our activities.
The speculative bearing of this power or" choice
is usually overlooked. It is the only basis for a
rational explanation of the fact of error in thought;
and the only ground of assurance that our reasoning

faculties are worthy of our confidence, ana will not
shipwreck us in our quest for truth. ?or if error is
necessary, it becomes cosmic; there is, them, no dis-
tinction between truth and falsehood, and reason ends
in scepticism.
Our experience of necessity is limited to certain
ideal forms of thought used in order to escape con-
tradiction; all else is contingent. This points to
Inte] ligence as the ground and source of all necessity.
In nature, any metaphysical necessity must mean that
existing laws make certain facts and events inevitable.
But laws are merely an abstraction fror, intelligent
activity; while facts ana events, and even natural
laws, are known in our experience to be contingent.
It thus appears that there can be no metaphysical
necessity in nature that is properly called mechani-
cal, and incompatible with change. We shoulu rather
say all is dependent upon Intelligence, and a Supreme
Will.
True freedom does not mean indifference to
law. Preedom that has any actual significance for us
can exist only under the most rigid principles of
uniformity. Intelligence is unaer law; it is the
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ant i thesis of lawlessness. This is a fact of sel£-cons cious
• personal experience. We declare ourselves rational by
free obedience. to the laws of thought. Abstract freedom,
and abstract necessity have no existencejbut both free-
dom and necessity are united in concrete experience.
This freedom is not opposed to science in any of
its formsjbut it presupposes uniformities in thought
and nature. Yet natural laws are all cont ingent ; and ar e
used in human experience to control facts and events
in human life. freedom gives the only rational foundat ion
for science and philosophy. freedom is a primal and centra]
fact in personality , and in experience; and must be sim
ply recognized as such. Its only demonstration possibl e
is the fact of experience itself. All categories must
find their content through experience. Otherwise they are
but forms of thought, and possibili+ ies of reality.
Allowing necessity to be a primary law of thought,
it does not
,
therefoee, reveal what must actually appear
in fact. The world is, in this way, cont ingent upon a fun-
damental
,
free
,
and volitional Reality. In this Reality,
these same primary principles take their source. They
do not rule over Being, but are dependent uuon Being.
Apart from a fundamental Reality, they have no existen ce;
't
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but they are the expression of the nature of +his Reality.
By being what it is, Reality founds all law, and all activi-
ty, and all necessity there is in the worlc^of things.
Law is not something imposed upon Realityjbut is
an expression of the nature of Reality through which tt
realizes itself. Law does not, therefore, limit Reality,
any more than the human mind is limited by its laws of
thought .Reality is One basal Being which founds the sys-
tem of things , including its laws, principles, and all
apparent realities. Space and time are not independent
and original existences ;but are, lika wise, among the modes
of realization of the fundamental Reality which is in-
telligent and free. Intelligence conditions all reality,
as we know it. This Intelligence unites our world-system;
and must be assumed in its knowubility.lt is the basis of
any identity and causality that we can understand.
Any other conception of the fundamental Reality
seems to us to offer no solution of the world-problem
which is not self-destruct ive and absurd. Apart from Intel-
ligence
,
there can be no system of law; and there can be
no reign of law, apart from the Lawgiver. The world of things
is phenomenal , and has meaning only as the activity of a
fundamental Reality ;and the finite spirit can interpret
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itself only by linking itself to the Supreme Spirit-
as its free creation.
But we are not to think of this Reality as limit-
ed by spatial forms. Reality is not only self-active and
causal, it is true personality . Upon this point , Ormond has
written <*s folows:"The great lessou the masters have to
teach us is that philosophy reaches its highest cate-
gory in the notion of being5/ in its essence self -active.
The intuition of this is as old as Socrates and Plato.
Every other idea of self-act ivity, short of that which
represents it as self -cor sc ious , involves a subtle con-
tradiction. Self -activity, in the last analysis ,means
self-affirmation ; and if self -active then personal.
Being only becomes intelligible when we translate self-
active intelligence into the energy of self-conscious
personality . " (1)
In personality , only intelligence and volition are
required. If self-consciousness , self-knowledge, and self-
determination constitute personality ,we must conclude
that tke fundamental Reality or God is, in the fullest
sense, the only personality ;and thatthe human personality
is incomplete.
We are to think of this personality as non-spatial
(1) "Basal Concepts of Phil osophy , " p. 13.

in all of PI is relations . We cannot say that the world
is either within or without the Supreme One. It is simply
dependent upon Him. Intelligence is not composed of laws;
though He may manifest Himself through these. Experi-
ence alone reveals the natuire of this Reality. we cannot
explain Him; we simply rcjcogniise Him. He is the alpha and
omega of our thought and life.
We carry our metaphysical inquiry a little further
and ask how we are to conceive of the aasELOs as a whole.
In evary age, says lotze,some necessary connection among
things has be^n sought. And Kant held that reason de-
mands that things shall form a system. This category
is expressed in the notion of the world, nature, or the
cosmos, as the embodiment of order and harmony.
With, our idealistic view of space and time, can
we accept the current notion that natuee is a salf-running
machine?Or must we think of the world as the continuous
activity of a self-conscious Kind?The popular view of
the world identifies it with physical nature. This concep-
tion is clumsy and materifllist ic. Space and ti'ne are as-
sumed as conditioning laws of the cosmos
,
physical ob-
jects are supposed to be substantial realities, and
causality is found in the form of inhering forces vhich

appear in the various motions among things.
According to Spencer we have these elements, space
and time, matter, force, and motion, the alphabet with <vhich
we must spell aat and explain the world or cosmos.
Tatter is taken in its usual literal sense. In his First
Principles ,he says"77e need not, in our physical , chemical
,
and other researches , refrain from dealing with matter
as made up of extended and resist ent atoms." (1)
From a common sense point of view, we may, of course,
rscogniz^ these categories as essential forms of thought,
and magnify their value for practical study, and for
their utility in our daily experience.But , if we conceive
of space and time as phenomenal , it is evident we must
look upon these forms as merely a scientific method of
research, and not as a metaphysical doctrine, or expla-
nation of the .vorld.From our view-point , the cosmos,
with its space and time,matter, force, and motion, is
phenomenal ; and, obviously its causality is located, not
in matter, but in the reality behind it. According to a
cheap, yet popular concept ion, everything in nature can
be explained in terms of matter and motion.
This view has been generally held as a sufficient
philosophical theory of the universe. Lotze said that
"First Principles," p. 14^.

./hat is distinctive of the mechanical attitude of COn-
^kot
temporary science, is not .there must be some necessary
connection among things, hut the further speculation as t
the meaning and origin of this necessity. 7rom our po-
sit ion, theoretically , nature as a strictly mechanical
system, is inadequate to the facts, not only, "but is ra-
tionally altogether impossible.
Practically, scientific naturalism, as the method of
advance toward a better civilisation, is a harmless pro-
cess, and can receive only praisejbut as a philosophy,
naturalism is quite another question. As such, it is but
a refined form of that crude realism which has already,
in our study of reality, been justly condemned as with-
out any solid metaphysical basis.
1'atter, force, and motion, with space and time, are
said to be the only factors needed for the interpreta-
tion of the world. All cosmic rjrocesses have been account
ed for by the integration of matter and the concomitant
discipation of motion. It has been urged that ill natural
phenomena are to be mechanically explained.But the pop-
ular conception of mechanism has never been clear; and
one must insist on the proper use of terms.
The Greeks ruled out of their theory all the no-
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tions of occult qualities , and allowed only matter ana
motion in space and time.?orce, it has been said, is a dy-
namic idea, and must not be introduced in pure mechanism.
Descarte denied the reality of space, which the Greeks
assumed, and held all dynamic theories of matter to be
oposed to mechanism; for he said, nature ia like a machine,
and is moved only from without. Newton claimed that
certain "forces"were immanent in matter, and produce
phenomena according to mechanical laws. Since the dis-
covery of ra.dio-act ivity , the conception of matter has
been again revolutionised; and the mechanical theory is
still further in unstable equilibrium.
T
rodern thinkers, of course, do not deal with tradition-
al and unwieldy mat f er;for matter has passed through
many revisions , and is 3till changing and advancing in
its possibilities.lt has advanced, in theory, from dead
and bulky mass, to become endowed with qualities of mind
and consciousness , ant with powers to produce complex
molecules and organisms , and the end is not yet.
The recent discoveries of Becquerel and Curie have
put a new fa.ce upon many problems in science. New rev-
elations in atomic structure, with ions , corpuscles , and
electrons , transmutation ancjnew creation of matter,have
<c
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opened, up questions of unprecedented interest. New
conceptions of mutter have now to be formed. Duncan
writes: "The casus belli of the contemporary struggle
in science, is the nature of the chamist's atom. There
has come, as the most upsetting of all preconceived ideas,
the discovery of Becquerel rays, and the phenomena of
radio-act ivity. Where lefore there was solid waivable
ground, for the older sciences, now there is nothing but
shifting sand. The last century began with the atom, and
the result is the implements of civilisation as we have
them. This century begins with the atom within the atom,
and if one may judge, the civilisation of the coming years
will be rapidly modified and eventually transformed into
phases of which we now have but the barest glimpses." (l)
Duncans atom is "a sphere of positive electrification
enclosing a number of negative electrified corpuscles."
On this theory, he says, we are able to explain all the
mysteries of matter. But he speaks here as a scients only;
for he has already that what matter is in itself is a
mystery, and concerns only the metaphysician.
Gutter, in whatever form, solves on mysteries. In
taenew science, as HOf feline n^s '-veil said, "The atom be-
comes a complete microcosm, a solar system; and a whole
"The New Knowledge," Introduction, p. X7«
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army of new questions and problems regarding the inne r
relations of this little world arise. The atomic conce pt
springs out of the need to localize the well-spring of
force." (1)
We emphasize the fact that any theory of matter, »7hich
retains it as a substanceAin space and time, affords no meta-
physical solution to the world problem. On any, theory of
matter, as such ,mechanism fails to give any adequate ac-
•
count of causality in nature. All that mechanism can <3ive
is a redistribution of matter according to the laws o f
• mot ion. Except in a merely scientific sense, it contain s
no aausal explanation.
There is here no metaphysical explanation of the
facts, except as we build the facts themselves into th e
mechanism which is to explain them. This process ends in
nothing but monotony and taut ology. Allowing atoms to be
real, just such forces , asd those only, must be posited
within the atoms as would be adequate to explain the fac t s
which would result from them.
lo account for qualitative dif ference3 , and for,^ c ~
ganization, forces trust become structural laws, with im-
plications of intelligence. We have seen that, in the
nature of being, spatial changes among things can be ac-
(1) "The philosophy of Religion," p. 59.
t
counted for only by assuming metaphysical changes
within things . Chemical changes among atoms must be view
ed as determined by certain dynamic relations within
the elements themselves. Qualitative change is far more
than mere quantitative arrangement of the atoms. This
process is not something we can picture {metaphysical
causality penetrates deeper than the imagination can
follow.
Every outer change implies an inner change. One
of the puzzles of the physicist is how atoms can act at
a distance. Haldane remarks upon the significance of
this principle that space , according to our theories of
mat ter , cannot be continuous full;and we are bound to
accept action at a distance.How can this be; for we
are driven to hold the word atom to be itself a mere
expression for a center of force without content or
dimentions. Yet all the mechanical activity of sub-
stance consists in activity at a distance.
Bowne/ias shown that
,
according to the mechanical
view of nature, act ion at a distance is both necessary
and absurd.He says, "To attempt to dispense with action
at a distance must really deny all attractive and re-
pulsive forces to the elements, and either appeal at
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once to a coordinating and moving force in matter
which is not of matter, or it must reduce all material
action to impact." (1) The latter is absurdjfor, accord-
ing to scientific theory, there is no contact among atom-
ic elements.
•Mechanism must be limited to phenomena; for its
explanation reaches nothing more than simple co-exist-
ence and sequence. As a metaphysical order ,mechanism has
no clear meaning ; for as such it contains no productive
or actual causality , but is a pure sbstraction. When
thinling in scientific terms , dynamic or metaphysical
causality is usually overlooked.But logic requires that
the effects shall equal their causes. In a mechanical
scheme, we have to postulate causes adequate to the ef-
fects. If we assume that mechanism can explain all the
phenomena of experience , life, mind, and morals , we see at
once, that in all concrete problems, the complexity would
become practically infinite. This complexity must be
provided for in the cause, or the cause fails to explain.
Naturalistic metaphysics comes to a deadlock here,
and breaks down. With the mere abstract terms, space and
t ime, matter , force and motion, we can never reach the
concrete facts in the cosmic world. As well may we, by
(1) "Metaphysics, p. 212
«
the chance tossing of a case of type, expect tqhave
them "build themselves into a poem or an oration. In-
telligence is adequate to account for the grouping
which constitutes lit erature ; or to explain the collo-
cation and coordination, which, out of chaos has construct
ed a cosmic order.
Popular naturalism assumes that atoms may "be so
endowed with elemental forces that they alone, through
interaction in space,may pass from the simple to the
complex, and from the homogeneus to the heterogeneous.
Put this is^illusion through falling a prey to a com-
mon fallacy, and mistaking mere logical form for actual
fact. This is to overlook the law of the concrete which
demands that the complexity found in the effect shall
"be also in the cause. Only intelligent causality can
construe the cosmos of experience.
The cosmos, as made up of matter and mot ion, and aa u
self-sufficient and self -running system, is an illusion.
Its metaphysics are untenable : and its application of
the category of cause from a point of view which is
impossible. By a mistaken use of language, the very elect
may be led astray. Fairbairn observes that "Slight of
tongue is a more illusive art than even slight of hand;
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and metaphysics do not become physics bji being stated
in .the terms of •matter ,mot ion , and force. 1 ITor do they
turn into biology by being expressed in the formula of
natural selection." (1)
In all this scientific mechanism, there is a very
interesting suggestion of idealismjand the more advanced
the science, the stronger the suggest ion. This grows out
of the essential mystery as to the nature of matter it-
self.Ormond has put it in this way: "As I understand it,
the chemist has no intuition of his atoms, and it is cer-
tain that the physicist has no intuition of the ulti-
mate forces on which his system rests, and much of trie
ether which is perhaps more of a luxury than a ns--
cessary of life. " (2
)
This clumsy form of the mechanical view of the
cosmos, in popular speculation , is seldom distinguished fro'
one more ideal and more plausible, which puts the emphasis
upon law rather than upon matter. It would at first se^m
that mechanism might be redeemed, if we could identify
nature with theVeign of law'^ Law now becomes the deter-
mining factor ;and the cosmic processes are controlsd
by some power we call law. This mechanical postulate
is now universally assumed.
(1) "Philosophy of the Christ ian Religion, "p. 52.
(2) "^ounaations of knowledge," p. 321.
1
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"There is of late, "writes Henry Crew "a very dis-
tinct change of feeling in regard to the principle of
the uniformity of nature. The father of the present Duke of
Argyle rendered marked service to science in pointing
out how wide-spread is the use of physical and natural
law.However tangled the knot of physical facts we are
called upon to explain, the first thing we assume is
that these phenomena are subject to law. We assume that
we are studying a machine which behaves in a definite
manner. This assumption aJJ. men adopt as a laboratory
convenience, one might better say a laboratory essential."
Grew admits that there apparent deviations from
mechanical law which have led to some of the most impor-
tant biologicals problems. Yet he is convinced that the
leading scholars of our country, even in zoology and
botany, are all working on the assumption that biolog-
ical phenomena are physical phenomena. He, however , wisely
guards himself by saying , "That
,
while we treat nature
as a machine, and while we adopt the mechanical hypoth-
esis as a necessity of productive scholarship, let us
be very careful not to allow ourselvesAto dogmatise to
the extent of saying that a machine is all we have."
It has been quite generally and naively assumed (1)
(1) "Science,
"
April 8, 1910.
II
"
w * I
that life, and mind, and morals, and all human activities,
^ may reasonably appear as the result of natural processes
This theory , also , like the cruder form of mechanism, he-
comes in popular thought , metaphysical , and involves, not
only phenomena, but their rational causes. Nothing beyond
nature is recognised as required to explain the facts
of exper ience ; and as law is magnified, the Law-giver
appears to be minimized.
Law ,as Lotze suggests
,
is not considered as
any thing mysterious in its nature. Ke writes that "Scien
tific is not that this connection is incomprehensible.
The severctial states of things are held to proceed in-
telligibly one out of another so that each prior state
contains in itself the reason why, by a universal and com
prehensible law, the poserior is necessary-ily required
as its consequence." (1)
The great truth in this notion of "the reign of
law," is, that order is a necessary postulate of our
thought; and all study of facts and events in life
assumes that •here are fixed laws by means of which
our aims car be realized. This fact constitutes the
scientific method of investigation, and upon this mew
thod all our practical wisdom and activities in life
(1) "Microcosrnus , p. 27.
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must rest. But to this conception of nature, as an
order governed by law, the temi mechanism has been
applied; and it thus becomes no less misleading than
the cruder form of mechanism alreauy notea which
centers in matter itself.
We have seen that, critically speaking, no on-
tological mechanism of any sort can be said to exist;
-
and that impersonal being car be viewed only as the
substantiation of phenomena, for it has no substan-
tial existence of its own. Law, no less +han matter,
is a mere abstraction, and can have no independent
being. As an order of law, then, the cosmos has only
phenomenal existence; and is wholly dependent upon
the will of an independent, self-conscious Law -giver.
In nature, we find sequence, but no real causality.
The explanations of nature made by "law" are only
superficial; and give no insight into the causal
ground and connection of things*
?airbairn, in his criticisrr of Spinoza, makes
this clear. Ke says "Spinoza distinguished 'natura
naturans' from'natura r.a+urata 1 ; the former causative,
creative, efficeint nature, the la+ter, nature as
caused, created, produced. The distinction was sub
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jective and arbitrary; it represented no objective
reality. We do not know this 'nature as caused' by
itself. It is the 'causative nature' viewed as a
realized and embodied order. Nor are we able to sep-
arate the 'naturans' from the 'naturata' ; for it is
only the system we know conceived through the causal
idea, a system charged with the energies which, as
efficient, are the sufficient reason for its contin-
uance." (1)
This nature as law is, however, looked upon as a
system of necessary causality; and it is said this in-
volves the notion of unbroken continuity, which allows
no interference or action upon nature from without.
The demand for continuity of some kind, is rational;
but the problem is bow we shall conceive this contir-
uity. Leibnitz first formulated the law ana limited
it to motion. How it is applied to every department
of thought ana experience. In evolution, it is re-
lied upon as a first principle, and a fundamental
law of progress.
The "uniformity postulate" is now generally re-
garded as a fundamental hypothesis. It is another
formulation of the mechanical postulate. Without
(1) "The Philosophy of the Christian Religion,"
p. 24.
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this postulate, it is said, we should be unable to
generalize our physical laws so as to include many
new phenomenal It is agreed by all that there is
continuity of some kind; but what is actually and
certainly continuous in nature.
As a system of existing things, nature is contin-
gent upon the will and purpose of a fundamental Cause.
As an order of inductive causality, nature, as a mat-
ter of fact, is continuous; but this continuity is not
a metaphysical necessity. The conception of inper-
sonal and mechanical causality contains, in itself,
no assurance of uniform r.anifcfestat ion . Metaphysical
continuity must again be referred to cosmic Intelli-
gence. The same is true of the continuity of phenom-
ena. We have an order of succession; but the inner,
and metaphysical continuity eludes our observation.
We recognize the continuous validity of some
system of law; and that the thought must be contir-
uos of which nature is the changing expression. But
+ he continuity of nature scans, simply, the continuity
of phenomenal law. Nature, as cosmic mechanism, is
not to be conceived as like a machine of human invention
Mature is contingent; and open to innovation and
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chance from humar intelligence. Nature opposes ho
hard and fast barrier to finite freedom; much more may
we conceive it to be mobile in the hand of the Infinite.
Natural laws are the rules by which Fundamental Real-
ity proceeds. We know by experience that the system
of law under which we live is pliable to our intelli-
gence, and thus serves our purposes. We find no ab-
solute and rigid continuity in nature; and we must
conceive the cosmos as dependent upon the continuous
purpose of the higher Intelligence.
Upon the continuity of law, evolution has been
founded; and it will illustrate^ the confusion of the
phenomenal and the ontological conceptions of nature.
As a mere description of a phenomenal order of things,
evolution is, when properly stated, to be commended;
but it car; not be allowed as an order of metaphysical
causality, nor does it simplify the concrete problems
of nature. It has been said we can trace the complex
back to the simple anu homogeneous as a starting
point. It is claimeu that this order obtains ir a.l 1
development, from the lowest inorganic forms, up
through mind to the highest civilization.
But «w©lution is very properly silent Ml to
J

136
It
causality; and when so pEesented, is compatible with
any theory of metaphysics. In a scientific sense,
evolution is but a description of a phenomenal order.
It has no creative, or productive power, or ever a
controling influence. As a theory of causation, evo-
lution has no metaphysical support. Whether as cosmic
formular, or as biologica.1 theory, upon this impersonal
tasis, evolution can explain no new departure; and,
therefore, in a mechanical scheme, there can be no
progress. If we find progress from the simple to the
complex, we must, if we would be rational, trace it
to free Intelligence as its source.
Free Intelligence, says Bowne, "is the only
simplicity which can originate complexity; the only
unity which car produce plurality; the only universal
which can specify itself into particulars; the only
real explanation of anything. " (IT) o doubt Intelligence
is itself the mystery of all mysteries; but it has
this advantage, it does explain other things, if not
itself. Mechanism but adds mystery to mystery. The
catagories of causality, potentiality, necessity,
possibility, and continuity, which have to be used in
mechanism, convey to us in the concrete, no definite
(1) "Theory of Thought," p. 233.
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meaning. Ultimate facts are always mysterious. Intelli-
gence is an ultimate fact; and can not be explained,
yet it furnishes the only rational ground upon which
to rest.
The world is a system of thought, law, and order;
and only a personal Thinker can account for it, and
explain it. "The system, or process of nature," says
Blewett, "is a divine activity; it is. if you will,
part of the divine thought. Our sciences of nature,
are the thinking of the thoughts of On e who is in-
visible- a thinking of God's thoughts after Him.
And this thinking of God's thoughts after Eim4 of reading
the hook He has written, is possible because God has
reproduced Himself in us. The highest conception of
idealism is the conception of self -communicat ing
Spirit as the principle of union, the constituting
and governing power of the universe." (1)
We think of the cosmos then as phenomenal; and
yet as real in our experience. The world is not a
fairy tale; but an actual , divine activity. It is
constituted, enegized, ard continued by an immanent
aivire Intelligence and Will. The natural order ex-
ists in constant dependence upon this Will. Natural
(1) "Jtudy of Nature and the Vision of God", pp.72, 251.

causation does not give any assurance of order. All
mechanical conceptions of the cosmos result from the
misleading realism of an actual space and time. Mechjf*
an ism explains nothing. To do this it must 'have a
co-efficier t of Personal Intelligence. Without this,
nature has no meaning. Nature is the manifestation,
under the forms of space and time, of a divine causal-
ity; and thus becomes an intelligible means of com-
munication between the Infinite and the finite. A
clear and helpful illustration of this conception
of the world is giver by Dr. Bowne in "Personal ism .
"
It is that of a musical symphony. The harmony of the
world-order is produced by the Divine Musician. It
finds its response in the human audience. The harmony
of the cosmic order is dependent upon Hia purpose
and pleasure. It exists primarily for the performer,
and secondarily for the audience; and both are mutual
ly concerned.
With the idealistic conception of tbe unverse,
we are free from the monotonies and depressions of a
materialistic mechanism; and are lifted into a sense
of the Divine presence and protection which is more
worthy of a Supreme Intelligence. Theoretically, this

S~\ view emancipates us from subjection to self -destructive
and superficial thought which accompanies, all forms
of mechanism; and it brings to our consciousness a
better realization of the Infinite as the immanent
and active Law of the cosmos, and the beneficient Life
of the ra.ce.
Of the mechanical theory of the world Ormand
says, - "j'rom the stand-point of this theory, a living
organism is inconceivable. The vorld-evolut ion is
grounded immediately in an immanent potency, and med-
iately, in the self -act iv ity of a trancendent Creator
and jTirst Cause." (1) And another writer sums up
mechanism in these trenchent words: "It makes no prac-
tical difference whether the real substance is of the
clumsy space-filling materaisl, or of the finer stuff
that dreams are made of, both are combinations of
atomic, indivisible elements, both are controlled by
physical laws, both make the world a succession of
causes and effects. Psychological mechanism has no
advantage over the physical. Both mean a dead world
without ends and values,- laws but no duties; effects
) but mo purposes, causes but no ideals." We may add
only the continuous going forth of «n intelligent and
(1) "Basal Concepts in Philosophy," pp. 90, 92.
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conscious Self -act ivity car account for + he actual
cosmos of hunan experience.
We find that the idea 1 ity of space and tire ,
theoretically, involves an entire change o& conception
as to the notion of "being, of causality, the 7undunen + a}
Reality, and of the cosnos. Turning once more, in
our metaphysical study , to mind or soul, we meet even
here, the subtle influence of the same realistic notions.
Upon whatever phase of the subject we look, we find
that picture-thinking has entered, and has distorted
the general conceptions of psychology. Space meta-
phors are used to speak o^ the invisible and +he
non-spatial.
Tho presnt is a psychological age, and, in pop-
ular thought, as it has "been said: "The vhole vorld,
I hyaiological
,
physical, chemical, and biological world of outer ex-
perience, is atomized and explained ,- there remains
only the world of inner experience to be brought under
the views of natural science. We are now in the middle
of the period of the natural science of the mental
life. It has develioped into an insight in. o the
mechanism of the highest acts, emotions, thoughts, and
creations. It is now at home wherever mental life is
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touched. All seek to have a psychology - society, art , relig-
ion, law, and history. What becomes of the universe, oil the
human race, our duty and freedom, uur friends and ourr
selves, if psychology is not only true, but the only truth,
and has to determine the values of our own real life. "(I)
Th3 nature of the soul is the central problem in
psychology. In our experience, the soul appears as the
mentul subject, as an active and abiding self. But the
new psychology approaches the subject from the physiolog-
ical side, and is inclined to look upon the physiological
self as but a group of sensational elements in consciousness
;
and the whole field naturally becomes infested with spatial
terms of the physical world.
The question is whether the soul is a mere name for
a set of states of consciousness produced by organization,
or whether it is, properly speaking, a self-conscious agent,
acting from its ov/n initiative. The latter would be the
idealistic view, tl.o former the realistic ormat erialist ic
conception. VThatever metaphysical view of matter we may
take, if ve hold that the soul Is but a function of organiz-
ation, and that it has no subs\antial existance, this is
Odllea materialism.
We observe that all such views deal with some form
—
=
(1). Munst erberg 1 s "psychology and Life," pp.4. 21.

of matter ,however refined and mysterious; and that its
conceptions are largely determined by the common
notion of the reality of space ana time. In our vie-v,
matter, in any form, has only phenomenal existence;
and the soul alone gives the true idea of actual "being*
But, in the natural science of psychology, matter is
assumed as a substantial thing; and, as .Tames says,
"matter is assumed to exist independently of the per-
ceiving mind, in spite of the fact that further re-
flection leads to idealism."
The common and superficial argument for material-
ism',^' that because, in life, the physical and mental
accompany each other, and the physical appears to con-
dion the mental, it is therefore its cause. This
conclusion is based upon spatial conceptions of matter
and motion; and that the grouping of molecu&s can explain
the nature of mind. Thought thus becomes the product
of purely physical forces in matter. But to say that
thought is nothing but a movement of physical elements,
or of matter in the crude sense, is now, by material-
ists themselves, considered absurd. As matt r is com-
monly conceited, all agree that thought and feeling can
not be deduced. Tyndal wrote that "the notion that

traditional matter car produce life and mind is absurd,
monstrous, and fit only for the intellectual gibbet."
But dues the new aefinition of "matter us a
mysterious cause" relieve the situation? Life and
mind, it is said, are the very "flower of matter and
force." If this be true, we amy veil agree that "any
definition of matter which omits life and mind must
be inadequate, if not untrue." This refined order of
matter is required by the higher modern materialism.
What advantage is there in definitions that make
such gratuitous assumptions? Still, the same crude
spatial notions are involved which have already con-
demned the '//hole theory.
Matter, it is claimed, has t vo sides or faces,
one is mental, the other is material. This is a mon-
istic conception for the purpose of uniting matter and
mina; but it is still materialistic. One substance
is back of tvvo opposite manifestations. We cannot, how-
ever, in this way transcend the ubiquitous sensuo s meta-
physics. Space is here again tacitly assumed, and Txistance
in space appears to be the only reality. We must, at any
ra + e, refer both vital and mental phenomena to matter;
not to vulgar matter, to be sure, but to that which is mys-
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terious and mystic. This is the dynamic matter of
science. By this the materia] and the spiritual are
to be reconciled.
But this hope is an illusion; for the picture
ef thinking continues, and the logic is found to be
untenable. The assumed "double-faced somewhat" fails
to explain the relation of the physical to the mental.
Psycho -physical parallelism, /ith its "neurosis and
psychosis", does not free us from dualism and material-
ism. The physical and the mental series of activities
can not be mutually adjusted without violation of fixed
scientific laws. The conservation of energy vill not
allow us, li is said, to consider thought as an effect
of the physical series. The physical series is ex-
hausted in the physical realm; and thought is therefore
dropped out as having no place in the series of cause
and effect. Thought becomes a mere attendent or shadow
of the physical and has no causal energy or power.
This saves the notion of continuity; but creates the
absurdity of thought accompanying physical motions without
any assignable ground for so doing. And yet inter-
action must be assumed, between the mental and the
phsical, which again makes thought a form of energy.
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On this "basis interaction becomes utterly unin-
telligible and absurd. This theory makes an Impassable
gulf, and then attempts to bridge it by the help of the
imagination. Though we modify matter as substance or
energy ana give it various .sides and aspects, still
we make no progress. Some sort of pluralism is hid-
den beneath our reasoning. There remain the incom-
mensurable ana irreconcilable thoaufcfc world and
thing world, under very atrami relations, and united
by hypothesis only.
With^'a conscious self, there can be no explana-
tion of our thought and life. An infinite substance,
with thought on one side and extension on the other,
has no necessary or intelligible relation to our per-
sonal eslf -conscious activities. All this is mere
sense thinking, and falls to explain the soul. 7rom
our point of vi^Ar, all impersonal existence is phenom-
enal only; and active intelligence is the sole form
of real being. We have founa that Intelligence is
th^only basis for a rational epistemology and metaphysics;
and certainly psychology can buila safely upon no
other foundation. The conclusions of a materialistic
psychology are summarized, with keenest insight, by

Dr. Eowne. "i'.emory, reflect ion, and consciousns^s
in general, are only the suggestive shadows of molec-
ular changes in the brain, or of nascent motor excita-
tion. Cental movement of every sort is due, not to any
self -de^terminat ion of reason, bu+ to the nervous machine;
and ^his in turn is subject only to laws of molecular
mechanism. The coexistance of ideas means the coexistence
of the appropriate nervous states* The comparison of
iaeas, the interaction of these states, a conclusion or
ct choice, means + ha + one nervous set has displaced another
nervous set. The processes of logic represent no nec-
essary order of reason; but only the subjective side of
a conflict among nervous states. A conclusion actually
reached, or a view actually held, represent no fixed
truth; but only the superior strength of the corres-
ponding nervous combinations. Truth, in any case,
is only a nervous resultant, and depends upon the
nerves." (1)
If we turn to Prof. James, we do not find much
relief from this empty materialistic psychology. "WE
can not", he writes, prove unconditional dependence
of mental action upon neural change; but this concep-
tion is the working hypothesis which underlies all
(1) "Metaphysics ii p. 319.
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recent ' phy&kological psychology'. This seems a prioiri
materialism; but, dependence of thought u;,on brain act:Lon
does not in the least explain the nature of thought.
Yet, at present, psychology is on the materialistic
tr*ck.
As to a personal self, he says, "Por psychology,
the hypothesis of a sub-strate, or abiding principle i)f
unity, or self, is superfluous."
Sowne has shown and both James and Funsterberg
acknowledge, that the concomitance of the physical and
the mental series is not absolute; nevertheless, the '.[at-
ter makes the following assertion: "whether the
psycho -physical connections have one exception, or on< i
million, is indifferent; the belief that the connec-
tion exists without exception is the chain on which
the psycho -physical system hangs; and it must fall if
the chain is broken,- whether broken once, or a thou-
sand times." "Psychology needs the psycho -physical
connection; and this is complete or nothing-- con-
nection is complete." "Every actioo, every expression
every function, which seems to refer to psychological
experience, must find the totallity of its causes on
the physical bide since evry exception would be a
Munsterberg, "Psychology and Life", pp. 42,
43, 64, 71.
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miracle-- according to the conservation of energy."
The statements of the great psychologist will
"befound, by not afew, to he irreconcilable, if not
positively contradictory; for along with t v'e ahove, he
says "We have emphasized the ftict that values and duties,
freedom and responsibility
,
belong to the inner life
and its real activity; hut not to the system of psy-
chological facts into which we have transformed the
inner life." From this it woi;ld seem that there is an
"inner life" unrelated to the outer or physical life.
We infer, however, that he simply affirms concomitant
variation; and, as he expresses it, "that, ideas are
but the accompaniments of the physical process; and,
that psycho-physical-paretllelism does not seek to ex-
plain the idea by physical processes, or vica versa,
but merely to state that they necessarily belong to-
gether. "
We have before shown that mechanism, in the physi-
cal world is a failure; and the attempt to carry mech-
anism into the organic ana mental realm will prove no
less fictitious ana empty. Spatial conceptions here
enter still more fatally to confuse our thought. The
processes are more complicated. In the inorganic
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world, wholes are made uf> of parts, and explained "by
composition. But, in the living world, the whole is
not the sum of the parts; hut the parts are functions
of the whole, and a«e determined by the lav of the or-
ganism.
When mechanism is applied to organisms, spatial
terminology is too often used, and counsel is darkened,
but knowledge is not advanced. This is especially
true in psychology. Kena&l activities can not be
spatially represented. When we approach the study from
the physical side, our terms are naturally cast in the
moulds of matter; but >ve can not, without absurdity,
ascribe spatial properties to mental states. As in
physical mechanism, so in synthetic psychology, com-
position has been assumed as the form of expla-inat ion.
All complex mental states, it is said, are com-
pounded of simple ones.
"The result," says Bowne, " is that a fearfully lar^e
part of psychological literature is a mirage of words
and physical images, which either conceal the facts,
or distort them out of all likeness to themselves.
No where has the fallacy of language wrought greater
havoc and ravage than in this field; and psychology

has no more pressing duty than to throw off its age-
long bondage to figures of speech." (1)
In this mental mechanism, terms with physical
connotations are in contant use. The facts are hidden
behind {physical and spatial metaphors, and then the
metaphors are mistaken for the facts. Spatial terms as
applied to mind, are figurative only and must be so
understood. We have a conscious experience of things
and events; but this fact can only be experienced, it
can not be represented in space images.
With the ideality of space and time, mental mech-
anism, also, is vacated, and vanishes of its own vac-
uity'. We observe, however, that sensations, which are the
elements of mental mechanism, are not things, and
can not be thought as fragments of "mind- stuff,"
or some sort of units with which we may build a
structure, and menatl mechanism also breaks down of its
own weight. Epistemology shows that sensations have
no permanent existence of their own; hut they exist only
in their logical meaning as expressed in a timeless
idea, which is made possible through a unitary self.
The mechanical theory begins with the universals
which it claims to create.

The interact ion, or reciprocal relation, of sensations
becomes intelligible only as we appeal to the mental
self or subject ;and this higher unitary principle cannot
be spatially represented. The elements in psychology are
neither spatial, substantial, nor dynamic. Our psychological
study must be a mere description of mental facts, and
of discovered laws. It must not attempt to be a metaphys-
ical explanation of these facts. We must be content with
describing the phenomenal oeder as given in experience.
The memory, or the reproduction , even more than the
constitution of mental facts has been the field of im-
agination , and misleading rhetoric. The subject lends itself
readily to phrases about "vast halls or dim chambers of
memory where the past is stored, or more scientifically
and philosophically, as filled with latent mental modi-
fications
,
and subjective consciousness , or sub-liminal
mental states,or us filled up with nascent motor-exci-
tations, with ideal attachments."
I'emory is assumed to be the bringing back into con-
sciousness that which exists in some form outside of
consciousness. Ideas and facts appear to sink below a
"threshold" and to rise again; and by this figure of speech
repcoduction is made clearfAll this is illusion, and

the mere picturing of unpicturable mental elements,
which have no spatial or temporal, but only logical
existence. The plain fact is that we simply have the
power to rethink what was once thought by us - this is
all. Memory cannot be explained by the physical organism,
but only in terms of itself.
Thoughts and mental states are mental functions.
They exist nowhere except in the activity of the soul.
Memory is a ne.v act and experience; but similar to
one that preceeded it. It is a unique functior^of the
mind. In such an axper ience , except in a figurative sense,
there is nothing in consciousness , or in the mind. The
laws of association are not causal. The term is assumed
to describe a process which admits of no construction.
Cerebral reproduction is but an added and meaningless
phrase from physiological metaphysics ; and throws no light
upon the sub j ect .Except in an inductive sense,mental
chanism,as an explanation of psychological facts, is pure-
ly fictitious. This is not a denial of the psychological
lav/s which have been revealed in experience, which enable
us to form valuable and practical rules for our daily
living.
Since the time of Kant, an attempt of a pantheistic
<
oraerjnas "been made, in which the soul or self has "been
dissolved away into a phenomenal or metaphysical haze.
Eere, too, the spatial illusion has "been effective. The (Sis
-
tinction Has made between the empirical and the noumenal,
the phenomenal and the substantial self.Kant claimed that
while the subject might appear as one, we could not say
that the substrate lying back of it, or the noumenal sub-
strate of the soul, had unity or identity. We meet here
the old superstition of extra-mental reality,which we
have ruled out as irrational.
In experience , we are bound to say there is onlyTes-
sential self for us to know; and that is the self which
v/e are conscious of knowing. The transcendental ego is
no back-lying noumenal self, but the unitary self of
experience , which is necessary to any knowledge.Kant
brought into this theory a crude notion of a mysterious
substratum of being ;but we have repudiated this as an un-
warranted bondage to realism. Kant said the mental subject
must be one;and this is satisfactory , for this subject
is all there is. The ego which thinks , feels , and acts,
demonstrates its own existence , and thus proves its
own unity and identity.
It has been said, that so far as psychology as a sci-

ence goes,'-re need no substantial or identical subject.
James declares that the hypothesis of an abiding prin-
ciple of unity or self is " superfluous, "States of con-
sciousness
,
or a stream of thought's is &H that psychology
needs to work with. For the presents the notion of a self
is abandoned^Aii yet sons aay +he soul or self may get
its inning again. In philosophy , the soul forms a category
of thought natural to the human mind,"
The notion of a "stream of thought "suggests that
this is all, and that the soul or self is unreal, or need
not be considered at all. But the reality or existerce
of the soul as an active ana abiding self, is a general,
conviction of the commom sense of the race. There is a
rational demand for such a unitary self to make knowl-
edge possible and to form a ground for society, and a
basis for a general notion of responsibility. Any denial
of such existence and reality is based upon the spatial
idea of a kernel or core of substance in which the catego-
ry of being might be located, and so constitute it an
existing thing. The opposite is the fact;the soul acts, and
thereby proves its existence and reality.
The identity of tne auul Consists in this fact,
that it thinks and feels and acts. How it does these

things we do not know;bu + experience attests it as true.
Apart from an identical self to note the fact,evan the
conception of a "stream of thought "would be an impos-
sibility.Except for a conscious self-identity , a flowing
mental activity could have no meaning. Unity gives plurality
significance. The confusion here comes from looking for
some abstract identity. Whereas , what is needed is the con-
crete identity given in self-identifying intelligence.
'This is the only identity.
We may ask what is the condition of the soul,aB
to its identity, when in some state of unconsciousness.
From experience, we believe the soul continues to exist
when unconscious. Consciousness , then , does not of itself
constitute identity. We are at this point confronted by
the phantom of an absolute time in which, it is said,
we exist. This phantom we have exorcised. Time is relative
to self-consciousness. Each* determ ins its own timejand,
when not so determined, for that self there is no time.
Continuity must be recognized, not as resting upon
an. unchanging core of some kindjbut as so affirmed in
experience that it cannot rationally be denied. It may b?
that to bring the soul to a state which we call self -iden-
tity , consciousness is required. But how the soul sustains

its existence, is a mystery only explained "by knowing
how anything persists in being which depends for its
existence upon its Creator.
This would necessarily rest upon the Power which
first best owed existence. He only, in His existence, is
independent and absolute .All things exist through Him and
in Kim and for Him. We are His expressed and active thoughts
and becuse He lives we shall live also.
An unconscious being may exist for others; but nut
for itself. When conscious, we exist for ourselves also.
The unclearness or this subject resnl+s from a false no-
tion of some absolute time and identity. There Is no such
time cr identity. We do not pause in a passing time, nor
do we measure our concrete identity by some fixed stand-
ard. When conscious, we know ourselves as the same; an
when unconscious, we simply rest in Him who "upholds all
things by the word of His power? Life may be called a con-
tinuous gift--a function of the Divine purpose.
If we asl further concerning the soul, as to its
relation to the body, we find thought still proceeding
under the ca + egory of real space, and many perplexing
problems arise. Many of th_p.se problems would be vacated
by the ideality of space and time. From this standpoint,

the traditional view as to the interaction of soul and
body is changed; and the problem is reduced to one of
inductive causality alone. If the body is phenomenal , met
-
aphysical relationships are not involved. The problem
would be simply to trace the order of concomitant varia-
tion between mental and organic changes, and to describe
the laws of these changes.
This simplicity ,however , is not observed, and we have
the usizal metaphysical alliance, wifcii its materialistic
not ions. Interaction has been construed spat ially. The
phenomenality of space would free us from all conceptins
of the swl as having form, and size, and location in the
body. We meet the conception that the physical organism
is a alosed systemjand that the law of conservation of
energy requires comjjlete continuity , of the physical seies,
and that hiiis series cannot be modified by thought.
This view arises from spatial conceptions which involve
the idea of interaction by impact . Again , all this is illu-
sion. The conservation of energy does not forbid mental
control over the organism, if experience affirms this con-
trol to be a fact.
The cause of interaction must be found in the states
of the elements; and, these states must refer back to the

plan and purpose Of the fundamental Reality. Every scheme
of mediation leaves the problem of causality practically
unaffected. Hatter , with enarged endowments , with complex
and organic molecules , with peculiar"affinities, inherent
aptitudes, and subtle tendencies," will not enable us to
escape the fact that ultimate dependence is upon the
plan which roots in Intelligence. A\\ attempts at media-
tion are but expressions of the demand that the inter-
action shall a sufficient ground.
Upon the theory of the ideality of space and time,
we account for the soul by a creative act; and the body
is its phenomenal accompaniment . The body shares in the
character of the general phenomenal order; and is governed
by laws, which, if you please, are mechanical, yet these
laws are not violated by mental activities which modify
the in teract ion ; that is exhausted in the fact of concom-
itant variation.
The soul is not a mere attendant upon the physical
machine ;but the relation of body and soul are rather log-
ical than dynamic. The ground of this interaction must
be found in the Infinite. Psycho -physical -paral leiism is,
in a measure, true. There is a parallel; but we cannot say
that for every physical state there is a corresponding
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mental state. This is largely fiction. As James admits, the
as sumption* of determinism in psychology are "merely pro-
visional and methodological. "And Mttnsterberg frankly states
that "The brain action is in no "/ay the cause of the i-
dea,and the idea is in no v/ay the effect of the "brain
actionjthe relation is strictly logical, and is derived
from spiritual ideality." (1) (2)
_?rom these facts as to the incommensurability of
the physical and mental activities, it appears that no a-
priori decision can be made as to the demand for a body,
or the kind of a body a soul must have to continue its
inner life. The present form of body, we cannot say would
be necessary in another state or stage of existence. Both
soul and body, are to be thought as phases of a plan of
the Infinite.
The phenomenality of space and time also remove
difficulties as to conceptions of future existence. Con-
comitant variation of body and soul does not involve the
destruction of the soul at deathjfor the body is not th j
causal ground of the soul. This view avoids spatial concep-
tions of the location of the soul, either here, or beyond
our present experience. We think of the soul as contin-
uously embraced in the thought of the Supreme Intelligence,
(1) James 1 "Psychology , " p. 461.
(2) "Psychology and Life," p. 65.
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Accoraing to the highest authorities , we have reason
to believe that the mental life and +hought cannot he
deduced from physical organization alone. It cannot be
construed as a physical movement ; and so lies outside
of physical causation. We recall the words of Lotise
where he states that the true life of science is to b e
found, not" in admitting nowAfragment of one view, and n ow
a fragment of an other, but in showing how absolutely
universal is the extent, and at the same time how com-
pletely subbordinate the significance of the mission
which mechanism has to fulfill in the structure of
the world. (1
)
The instability of mental mechanism could not be
more strongly expressed than in the words of those
whose claims to high regard have led us already to
generously quote them. Only their own «vords , however
,
can do justice to their thought . "Psychology',' says James,
is not yet on solid ground. Psychology , as natural sci-
ence, is particularly fragile, into which the waters of
metaphysics leak at every joint. Into the real element s
and forces which the word psychology covers, not the
first glimpse of clear light exists. "The meagerness of
our knowledge of psychological law, notwithstanding
(1) "Ficrocosmus , " Introduction, p. 16.
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the claims of the popular magazine, appears as James
continues, -we have "a strong prejudice that we have states
of consciousness , and that our brain conditions them ; but
not a single law, in the sense that physics shows us
laws, not a single proposition from which any consequence
aan causally be deduced. Psychology is no science.lt is
only the hope of a science. At present psychology is in
the condition of physics before Galileo. when the Gali
leo of psychology comes, the necessi+ies of the case
wi31 make him metaphysical. The best way to facilitate
his advent is to understand how great is the darkness
in which we grope; and never forget that the assumptions
of natural science with which we started are provisional
and revisable." (1)
Another Very pronounced authority records him-
self in these incisive words: "The last word of a psy-
chology that pretends to be a philosophy is this,-'th e
real psychological fact is without time, as without
personality ; it is for nobody, for no end, and with no
value. 'Are we really obliged to accept this view of
the world as the last word of the knowledge of our
•
century?
"To be sure we canno?.."he continues," V7e cannot
James' "Psychology," p. 468.
rt i U T i
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be satisfied with that practical outcome of psychology;
with this conclusion about the final character of per
sonality and freedom, about history and io^ic , and ethics,
about men and the universe.Do we still think histori-
cally, if we consider growth of nations, and this gigantic
civilisation on earth, as the botinist studies the growth
of the mould /vhich covers a rotten apple?Is it really
only a difference of complicat ion?'//hen ideal duties
penetrate our life, we cannot rest at last in psycholoi
ical metaphysics where the universe is an impersonal
content of consciousness! and every straight -for vard ]nan,
to whom the duties of his real life are no sounding
brass, speaks with a calm voice to the psychologist ,
-
'There are more things in heaven and earth than are
dreamt of in your philosophy]"
Once more from the same author , -"Psychology , as
science, is right ;but i-„foe psychologism which considers
the psychological elements and their mechanism as reality,
is wrong from the ruot to its top. This is no better than
mat erialism. Psychology is an ana, is the last wore of the
naturalistic century which lies behind us; it nay become
# a hej^innintf as the introductory word of an idealistic
century to be hoped for." (1)
(r)Etinsterberg 1 s "Psychology ana Life, "pp. 14 ,16,18, 21,3-i.
(i)
Among the best thinkers , there appears to be practi-
cal agreement that mental mechanism cannot explain men-
tal act ivities , apart from the assumption of some deeper
reality, or what ire would call an abiding, self. The facts
of mind are found to be incommensurable with the physical
facts, and cannot be spatially represent ed,Doubtless the
mental is in some .vay conait ioned, in the sense that
changes are concomitant ;but the mutual relation is log-
ical rather than metaphysical and causal .
It is agreed that psychology may ao its great and
legitimate work, without entering into metaphysical
questions as to the nature of the soul. Its chiel func-
tion is to discover and record fehe processes of th a men-
tal life,with their physical conditions as their con-
comitants. Psychology may well omit metaphysical pre-
suppositions and materialistic suggestions. As a sci-
ence, it need not run on the*materialist ic track,"
"When kept within its proper limits, its service may
be all the more valuable, to both science and metaphys-
ics. To this end the phenomenal ity of space and time
points the way, and to a rational emphasis upon the
real self and personality which finds its complete
expression in the Supreme and perfect Personality.

Chapter III.
The Relation of the Ideality of Space and
Time to Theology.
"The knowledge of God" says Blewett,"is the ulti-
mate truth about the world. When God is found, the world
bacones new. In finding God, the world also is found." W
The idea of God may be treated from the speculative
and metaphysical side, or from ehe practical and relig-
ious point of view. Theology, proper, deals, in a speculative
way with all attainable knowledge of God, and of Eis
A
rela-
tions to the universe.lt does not , therefore , attain to
a strictly religious coception of God. Theology is the
formal and scientific statement of religious truth,
rather than its practical essence. "Theology arises from
the intellectual passion after God, just as, upon the high-
est conception of the matter , religion arises from a
practical passion after God." (1)
To what extent would our conceptions of theology
be affected by the idealistic vie-v of space and time?
We touch upon a few points of general interest. By this
doctrine, theology would evidently be relieved of a de-
ity conditioned by space and time. This iads us to a
(1) "Study of Nature of fratur-e and tha Vision of God."
Preface.
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9 monistic
ra+her than a pluralistic conception of the uni-
verse;for
5 by the necessary divisibility of a real space
and time, every attempt under the realistic view, to ar
rive at unity, gives us a conception that is broken up
into plurality. If God is One, how shall we conceive of
His Unity.
We have* that a system of some kind is an ideal of
reason, and a demand of our cognitive natuce. James truly
says that the notion of a One Knower is the great in-
tellectual achievement of our timejand that this con-
ception may turn out to be a more acceptable hypothesis
than pluralism. In this unitary system, law and unifora
ity are implicit; and are by all assumed. What is the
nature of this unity, and how is is expressed, has been
the problem.How shall we interpret a system of mutual ~
ly related, and apparently interacting things.
Unity in the system is commonly explained by assum-
ing a dynamic interaction among real things. As general-
ly understood, interact ion postulates a real space occu-
pied by self -exist ing things. Then these things, by act ing
upon one another , solve the problem of"system." But te
>• have found that the interaction of independent things
is an implied contradiction in terras. And, moreover
,
t
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we have concluded the entire realistic scheme to he the
product of the imagination and picture thinking, which
we have "been obliged to set aside.
Whether we think of "fussing influences," or "states
transferred, " or "forces at work among things," we have
in interact ion, simply the recognition of causality of
some kind; but no solution of the mystery. The phenomenal
-
ity of space and time vacates this form of explanation;
and suggests an energy deeper than external things, hy
which they are coordinated. All that experience gives
us is reciprocal change which implies a cause ;hut this
cause cannot rationally be distrihuted among things.
The fact of action at a distance also adds greatly to
the puzzle of interaction. We need to beware lest we
mistake symbols for solutions, or formulas of speech for
metaphysical explanations. Lotza has well remarked that
"Physical science is wrong in turning from aesthetic
and religious thought *It forgets that its own fun-
damental elements, the ideas of force and natural laws,
are not the ultimate components of the threads that
weave the texture of reality. On the contrary , wh en we
exercise keener insight, they too lead us back to that
supersensuous region of which we cannot compass the
boundaries." (1)
(1) "TTic^ocosmus , " Introduction, p. XII.
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BTe have learned that causality is reality;and,
that the activity of a thing necessarily involves its
being. In a system of things, every change of relation
means a change in "being itself ; and, when things are view-
ed as phenomenal , the source of the activity must be found
in the being of God upon which the whole system de-
XJends. With Uewton,we hold that interaction is not a
"force "of gravity , resident in things and operating among
things ;but the dynamic energy must be referred to the
Divine Will. The term system is but an abstraction from
an observed orderly movement of the Tundamental^Real ity.
We cannot agree with James that the world is made
up of fragments , and that God is merely one of the frag-
ments in a hard struggle to maintain its place. The plu-
rality of experience is unified by the all-embracing
activity of the One Reality. Interaction is thus made
possible, rational, and actual. .\real monism by an immanent
causality displaces a phenomenal pluralism. Things do
not have the ground of their activity in themselves;
but in the only Self-sufficient One "In whom all
things consist."
In affirming the unity of God, we eliminate espe-
cially the notion that He can be made up of patts.
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In any scheme that makes space and time substantial
realit ies , there can he neither unity nor plurality.
Idealistic theism holds that the world is, on the part
of God, a free act of creation. As Duncan has said,"Cre-
ation means something , and means it intensely, le feel
that we know this, -"In the beginning God created.
"
(l
)
This view rules out all forms of pantheism, which makes
the world either a part or a mode of God, or a necessary
consequence of the nature of the Infinite.
Pantheism is a factor in all theories of emanation.
Here we find the old realistic picturing. Things are
said to be parts of the Infiniteas "waves are parts of
the sea," or as "moments are fragments of time. "Things
are bits of plastic §£u£f for the fashioning of a un£-
verse. This is pure imagination . On the other hand, re-
ality is causality , and cannot be picturedjand as an
agent is one, God i3 One and indivisible.
The relation is one that cannot be spatially or
temporally represented. Spenoer r-^cojnized an all-em-
bracing
,
though unknowable, omnipresent Energy. This En-
ergy is not , however , as he assumed, located spatially,
in phenomenal things ;but in substantial Existence
which can be predicated only of the self-conscious
(l)"The New knowledge," p. 25^.
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personal Being. Idealistic theism gives the only concep-
tion of God which trill explain the cosmic order. God
cannot be brought into subjection to any form of me-
chanical necessity .His free and rational purpose is the
only necessity of anything . Pantheism, in any form, is an
untenable theory.
Theism gives us, not a God that absorbs all things
Tinto Himself, and forms a static and mechaaical system
which excludes all freedom and progress ;but a personal,
free, and immanent God, in whom we may live,move and have
our individual being; One whose loving kindness and ten-
der mercies are manifest in all His works. ITany tradi-
tional puzzles concerning the time when creation began;
what occupied the attention of the Divine Being during
the preceding ages;what are the boundaries of space ; an I
what may fill the empty regions lying beyond the power
of thought to reack rthese and others are removed by
the ideality of tine and space . Spat ial and temporal terms
are significant only within the cosmic process, and
for finite beings. •
0ue3tioBs as to the infinitude of apace and time
are vacated by this view because the only infinitude
concerning these appears in the fact that the laws of

1'
spatial and temporal synthesis cannot be exhausted;
but like the numerical series, they are simply poten-
tially, not absolutely, infinite.
There is also a fictitious notion that laws
themselves are self -existent ;and may interfere with the
unity and freedom of God. It is true, that in the cosmos,
an order of law is impliedjbut this order is not first
created and then applied, nor did it pre-exist and con-
dition the activity of God, but God is the free and
self-conscious Being from whose activity law and order
acquire their existence. God's activities are the law,
and constitute the order.
The system is One. The unity of God, however , does
not exclude variety, but rather implies it. It is not lif e-
less simplicity that we seek, but living complexity.
Mechanical thinking involves us in a puzzle from which
only an appeal to free intelligence can extricate us.
The only unity we know in experience is that of the
free and conscious self. Space and time contain no uni-
ty. Divine Intelligence can freely posit both plurality
and variety, and still remain One and the same. The so-
lution of the problem for us comes through an appeal to
the personal experience of living intelligence. Our

own intelligence makes possible the conception of a true
monism, which is constituted and sustained "by the One
infinite and immanent Being.
In the science of God, the question of His intel-
ligence has occupied a central place. Is fundamental Re-
ality intelligent? If so what relation has the ideality
d>f Sj ace and time to this problem? In our studjr of epis-
temology and metaphysics, this question has been, at last
by implication, already answered.
Metaphysics shows that the basal Reality must con-
dition every individual thing. Unity demands the inde-
pedence of fundamental Being; and whether it be intelli-
gent or blind, each specific object is necessarily de-
pendent upon this Being for its nature, as well as for
its existence. We have further found that Reality is
Causality ; and that fundamental Reality must be regarded,
not as material substance, but as a spiritual Agent?
Passing over the inductive and more popular ar-
guments for the intelligence of God, we need here only
note those more essential and satisfying arguments from
epistemology and metaphysics , which point directly to
the root of the matter. It will be sufficient at this t
V
time to recall conclusions already reached in this
paper,in which it was stated that naive realistic no-
tions of space and time in epistemology and metaphys-
ics are destructive of pure thinking.
The argument for the intelligence of God was espe-
cially expounded "by Kant, who showed its far-reaching
significance . though new, it is perhaps the strongest
of all. In popular arguments for the intelligence of God, -
order , design, mechanical explanation , and evolut ion -com-
mon sense realism dominates ; and of the implications of
epistemology, and metaphysics , there is not a suspicion.
From the epistemological point of view, atheism, as us-
ually based upon mechanism and necessity, is suicidal.
In all speculation the trustworthiness of reason is pre-
supposed„Realistic mechanism destroys reason. In the me-
chanical view, psycho-physical occurrences take the place
of mental logical calculation; and the distinction "between
rational and irrational is lost .'.Reasoning is but the
illusive symbol of physical and mechanical processes
which determine all our ideas and conclusions. On this
view, truth and error cannot be distinguished. Only by
rising to the plane of freedom are rationality and
knowledge made jJossible.All mechanical theories of

When we attempt the study of objective reality,
we pre-suppose an orderly system, and that this system
is intelligible. A literal space and time assumes an ex-
tra-mental world, exist ing apart from all laws of intel-
ligence ;but , as Bowne has clearly shown, a rational cosmos
involves certain assumptions as the basal certainties
of knowledge.lt assumes, not that we live in a world
made up of matter and void, a void which is itself some
kind of realityjbut it assumes rather a world of self-
conscious persons, who are governed by common laws of
intelligence, resulting in a common rational experience..
"^pist emology shows that all articulate and rational
experience is a very complex mental process, arising from
immanent laws of mind which truly reproduce things in
the form of ideas.Knowledge is not a passive mood, but
an active process. That these ideas may accord with, ex-
isting things, the laws of things must be the same as •
the laws of thoughts. The problem of knowledge thus in-
volves a rational universe, a knowing human mind, the id?n
tity of the categories of thought with the principles
of cosmic being, with such an adjustment of the outer and
inner world that a common human nafuee would trustworth-
ily reproduce the objective facts. "These implications

are so involved in the very structure of knowledge
kr^ewiedt^ethat we take them for granted without thought
of their significance; whereas they are the perennial
wonder of the world." (1) ?or these implications of
epistemology,mechanism, based upon a real space and ti|rie,
has no explanation. Intelligence is their only solution.
However real or ideal the spatial fact may he, it
contains no meaning in itself. It is but the medium of
thought or intelligence. Nature expresses the thought
of a Thinker who is the source of nature ; and has mean-
ing for us only as we ,by laws of the same kind of in-
telligence , out meaning into it. The world is a process,
and ideas are contained in the process only for intelli-
gence. An intelligent God is the only explanation of an
intelligible world.
Metaphysics supplements the argument from epis-
temology by showing that the mechanical world of space
and time which atheism builds, has no substantial, but
only phenomenal existence. As colors and sounds exist
only for the sensibility that recognizes them, so the
world of related things has its existence, not in a sub-
stantial space and time, but rather in the intelligence
that is able, in the forms of thought, to interpret the
contents and meaning of that world.
(1) Bowne's "Theism," p. 132.

Ketaphysics makes it finally plain that space and
time themselves must be viewed as forms of experience,
and not substantial tilings apart from mind. Upon the
supposition of real space and time existence would be
broken into infinite plurality , unity and reality would
disappear , and existence would become impossible. Things
are not, strictly speaking, in space and timejbut our ex-
perience has both temporal and spatial form. Thus the
world of space and time becomes entirely phenomenal;
and has being only for and through intelligence.
Real existence must have unity , identity, and causal-
ity. Only self-conscious and active intelligence can
meet this demand. This world is more than a mere idea;
it is an activity.lt is the out -going, according to ra-
tional laws, of a Divine Intelligence. If science and
philosophy presuppose that reason is trustworthy and
knowledge valid, then we must hold that both assume
that God is free and intelligent.
The supreme category of Reality is intelligence and
purposive causal ity. Only on this basis, can epistemology
and metaphysics reach any stable equilibrium. On the
impersonal and realistic plain, both fall into irrecon-
cilable contradict ion. Science, no less than theology
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is bound up to a theistic faithjfor atheism has
been well styled. "Philosophic illiteracy."
To this conclusion, it has been objected that intel-
ligence involves personality ; and that these notions
are not at all compatible. Personality , it is said, can-
not be applied to an absolute Being; for it is an im-
plied limitation of that Being. The infinite complex-
ity of the cosmos would be, in the detail , beyond the
powers of any conceivable Intelligence. This is simply
an anthropomorphic conception of God. It is another appeal
to the imagination ; and to difficulties resting upon the
same old realism.
It is objected to personalisra that, as in mechan-
ism, we should have to carry effects into Intelligence
before we coula draw them out again. This is entirely
to misapprehend the nature of Intelligence. Intelli-
gence cannot be mechanically conceived; and if it could
be so c one s ived, thought would itself collpse. By its
nature, intelligence must -be free. To refer facts to In-
telligence , is a very different conception from carrying
facts, in some spatial and temporal sense, into Intel igence.
This reference of facts to Intelligence , is their best
explanation. Intelligence is the ultimate fact of expe-

177
rience;and itself , therefore , admits of no explanation.
Intelligence, like light , ilumins everything but itself.
Active intelligence , as a fact of experience , simply Is;
and from this we pass to the^Enfinite Intelligence as
possible and real . Intel! igence has never been explained;
but it explains everything else.
The personality of God is a vital problem in theol-
ogy? and needs further not ice. Personality has been denied
by some who hold that the fundamental Reality is intel-
ligent. This is a futile attempt to escape crude real-
ism, and attain to some form of monism in God. It is as-
sumed that there is one underlying substance which has
two modes of manifestation. This substance, it is said,
has two sides-extension and form on one side-life and
reason on the other.
Here we find the space and time notions implicit
in pantheism and mechanism, which we have discarded as
impossible conceptions. The substance of this theory
proves to be some kind of substantial "stuff," which,
lacking any rational basis , appeals to the imagination
for completion. God has been called "unconscious intel-
ligence," "impersonal reason," "impersonal spirit,"
"universal life,"and by Schopenhauer , "pure will,"
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without intellect or personality. But such phrases are
an unwarranted use of psychological terms , which, apart
from the idea of conscious personality ,have no intel-
ligible meaning. We come again, in this way, to God as a
blind force or mechanism of some kind, which leaves
us upon our old realistic basis.
Whatever name we call the fundamental Reality,
if it involves no ideal or conscious aim, we have left
only a persistent force, which is wholly bind,mechanical
,
and necessary in its activity. Intelligence must be
thought of as conscious and personal.
Intelligence and personality mean simply the power
of self-knowledge and self-determinat ion ;and do not im-
ply limitation of being, but are rather the marks of inks
perfection. The perfect Intelligence may be the Absolute
One. But popular speech, in reference to God, is always
spatial , corporeal , and anthropomorphic. In this way arise
objections to the personality of God. In pure and clear
thinking , these objections disappear.
The absolute is not the unre3 ated,but the Being
who creates relations ; and the Infinite is not the quan-
titative whole, but the independent source of the finite.
Both mean simply the independent ground of finite things.
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They imply each other, and are but aspects of the One; -
and conscious intelligence is a part of the perfec-
tion of God.
Any psyehological objection that an Absolute One
could not be conscious of a distinction between sub-
ject and object, is ibu* another confusion of form with
fact. This distinction is simply a mental function. S elf-
consciousness and personality do not depend upon a sub-
stantial external object. The objection rests upon super-
ficial psychology , and upon the application of human
limitations to God. It would be truer to affirm that
complete personality is possible only to the Absolute •
Our mental life, and so our personality , is limited to
the external worldjbut to be self -determined, and self
possessed, would be conditions of perfect personality.
Intelligence is the deepest factor and the completion
of being. Personal Intelligence is the ultimate fact
and self-explanatory.
It is said God is also unchangable.Eow shall we
think of this attribute of the Bivine Being? Miscon-
ception is here readily formed through confusing phys
# ical metaphysics with spiritual and personal elements •
Existence may be reduced to a rigid static substarvce
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and no provision "be made for life and movement. If then,
there is to be change, it can "be found only in the states
and activities of the fixed substance.
But we have discovered that reality is not composed
of a core of being plus states and act ivities ; for every
change in state or movement imjjlies a change in being
itself. Reality is causalty. God is an Agent, a conscious
Person. His unchangability is not a monotony of substance;
but a constancy of nature, and a corresponding continuity
in the law of Kis freedom in the exi^ression of a benefi-
cent purpose. The truly abiding, in both metaphysics and
theology, is found in free and conscious personality.
Here metaphysics and experience meet. Identity and change
can be affirmed only on the personal plane. Unchange-
ability is possible, not in rigidity of substance , but
in the reality of self-conscious Intelligence.
We may inquire what is the relation of God to spaee
and time themselves. First,His relation to space. What
do v/e understand by the omnipresence of God? Omnipres-
ence is commonly coneeived as the extension of an Infi-
nite Being throughout an infinite void.
This view conflicts at once with the unity of
God. Whatever exists in space is subject to the law of
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division into parts, and so loses its unity. If God as
only
substance fills space,Ke could be in any place -as a
part, and not as the whole of Himself. Omnipresence de-
mands that the whole self shall be present, even as one
whole mind is present in any finite thought or act.
Space must be conceived as ph©nominal, and relative to
"he acting agent. 1+ is a men + al law by irhich objects! are
spatially related. Where one is able to act directly or
immediatly, there he may be said to be present. The ideal-
ity of s^acejand the immanence of God remove the diffi-
culties of this problem. God, being able to act immediate-
ly in all places at the same time, is omnipresent. His
action upon things or persons, does not at all involve
spatial conceptions, or spatial limitations. Space, though
«
it has no substantial existence, applies to finite beings
as a law of limitation ; but to the infinite, and the every-
where immanent , there is no spatial limitation.
And what, in the second place, are we to understand
by the eternity of God,or His relation to time? Cer-
tainly not + hat God transcends time as if it were some
boundless form, as He has been conceived to transcend
space. Both are metaphysically untenable. Time is no in-
dependent , limitless , and moving existence in which

changes occur
,
ar.d^wteich God fills out with measureless
duration. This would involve God in a law of self-devel-
opment; and destroy His unity by making Him exist in suc-
cession.
Time is a relation in consciousness.lt is an epis-
temological law by which the conscious self relates events
in succession , and which at the same time requires that
the knowledge of succession shall be timeless, or with-
out succession. Metaphysical time can be no independent
thing ;but this time is relative to the range of ones
consciousnens. Whatever is grasped in immediate con-
sciousnesses to that consciousness , in the present.
Each mind thus makes its own present. In this sense,
God,who is always in full sef-possession , is independent
of time. He is nont-emporal and so eternal. He dwells in
an eternal present.
But it may be asked how can God be non-temporal
in creation? It is said activity in creation is necessa-
rily temporal. We need to remember ,however , that change
can be measured only b} a changeless consciousness;
for we have found that we cannot carry ontological
change into consciousness. The conscious self alone
gives meaning to changing, or developing, evants. Change
See Bowne's "Theism," p. 184.
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is not in thought ;but simply in the order which
thought creates.
This fact is conceivable only on the basis of a
self-conscious and free Intelligence. We must interpret
the temporal relation by living experience. The self-
equality which we know in experience , is the only non-
temporal reality. Time is not a form of exist ence ;but a
form of experience. In finite intelligence , the tempo-
ral relation varies, and is relative to ones range of
consciousness. With the Infinite "and absolute Intelligence,
temporal conditions vanish; for He is Himself their
source. He cannot , therefore , be limited by them.
In philosophy, space and time phantoms appear in
most unexpected places. Even in connection with the notion
of the omniscience of God, temporal limitations and
picture thinking are found. Since, in our knowing, we
are encompassed by mystery, may not the Infinite also
be limited by the unknowability of some things? How ar ^
we to conceive the omniscience of God? We meet here the
notion of a fundamental substance having the double aspect
of consciousness on one side, and unconsciousness on the
other side. This notion, with its materialistic and mech-
anical implications, we have set aside. We must think of
*
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God as absolute in His self-knowledge and self-control.
There are, no doubt, in the Divine omniscience, mys-
teries which we cannot penetrate. How God can enter con-
sciously into a finite experience, which is bound up in
a physical world, may never be made clear to us; but no
form of pantheism, with its spatial picturing, can solve
the problem. Or again, how is God able to foreknow^an afct
which is free, and by i+s very nature, as we understand
it, is a wholly new departure without antecedent b; rhich
it may be determined. This is an exceedingly difficult
question. But, if time is only phenominal, the problem
is simplified; fur succession in literal time is by this
view eliminated, and there remains only the mystery how
God can know fct all, a mystery we never can explain.
Still again, coming to God's power or omnipotence,
how, if at all, will the ideality of space and time a!"
our thought. The problem appears to center in whether there
are limitations imposed on God by certain eternal truths,
or the necessities of reason. The danger here is that
we hypostasize these abstractions,and make truth and
law self-exist ing things. Then by some inscrutable neces-
sity, we have the reign of law, and of eternal truths,
which implies a boundery within Yfhich God must act.
9 XV*
,'oq a I pi
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But we here recall the fact that laws and truth do
not preceed Reality, and exist as conditions of His man-
ifestation; nor does He create them and then necessarily
limit Himself by them. For us laws appear to antedate
everts, and to dertermintf them; but God is, Himself, al-
ways immanent in the events. God is, therefore, the con-
dition of the lawsby which events occur. He is also the
immediate source of all truth, though, tu us, it may seem
to be a self-abiding system of reality.
By this view, we avoid the notion that God makes
truth, which thereafter exists by itself; or that He rec-
ognizes truth as something independent of Himself. God
is the author of truth; and il is a moae by which His
actions proceed. That is truth which is in accord with
God's order.
It has been said that God is limited by His nature.
But this is the old notion that a real thing or being
muat contain some core of rigid being. As the law of a
thing is 4 he thing itself, so the nature of God ts His
being. There is no nature in God which commands Him. He
is self-commanded. Rational life is both fixed and free.
God does not tempera 11; exist, and then act; but exists
in His acts. The relation is not temporal, but logical
«(
-
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only. His acts are both free and necessary; "but necessaary
only as self-conscious personal existence involves both-
These are with us actual principles of experience.
The laws of truth are, in human experience, inexorable;
yet only by free volition do they determine us. Of the
absolute, we may say that His activities are freely and
self-determined; that they are in no way arbitrary; but
are performed in accordance with rational and eternal
principles which take their rise in Himself. The bosom
of God is the fountain of truth.
Consideration of the Divine omnipotence naturally
leads us to a final word as to the conditions of finite
existence in the ages to come. As we understand it, the
phenomenal ity of space and time will give us new con-
ceptions of many questions in eschatology. How we should
conceive the problems of death and the resurrect ion, of
the coming of Christ and the millenium, of the judgment
and of the future state, is a matter upon which our
view of space and time has a direct bearing.
These subjects depend so largely upon revelation,
that philosophy should advance with unsandalled feet; and
not presume to dogmatically ire discuss them. We should
also keep in mind that, as under the present system of
natural law, a very different world is conceivible, i
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so metaphysical possibility as to future conditions car-
ries no necessity into the concrete order of the future
world. Principles may have a wide application without
any specific and concrete implication. We have found,
moreover, that f,necessity M is a category of very doubtful
location, and we do well to apply it with caution to the
of <M I
future life. The rational will and pleasure A is the only
actual necessity in the universe.
Nevertheless, speculative interest in the problems
of our future state has its place; and may be not only
of much theoretical value, but also of great practical
satisfaction. "From our point of view, many ideas which
we now have of future spatial and temporal limitations
may be avoided; and broader visions, and grander possibil-
ities, as to coming conditions and events ,become the
heritage of the race.
Two questions among many present themselves as
perhaps of special interest. A»d f-ir-»t what s^eeial
i*^ere€H;. And first what should be our conception of
the change which we call death. According to the tradi-
tional view, the soul is thought of as a bulky substance
of some kind having a local habitation, and occupying
a definite place in space. When the body, like a taber-
nacle, the soul is supposed to separate spatially from
>vlnu
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the "body; and to depart through a vast expanse to
some far-away hone, where, for long years, to remain
in waiting for those from whom it is barred "by the
great divide.
The language of Revelation is pictorial, and thus
no doubt best .adapted to our understanding. But a
conception very different from, the above is suggested
"by the Master, when ire speaks of death as a sleep, and
of Himself as the resurrect ion , of God as a Spirit,
and of the kongdom as among or within the people.
The puzzle of the whereabouts of the soul as related
to the body during sleep, may throw light upon the
state and location of the soul after physical disso-
lution.
Consciousness, we have seen, is not the seat
of personality ;nor does it alone constitute identity
of being; for we are bound to believe that identity
and personality abide through unconscious sleep.
Where, then, is the soul during this sleep? The best
answe^./e can make is that it is in the care of Him
who first constituted it a real existence.
And when in death, the soul surrenders the body
to the dust, we are to think, not of spatial condi-
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tions, which are incommensurable with spiritual realities;
but simply of a change of state and relation, which leaves
it, in a metaphysical sense, just where it was before , in
the hand of its Father, God.
Again, to human thought, the permanence and condi-
tion of the soul in the future is of intense interest
and importance. Spencer , whose philosophy rested upon
a materialistic basis,had no expectation that his soul
would survive the ordeal of death. But the fact that we
are now in complex and interacting relations with the
body, does nut at all prove the unreality of the soul,
or that with the body it .vill cease to exist.
It is now a well-established view that the relation
between body and soul is not causal but logical only, and
that interaction between them means simply concomitant
change. To quote from an already familiar name, "Psycho-
physical -parallel ism brings no ethical danger , because
the connected object^ do not belong to reality-mere
theoretical connections for logical purposes." " Ty
mental life goes on in my organ ism-this means my feel-
ings and ideas are with me in this town, this room, or
|
body, -but does not include any hypothesis as to rela-
tion of mind to body." (1)
Ettnsterberg 1 s "Ps-cholcgy and Life," pp. 43, 5?..

Moreover/it m&y be held, with metaphysical confidence
that an absoite mental life would nead no organism what -
ever. "God dwelleth not in temples made with hands;"
for God is a Spirit. For the finite spirit , existing in
<a state of interaction and communion, some sort of an
organism would appear to be necessary. But there is no
apriori necessity that he finite spirit in the future
state, should have any particular type of organism. "God
Giveth it a body as it pleaseth Him."
It is reasonable to suppose that mental life may
continue under altogether different conditions from
those we now experience ; for we cannot say that an actual
body is necessary to our consciousness. Speculation may
not dogmatize upon the problem of the future state; and
philosophy must fall back upon the reality of experience
as illuminat ed by the facts of Revelation.
Rational metaphysics ,however , vill set us free
from all notions as to the finality of the sense life.
As here united, our ijhysical and mental life are impli-
cations of an Infinite Wisdom and plan. But the ideality
of space and time removes many difficulties which are
met in an attempt to construe spatially the soul in
the future state.

We may hold with confidence that the dissolution of the
"body does not imply the destruction of the soul ; for
the body is not its causal ground. And we may, with as
-
surance, banish all fear for the future as to spatial
separation from our friends, with the dread of long
journies through regions unknown. "The soul, when the body
fails, has not to go wandering through space to find an-
other home; it is continually comprised in the though
and activity of the Infinite. God gave It life, and, if He
wills, He will maintain it. This actual existence of all
things in God, while it does not remove the mystery of
o r being, does diminish the sense of grotesque for-
lornness which the conception of our disembodied ex-
istence is pretty sure to awaken when we conceive it
in spatial forms." (1).
We do not know nor can we with certainity predict
what Infinite Wisdom may chose to continue in the
ages to come of phenomenal conditions and limitations.
Metaphysical reasoning as to the nature of substance
will not solve these problems. In this life, the
finite has a local habitation; may not the mansions
provided by the Father on the other side also be centers
of reunion and communion? Absolute existence belengl
(1) Bowne's "Metaphysics"
,
p. 579.

to the Absolute only; and while the immortal state may
be largely free from spatial ana temporal limitaions,
may not HeAYan be both a state ana a place?
Further intimations concerning the future life
must oe drawn from Revelation, and the demands of our
moral and religious nature. The general principles of
metaphysics open to us visions of a life vastly en-
larged and physically free. How fully it is possible
for the finite to be untrammeled, we can not say. All
concrete existence and conditions are embraced in uhe
Divine will and plan. At the close of this stage of
existence, we shall simply enter into a nobler type
of experience with a more abundant life, with larger
being, larger loving, and larger powers of thought and
action, witfythe range of our possible development in-
definitely extended.
"The ethical belief in immortality means that
we as subjects of will are immortal; we are not reached
by death. Kow can death reach u reality which is not
an object, but a.n attitude and therefore neither in
time nor space. Our real inner subjective life has
its felt valiaity, not in time, but beyond time; it
is eternal." (1)
(1) Mflneterberg'fl "Psychology and Life',' p. 279.

Chapter IV
.
The Relation of the Ia.ea.lit/ of Space and
Time to Religion.
It ':as been suggestively said that "Man is incur
-
ably religious." j'or religion is more than a logical
inference, or a local accident; it is a leading activity,
and a fundamental demand of the soul. In human experi-
ence, it is central and supreme. The highest function
of both science and philosophy is to minister to relig-
ion.
The superiority of this deepest element in man is
suggested in these words of Lotze: 'Tan is not a mere
copy of external nature, but is a living product , unique
in kind, receiving indeed innumerable impressions from na-
ture ;yet not in order that he may reflect them back in
the form in which they were received, but that he may,
in accordance with his nature, be roused by them to re-
actions a.nd developments , the explanation of which lies
in himself and not in what is external." (1) It lies
in his religious nature.
Religion wa.s first in the field of knowledge. long
before systematic investigation was thought of,relig-
Vicrosmus," p« 21. also, Introduction
,
p. IX.

ion, with its hopes , aspirat ions , and anticipations, had ex-
plored and taken possession of all the departments of
the mental and physical world. Religion forms the ba-
sal character upon which alone science and philosophy
can, with confidence , build. Knowledge is not to be pur-
sued for its own sake. To do this would be both unwor-
thy and irrational. The significance of science is that
it leads to a truer conception of the soul's reverence,
the meaning of existence, and the real purjjose of all
our hopes and activities.
To quote again , "Taking truth as a whole, we are
not justified in regarding it as a self-centered splen-
dor, having no necessary connection irith those stirrings
of the soul from which indeed the impulse to seek it first
proceeded. On the contrary , whenever any scientific rev-
olution has driven out old modes of thought, the new
vie//s that take their place must justify themselves
by their persistent and increasing satisfaction which
they are capable of offering to these spiritual demands
which cannot be put off or ignored."
Beyond the sensuous and the phenomenal , lie powers
upon which human life depends, and toward which huran na-
ture has a conscious sense of obligation. This sense of
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responsibility to God was , according to Webster, the
greatest thought that could possess the human mind. The
universal recognit ion, however vague, of an alliance with
the Infinite is the most determining factor in human
existence.
"Religion" v/rot e Bowne,"n-ay be a mistake, an illusion,
and a supert it ion , but as an historical fact it is unde-
niable, and no exorcism has yet been found that has been
potent enough to perrattnently exorcise the evil spirit." (1)
The failure of agnosticism in this field has been well
put in these words: "Of the two species of agnosticism
with which the thinking of the times is affected, the de-
nial of everything that transcends the phenomenal , and
the denial of the possibility of knowing a transcendent
whose existence must nevertheless be affirmed, each in
turn fails to meet demands of vital impotance; and
both alike present an attitude of bald helpless nega-
tion to the most pressing issues of the human mind. "(2)
The foundations of a genuinely religious faith are
sure, says Royce,and our problems are all solved in
God's life, and in our relations to Him. "The tossing sea
of human life is not itself the Divine, but over it uou's
winds are blowing, and in it we find copies of the Eternal."
(3)
Bowne's "Theism," p. 2.
(2)0rmond»s "foundations of Knowledge, "Introduction, 11.
(.'5 ) "Religious Aspects of Philosophy," p. 174.
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Apropos to this is the last uterance of Huxley , "It
seems to me that there ia a third thing in the universe
to wit , consciousness
,
which, in the hardness of my head
and he«rt, I cannot see to be either matter or force,
or any conceivable modification of either."
The origin of the term religion is obscure, but it
seems to involve the recognition of a higher Power,
ar.d a conscious human obligation to that Power. As
opposed to the theoretical point of view, religion is pie
practical aspect of the theistic idea;and is clearly
differentiated from theology.lt has a field of its
own; and its concepts are readily distinguished from
those of the metaphysical treatment of God. Wither is
-
totle,the latter prevailed; and God was conceived as
merely the primal and self-moved Reason. He was not
at all the object of love and worship; but had only a
metaphysical relation to the universe. This idea of
God, except as providing a possible foundation for it,
has no religious significance.
The first demand of the race ,ho?/ever , is not a theo-
retical philosophy , but a practical faith. "wTiat we
need in God is a personal presence, not a logical postu-
late. God is the Reality which our mind and spiritual
nature needs and finds." (1)
(1) Baldwin's "Fragment! in Philosophy and Science,"
pp. . 48 , and 342.
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Religion is the relation of trie soul to God; and is
essentially spiritual
,
personal , and pract ical.The .bearin ;
of the ideality of space and time upon religion is tv.ero-
fore practical rather than speculative ; and, religion un-
dergoes no necessary change "beyond that which folows
upon the more spiritual concep + ion of our relation to God.
Already we hold that we live and move and have our be-
ing in Him. The removal of the limitations of space and
time would only emphasize and intensify the spiritual
siae,and further emancipate the soul in its active re-
lation to the Infinite. This doctrine makes clear and
necessary the immanence of God, which, though it does not
remove the mystery connected .vith the incarnat ion , and
the redemption of the race, it carries with it the conser-
vation of every spiritual and moral value. This imma-
nence of God becomes the supreme religious fact, and is
of the highest importance.
We may hold a purely metaphysical notion of the
Divine immanence tfhich has no religious or moral signif-
icance;Xhe presence of God in a religious sonse involves,
not merely dependence of the finite upon the Infinite,
but also a personal spiritual likeness and nearness
to Him.
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This vie.v gives us an entirely new conception of the
presence of God in the physical irorld.lt provides a
thought of God which is in direct contrast with that
of the deist. With the deist, the Infinite is a Being .
afar off, a kind of R ex machine" Deity, who, after hav-
ing set the world in mot ion, rarely , if at all, concerns
himself with its daily working. The truer conception
"brings the Divine as a factor into our world so that
God becomes an immediate and constant Presence, an actual
Citizen; so that we "become members of His kingdom, and chil -
dren of Eis family. God is not an absentee from the
universe, who now and then appears in some miraculous
manner; but the entire cosmos is His dwelling place, and
the natural sphere for the display of His beneficent
paternal providence.
This conception of God in the world is fai*reach-
ing;for it stands diametrically opposed to the tradi-
tional,materialistic , and atheistic notion that nature
is a mechanical and self-running system, which pre-
supposes substantial and independent space and time in
which God is but a temporary hypothesis ; and may, sometime,
upon the fuller extension and dominion of law, as it is
said Comte once remarked, be finally conducted to the

frontier of the universe and bowed out with thanks,
for Kis provisional services. Some have seemed to think
the more we have of law, the less we need of God; and that
He will ultimately become a needless hypothesis.
On the other hand, to trie theist,the presence of
God involves no fear of natural law as . interposing an
obstacle to His vorking ; but natural forces, so called,
are themselves but the mode of the Divine immanence
and manifestation. A large part of the confusion in reli
ious thought, as Dr. Eowne has shown, has resulted from
the superficial conception of the "naturctl"and the
"supernatural," and this in turn has come from a sens-
uous view of space and time. A certain shallow inter-
pretation has made the terms natural and supernatural
mutually exclusive
;
whereas, thef are rather inclu-
sive, and inseparably united. Causally, the natural is
rooted in the supernatural ; and the supernatural finds,
in the natural order of things, its normal mode of
expression.
The solution turns upon the discovery that God
always works through law; for He it> its source, and order
is Heaven's firs 4-, law. furthermore, God is the only .vork-
er;And His activity is unceasing. This is a new and
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radical concept ion. In the order of natuee, the mode
of o ideation, and the 6ause of the procedure, are to be
ever kept logically separate, and always concretely u-
nited. By this Divine immanence we mean "that God is
the ever present ground of all finite existence and actv-
ity. The world, alike of things and spirits, is nothing
existing and acting on its own account , while God is
away in some extra-sider ial region, but it continually
depends upon, and is ever upheld by, the ever-living, ever-
present
,
ever-working GodV The natural and the super- (1)
natural cannot conflict; for all is natural which is
in accordance e with the Divine purpose and activity.
And since there is no self -exist ing and self-running
mechanism, but only an order of events, the order must
be explained as the present mode of the Divine activ-
ity. This conception of the natural and supernatural
throws light upon many puzzles in modern religious
thought. Something of its significance is suggested
by Haldane #hen he says" Life now stands for us as in-
telligible only when contemplated from the stand-point
of the Eternal.Here and now is God, here and now is
freedom, here and now is immortality."
Upon the Divine intelligence and power, all nature
Bowne's "Immanence of God," Introduction, p. 3.

waits. That "My father worketh" is forever true. Every
implication of nature is comprehended in His purpose,
and is wrought out as truly through "natural processes,"
as by means of "special interposition." God never sleeps
nor slumbers ;and through the ages one eternal purpose
runs.'The laws of nature are the highways of the Almighty.
The immanent Divine will is at once the cause and
explanation of all natural events. Without our father,
ir
not a lilly blooms or a sparrow falls. To Lord Kelvin
liebig said" I cannot believe that the grass or the flow-
ers gro.v by mere chemical forces, any more than I can be-
lieve that the book of botany describing them grew by
mere chemical forces." Science may point out an otder
of procedure , but this order demands Gcd as its causal
explanation. "Scientific thought , "suid Lord Kelvin, "is
compelled to accept the idea of creative power."
To the theist,the immanence of God means simply
the constant xjresence j_n matter and mind of this Cre-
ative Power. "The theist knows that he is in God's vorld,
and that the ultimate reason why anything is, or changes,
or comes to pass, must be sought ,not in any mechanical
necessity , nor in any natural ant ecedents ,nor in any
impersonal agency of any kind, but in the will and pur-

pose of that God in whom all things live and move and
have their being. JSvery system of whatever sort must
come down at last to some fact, or system of facts, of
which no more can "be said than that It is. This fact
to which all else is referred, and from which all ?lse
takes its rise, is, for theism, the will and purpose of th
Eternal." (1)
In this conception of the Divine presence express-
ed through law we have the condition of true science,
philosophy , and religion. Nature is not the rival of
God, hut the form of His activity. We live in a world
which is the home of God. The true theist may, without
fear of pantheism, say with Wordsworth:
"Ana I have felt
A presence that disturbs ne with a joy
Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime
Of Something far more deeply interfused,.
'.Those dwelling is the light of setting suns,
And the round ocean and the living air,
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man;
A motion and a spirit, that impels
All thinking things, all objects of all thought
And rolls through all things." (2)
(1) "Immanence of God," p. 25.
(2 ) "T intern Abbey.
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The significance of the true theiStic view of the
presence of God is, in religious thought, comparatively
new, and is worthy of further specification. This view
of "he presence of God in (he natural world removes many
difficulties that have hitherto perplexed the honest
seeker after truth. Any conflict "between science and
religion becomes impossible; for science, as an order of
law, needs the presence of God to give this order dynam-
ic force and rational meaning. So also evolution, when
It is seen to be merely a mode of the Divine working,
loses its power to in +. imidate our faith. Looking upon
nature in this way, we are assured + hat we dwell, already,
in our Father's house; and that all the laws of +he uni-
verse are pledged to work for our good. Nature is thus
no rival to pur Father's will, but is rather a comrade
in the execution of His plans.
This conception of the Immanence of God is directly
connected with every phase of the problem of the Divine
interrelat tun and communion with men. In i' s emphasis
upon law, science has done a praiswort.hy service, ana
has made all men its debtors; but in its exorcism of
God from nature, science has wrought serious damage.
Law has been extended to cover all events in phys-

ical, mental and social life, so that the supernatural
was supposed to be en + irely ruled out of human events.
This follows upon the conception of nature as a self-suf
ficient system. Bu 4- the broader view has made it clear
that science and philosophy have each i + s place, and are
necessarily uni + ed in any complete explanation of the
facts of experience. In reality they are parts of one
whole. Interference, interposition, or miracles, as the
violation of law, have no longer any place among intelli
gent thinkers. We do not now look for '•he presence of
God so much in "signs and wonders" as in the unseen,
spiritual forces at work in society, and in the moral
reformation of men.
It is now seen that the true conception of the Di-
vine presence removes the obstacles which prevent His
activity in all the ordinary affairs of life and histo-
ry, what we call "providence" is but one way in which
God choses i o relate Himself ^o us. There is continu-
ity of law and purpose in all His works. As He moves
through, the lavs of nature to produce physical results,
so He is in all the laws of socie + y accomplishing His
moral ends. It is no doubt true as Cowper wrote,
God moves in a mysterious way,

His wonders to perform;
He plants His footsteps in the sea,
And rides upon the storm.
And yet, though ve see i + net, with Him, all is
done in harmony with a Divine law.
Blind unbelief is sure to err,
Ana scan His vork in vain;
God is His own interpreter
And He will make it plain.
Providence is simply God's p^e-vision , and His
providing. We should look for the moral purpose, rather
than fur the material process. Bo"\h philosophy and relig-
ion need a larger consciousness of God. Our vision has
"been darkened "by the deist ic philosophy of a self -running
nature, and with an- absentee Divinity. The presence of
God, with a purposive interest in all His works, solves
every question of providence. Whether common or occa-
sional, according to this view, one even + is as providen-
tial as another; for -the greater includes the less.
Our lives are in His hand; and for each one His care
is individual arc! particular. "Special providence" is
rooted in a sound metaphysics; for, in the actual and
the concre + e, only the individual is possible. There

There is a logical antithesis between the individual
and the universal; but, concretely considered,
:
there can
"be no general providence, as there can be no general cre-
ation. Every particular fact is necessarily wrought by a
particular act. When God deals with men, He does so m
specific ways; and +his makes every providence "special."
True philosophy and religion unite in this view;
whereas the notion that there i£ a general ongoing of
nature, with an occasional interference by the Divine,
is a logical fallacy and a delusion. A1.1 events, in
their origen, are supernatural; "but, if we should trace
the steps of each process, ir their mode of manifestation,
they would all appear as natural.
As not a sparrow falls without the Father's thought,
so, in the same sense, every human experience shares
Hie special supervis ion
. In every life,His plan includes
the specific; and the very steps of a good man are ordered
by. Jehovah. We may not be able to interpret His purpose,
but His presence assures us that we are guided by Kis
eyejand the banner of his love is over us.
We cannot always trace the way
Which thou, Almighty God, dost take;
But we can always , always say,
That God is love.
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Again, the conception of the presence of God in-
volved in the ideality of space and time,which, as we have
seen, removes all notions of causal mechanism of whatever
form, readily solves the puzzle of miracles, and makes the
distinction of miracles, itself , inconsequential, niracles
are hut another form of God's self-communication to
His chilaen. As invoking the immediate activity of Goa,
the most familiar fact is, in its causality, as miraculous
as the most unusual and extraordinary avent.
The confusion lies in a misconception of the na-
tural and the supernatural. What we call natural comes
readily under an order with which we are familiar ; while
tha miraculous is an event which we cannot locate in
our known system of procedure. To the intelligent theist,
it matters little whether he be fed like Elijah by the
ravens, or from the harvest sown and gathered by his own
hand, he is equally assured that he is provided for by
his 7ather,who never moves in an arbitrary manner , but al-
ways in accordance with a rational and beneficent purpose.
Our view of the Divire manifesting himself through
natural law, frees us still further from a materialist-
ic philosophy as seen in a mechanical psychology , and
enables us more fully to realize our father's Revelation

of Kis will in the Sacred Scriptures. For Revelation,
when conceived In the light of His Jivine immanence,
is another mode of His communication which is1 ',' truly
rational an^ d natural as are His activities in the
physical world, and the providential events of human
history. In addition to His open "book of nature, a spe-
cial Revelation from God would be perfectly logical
and natural, were it not for the limiting and depressing
notion that the Supernatural , in order to speak to men,
must break through some mechanical and neeessary system
of law, and vioite the psychological principles of in-?
telligence.
With the more intelligent view of the Infinite
as^related to the finite, we are again emancipated from
a crude supernaturalism . ?or God there is no self-ex-
isting natural order to be encroached upon by His oc-
casional interruption of its laws. All natural events
are the doings of God Plimself. As the father of men,
we can very properly think of Him as present with Kis
children in such a way that," at sundry times and in
divers manners, He should communicate Himself unto them
by a special Revelation. If we think of God as intelligent,
personal , all -powerful , and good, with a purpose involving
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a supreme moral aim,however many the mysteries o-£ His
Revelation may contain, we shall thereby not he prevented
from accepting it as a natural expression of His love
and care.
Still another of the communication of God with
men is that uf prayer ;and difficulties have arisen es-
pecially with reference to specific requests for partic-
ular personal benefits. The problem is how prayer can
actually accomplish anything beyond a certain beyond
a certain reflex influence upon the petitioner. It
has been said that God cannot answer ir the sense that
any change is effected in the natural ongoing of events.
We are here once more confronted by the superfi-
cial notion of a self-sufficient inflexible order of law,
which allows of no interruption from without. A mechan-
ical and necessary uniformity, it is said, rules everywhere;
and all petitions for special blessings must fall help-
less and hopeless before the laws of nature. But r.ore
ideal and worthy conceptions have set this notion aside;
and in its place we put the higher view of the immanence
of God, which makes Ilim an evar-present and controling
power, and upon whom depends the whole phenomenal world.
In the Divine p] an, all human need, to its minutest

detail, has been provided for; and the laws of nature
are but the lines along which the messages of His love
His love are borne. Natural laws have no self-exist ence
and activity ; and, of themselves , they never effect or
produce anything. Men are able to use these laws, or rath-
er to act in harmony with them, so as to accom£>lish thoir
own ends. This is done without any violation of these
laws; and ujjon this fact hangs the progress of our civil-
ization. Kow much more, then, can Ke,who is their source,
cause every law to move in harmony with human ne^d.
The immediate presence of God in all His works,
constitutes Kim the rightful administrator of all law;
and there can be, in nature, nothing to prevent the an-
swer to any petition that is in accord with His will
and plan. 7or our God is not an absent Jivinity ,af;ir off
and ir different to the wants of men; but He is the father
of One who taught us to pray, and whose ear is ever open
to our cry. Answers to prayer are a revelation of His
love,ard are dictated by a higher than human wisdom,
'"/hen in prayer,His will is our supreme desire, we " sym 1-
phonize" with Him in a harmony so complete that before
we call He answers; and while we are yet speaking,He hears.
Beautifully has Tennyson said,
-

"Speak to Him thou, for He hears,
And spirit with spirit can meet;
Tor closer is He than breathing,
And nearer than hands and feet."
Prayer is grounded, according to Professor James,
in the deepest needs of humanity. . He expresses his
conviction in the following language, "It seems prob-
able that in spite of all that 'science' may do to the
contrary, men will continue to pray to the end of time.
We pray because we can not help praying-- the social
self demands an ideal world as well as the present
social world-- refersflce to the inner refuge carried in
every breast. Its own body, its friends next, and
finally its spiritual disposition, must be the su-
premely interesting object of each human mind." The
theist may hold that • the demand is prophetic of the
supply; and that, through a rational view of the pres-
ence of uod, which renov es the objections of a superfi-
cial and materialistic philosophy, his prayer of faith
will be welcomed by his father, and his deepest needs
be abundantly satisfied.
We find, furthermore, that our idealistic view
of the Divine presence dispells the fear of a false

naturalism in connection with persona.1 Christian ex-
perience. As law, without intelligence or purpose,
has been assumed to reign in nature, and in all human
events, so a mental mechanism has been supposed so to
determine all experience that only could be called re-
ligious which was extraordinary and anomalous.
The +heistic view brings religious experience into
line with th§ normal wordings of the mind; and opens
new possibilities and assurance in the realm of the inner
life. As the hart for the water-brooks , so the soul
"thirsts for God, for J.Le living God." A sensuous
philosophy has thrust a godless "nature" between the
soul and its Father's heart. God, Himself, is the
supreme aesire of the human soul; "Hidden with Christ
in God" as Paul expresses it, or as Dante, "His will
is our peace." Not the form, but the fact of experience
is +he chief concern-- "One +hing I krow, whereas I
was blind, now I see," was a wise response to the
healing touch of the Master.
But, in what we know of Christian experience, a
false philosophy interposes and demands a special
"sign" as the visible evidence of an invisible union
with God. Ecstatic states and psychological raptures

may be pleasing to the senses, but they do not take the
place of the pure heart, and the vision of God. An
assurance of the Divine indwelling, is the essential
thing. The man "in Christ" is a "new creation", not
so much in out.vard "derr.onstrat ion" as in inward faith,
goodwill, and moral purpose.
Our theistic view makes it clear, that in our
spiritual experience, we suffer no violation of any
psychological principle; for it is tl.rcu h natural
ment ul la 1,vs alone +hat God works in us to will and to
do of his good pleasure. Spiritual life thus comes to
the soul, not as unmedia 4" ed, or miraculous, in the com-
mon use of th.9 + erm; but always in harmony with +he
order which is both normal and Divine. In this way,
the conception of God as manifesting himself through
law, eliminates all misleading naturalism; and opens
the whole inner life to a simple, yet true, supernat-
uralism, with a l<s.rge ar.d unbounded horizon.
And yet once more, another great advantage from
our idealistic view point is seen in the relation
of the inner life to the individual conduct. What is
the bearing upon ethics of our view of the Divine pres-
ence? There is a supernatural "involution" operating

through natural mental laws; and 4 here is also an
evolution, or "Working out" of salvation along the
normal lines of human activity. In o^her words, all
true religion is essentially ethical. Experience deepens
with expression; and its expression mus J he in accord
with spiritual laws, and in the field of natural world.
Religion is not only the "binding" of the soul
back to God; tut also a strengthening of its bounds
v/ith men. Personal spiritual growth is attained
through the indwelling of the Divine Spirit, who creates,
not pathological states, but intelligent mental moods,
which find their normal manifestation in practical
human service. Eight relation to God is but the first
step to yard right activities among men, which must move
along the natural channels of life.
But here we guard ourselves against the subtle
philosophy, which, from the mechanical side, interprets
the "natural" as meaning the unmoral, and "natural
consequences" as something detached entirely fro"'
religion and ethics. The Divine presence deepens
personal responsibility, alike in public market and in
private prayer. 7or "the wish to be in harmony with
God" says Royce, "is the ultimate motive that Jesus

gave to men for doing right." (1)
Soul culture is by natural .law; and life ^icong
men is the wide-open field for its development . Emanci-
pation from all mechanical necessity, through the
Divine presence, does not mean tha + ail Ls Divine and
therefore equally good. The trite immanence of God, in-
stead of removing moral distinctions, indefinitely
accentuates them. We can not say that, because God is
in all, all must, therefore, have Hie approval. Hot
all that is, is right. It is true that, by the Divine
permission, evil is in the .vorld; and also that tfe can
turn the anger of men into notes of praise, neverthe-
less, toward all moral evil, God is forever a con-
suming fire.
The metaphysical immanence of God does not imply
Kis moral indifference, but rather trie opposite. """he
sinner, no less than the saint, has his being in the
omnipresent One; and the consequences of evil, as yell
as of the good, are no doubt perfectly "natural". Yet,
by 4 his fact, both are vastly intensified. Nothing
could ma'<e evil more tragically terrible, than that it
should be mediated by law.
By our vie.v, in natural consequences, through
(1) "The religious Aspects of Philosophy, " 1. 41.
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natural law, the Divine attitude and vil are revealed p
The natural is no refuse from the Supernatural.lt is
just here, in our vie;/ of the Divine immanance, that
we meet God face to fu.ce. Evil appears in its infin -
Italy forbidding and terrifying aspect, in its natura 1
consequences upon the soul, bending it toward willful
>
yet ultimately, inevitable self-destruction. "WhatSO
ever a man sows, that sha" 1 he also reap," is the most
4 err if ic of truths. Thus, through the Divine presence,
the ethical is magnified and wwte supreme. In this way
the soul is emancipated from moral drugery, and lifted
into a sublime partnership with the Divine. Only as
related to the spiritual, do signs and wonders have
meaning or significance. By their relation to practi
cal conauct alone, can psychological conditions prove
themselves religious. As the bodies of men are the
instrumen be of Bis righteousness, do they become the
"temples of God". "By their fruits", will ever be the
measure ox* soul development.
This brings us to a final wurd as t
o
'bearing of tlae
doctrine of the Divine presence, involved in the ideal-
ity of space and time, upon our thought of human pro-
gress in general. This uoctrine of immanence reaches
i
I
beyonu the individual, into ever,/ relation in life.
It spiritualises and magnifies all our activities, and
gives to human progress a ne^v meaning and fuse in *t ion.
A rational enlistment of the soul as a co-worker with
Clod, lends to a fuller knowledge of Mis ethical pur-
pose for the world, and to an earnest endeavor to re-
alize the same among men. Good aspirations are trans
-
formed into still better activities. Through a truer
conception of religion, the sacred is no longer divorced
from the secular. Prayer, as the source of power, now
becomes the impelling force in public service. The
whole worla of human experience becomes the field of
religious activity; and social srvice takes the place
of monastic seclusion.
Progress in human affairs ,yill turn upon the
measure with which the so-called natural is mads the
conscious medium for the supernatural • We pome, fin-
ally to realize that we live in God'S own world, which
is also Kis home; and that where Ee is Hastar, men are
free. The yruyer of faith, purity of heart, and the
life of devotion to men, make up true and undefiled
religion.
According to our view of God, the recognition od

His presence, in evry department of life, becomea the
supreme fact. Through the individual soul, the Divine
Spirit is to manifest Himself. Every psychological ppw
is u 3acred trust to be dedicated to the "/elfare of
the race. All intellectual achievements ana learning,
all emotional energies and^atural sympathies, all vo-
litional determinations and far -reaching plans, all
aesthetic taste and the productions of art, with every
other resource of wind and heart, are to be consecrated
to the common good.
According to the old deist ic conception, God is
increasingly a vanishing quantity, nature is a blind
mechanism, and morally indifferent; while the common
order in life has no religious meaning. Religion is
therefore a distinct and separate matter, a by-product
of nature, and an affair quite detached from life-
certain things belong to religion, others, in con-
trast, belong to the world.
This is an irrational and distorted vie*, 'Hie
consciousness of the Divine presence makes sacred
every normal social relation. Religious duties can
not be limited to formal rites, having no relation to
life. Good will must be accompanied by good works.
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The perfect and abundant life is the ideal toward vhich
we 3hould work. Only through the social order of service
does man develop into his best self. Individual wel-
fare is inseparably linked with the general good. Self-
realization and self-preservation hinge upon fidelity
to every social relation.
Religion and morals exist, not in abstract terns,
but in concrete facts. All the: represents human int-
erests becomes the field of religious activity. All life
must be transfused with intelligence, morality, anu
ana : .< nti « . <
•
religion. The whole order of civilization must be
embraced in our plans of religious endeavor.
If we think of God as the source of this order,
and as present in its administration, the family and
home become His domestic hearth, the church would be
His sacred altar, the state is the executive of T "is
righteous will, and government the embodiment of ilis
personal rule among the nations. Every social form
will be regarded as a medium for nis concrete activity
in the spiritualizat ion and rao-cali/;at ion of this order;
and this is simply the manifest implication of the
present existence of our system. Since the Christian
is a co-worker with God, he is conoened in all phases
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of civilisation, which are to be so transformed that
in all things He shall have the preeminence.
Every language and all lit erature shall wing His
message of peace and good will, all culture "be made to
adorn %<t0 doctrine of truth and life, all inventions
and new discoveries sha"1 1 reveal the secrets of r is
power, all industry and commerce shall minister to
His temple of progress, all transportat ion and communi-
cation herald the wonders of His love, while all wealth
and wisdom and human conquest sha'l contribute to the
advancement of His kingdom.
We may not know the order of the Divine program,
which as to times and seasons, the Father has wisely
retained in His own counsels, ;|7ut we may believe that
when \he millennial glory shall be ushered in, the
present instruments of civilisation will not be elim-
inated, but more fully consecrated to the service of
mankind. Surrounded as we are by unsolved mystery,
in the midst of the pre sen 4 world, we may say that
the best thing about it is that, by the good will and
generous activity of men, it -an be made vastly better,
until it becomes more truly the home of the Jihvine,
and a universal blessing to men.
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"I dream of a time when humanity shal 1 come to
its own, when physical nature shall be subdued to
human service beyond all present, conception, when want
and disease shall have disappeared, when the social order
shall be an expression of perfect justice, when
race shall be rich enough to afford all its members
the opportunity of a truly human existence, when the
bondage of physical drugery shall have been taken off
from human shoulders, when the treasures of knowledge
shall be a universal possession, and when over against
these external conditions there shall be a moral spirit
wise enough to use them and strong enough to control
them. Then the kingdom of man and of God will have
come. And to turn this dream into a reality is the
Christian program, the true meaning of prayer, so often u + te*ect
and so seldom understood "Thy kingdom come; Thy will
be done in earth, as it is in heaven."
Sometime, somewhere, this dream is to be realized.
Just when, or where, or how, is of secondary importance
to the oertainity of its fulfillment. If "G-od la not
mocked", neither will Ke mock the children of men.
Aspirations and hopes, implanted by Him in the human
soul are no delusion. Their cosummation in concrete
Bowne's "studies in Christianity," p. 32o.
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fact only waits the father's pleasure and purpose.
All true learning in science and philosophy unites
in giving wings to the prophesies of love and faith
and hope that spring eternal in the human "breast.
Idealistic theism gives us the immediate jjresence of
our father, and with Him the assurance of the ultimate
solution of all our problems. 5y Kim "'he universe has
been so constructed as to serve the highest welfare
of all men; and the individual "mansions" in this
our father's "house", attest His personal care.
His love is stronger than death; and in His pres-
ence all fetters fall from human hands. By this divine
immanence, the universe becomes intensely rational; and
the world-order full of meaning an<i great with the
promise of life, and of final triumph. Whether the
consummation be near, or, far, the world's best think-
ing is rapidly tending toward this spiritual, sane,
and optimistic idealism.
As science becomes freed from fruitless specula-
tion, and is content in doing its invaluable and le-
gitimate work in finding and recording the facts of the
universe; as metaphysics becomes emancipated from the
fear of the "intimidating phantoms" of space and time,

unci transcends the obsessions of u materialist ic phil-
osophy j as theology provides us with a worthy concep-
tion of? God, who is intelligent personal and untrammel-
ea in His purposes by notions of a sense-bound, blind,
and fatalistic mechanism; and as religion hel^.s us to
the consciousness of an immanent, active, arid benefic-
:ent father, - just to that degree are ire advancing
toward the conditions which will speedily make possible
the dream of the ages - a new heaven ar.c. a new earth
wherein dwell eth righteousness - and make actual the
longing of every human heart, to be like Him and see
Him as He is. Then will philosophy, religion, and
Revelation unite in saying "Eehold the tabernacle of
God is with men, and He will dwell with them, and they
shall be His people, and God Himself shall be with
them, and be their God."
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